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The theoretical and empirical study of auctions is of importance to economists as it 
provides unique insights into the behaviors and decision-making processes involved in 
the setting of prices that are otherwise unobserved in traditional fixed price sales. The 
papers in this dissertation look at observed outcomes from real world auctions and 
draw inferences as to the underlying economic behavior.  
 
The first paper examines the practice of auctioneers “fishing” for an opening bid by 
calling out lower and lower amounts until an opening bid is eventually proffered.  I 
incorporate such a tactic into an auctioneer’s strategy set within a game-theoretic 
model in which an indivisible good is sold via English ascending-price auction by a 
seller or auctioneer that cannot commit to a predetermined sequence of starting prices 
in advance. The analysis departs from previous literature by showing that the English 
auction is not strategically equivalent to the second-price auction within the dynamic 
setting.  This difference has implications for the optimal starting price path, giving rise 
to an initial starting price consistent with the Coase conjecture. Additional price 
dynamics resembling “auction fever” are rationalized within this rational framework.  
 
In the second paper, I, along with a co-author, investigate theories of non-standard 
preferences and irrational bidding that have been used to explain the behavior of 
bidders in auctions online. We test these theories using data from a field experiment 
  
 
that we ran on eBay and supplemented with an observational dataset we collected 
from eBay. We find little evidence that several of these behavioral mechanisms are 
important in the field, and instead find behavior consistent with a standard rational 
model. 
The third paper examines the practice of shill bidding, whereby a seller in an online 
auction bids on his own item. To incorporate shill bidding into a seller’s strategy set, I 
model the sale of a common value item via auction where some proportion of potential 
buyers have superior information and some proportion of potential sellers participate 
in the market only for the purpose of fraudulent selling. The model establishes the 
conditions under which shill bidding is supported in equilibrium. 
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CHAPTER 1
SEQUENTIAL ENGLISH AUCTIONS
1 Introduction
In his 1967 survey of all things auction, Cassady describes the sale of a range of items
from livestock to antiques in which the auctioneer goes shing for an opening bid. The
auctioneer begins the proceedings by soliciting bids from the set of buyers at some
announced opening bid. If a bid is proffered, the auction proceeds as in typical English
ascending-price fashionsoliciting higher and higher bids until the item is hammered
down with a gavel. But should the auctioneer fail to nd a bidder, the opening bid is
reduced and a second attempt is made. This process continues until an opening bid is
arrived at which eventually gets the bidding started. Cassady points out a paradoxical
outcome of this process: once an opening bid is proffered and the bidding gets under
way, it is not uncommon for the bidding to progress beyond the amount of the original
opening bid.1
It is surprising, given the breadth of the literature on optimal auctions, that the tactic
of opening bid shing has not received more attention. Further, the outcome in which
the end price exceeds the amount of the initial starting price is paradoxical in light of
existing results. To explain this paradoxical outcome, I model the sale of a single item
to a set of buyers in which the seller (or auctioneer whose incentives are aligned with
those of the seller) runs an English ascending-price auction (APA) with an announced
starting price, in each period of an innite-horizon game. The model considered herein
is identical to that of McAfee and Vincent (1997) (M&V) except that in M&V, the
sales mechanism is a sealed-bid second-price auction (SPA) as opposed to an APA.
1Cassady (1967), pages 57, 105, and 113.
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This distinction is interesting from an auction-theory standpoint due to the well known
equivalence between the APA and the SPA in static settings.2 Formally, if buyers' valu-
ations are independent of one another, then the amount a buyer would choose to bid in
a SPA is the same price at which he would drop out in an APA. As a consequence, the
seller's optimal reserve price in a SPA is also her optimal starting price in an APA and
the two auction formats are revenue equivalent. Within the dynamic framework consid-
ered here, the two formats are no longer strategically equivalent. They are, as it turns
out, still revenue equivalent.
To understand how the strategic equivalence between auction formats fails, we begin
by considering the model in M&V. M&V wed the literature on optimal auctions to the
literature on sequential bargaining with one-sided incomplete information.3 As in the
optimal auctions literature, a seller of a single item faces a set of buyers, each with
unit demands. Buyers have private information over their own valuations, referred to as
their type; while the valuations of others are unknown, assumed to be independent and
identically distributed. As in the sequential bargaining literature, the horizon is innite
and buyers are long-lived. In each period, the seller may run a SPA with an announced
reserve price. The seller cannot commit to a predetermined reserve-price path, nor can
she commit to keep the item off the market. Therefore, if the auction in a given period
fails to produce a sale, she relists in the following period, and continues to run successive
auctions until a sale is eventually transacted.
The equilibrium of the game is characterized by a marginal type in each period such
that all buyers whose valuations exceed the marginal type, or screening level, bid their
valuations. In this way, if the item fails to sell, the seller infers that all types are below
the screening level and reduces the reserve price in the following period accordingly.
2See Vickrey (1961).
3See Meyerson (1981) and Riley and Samuelson (1981) on optimal auctions. Gul, Sonnenschein, and
Wilson (1986), Fudenberg, Levine, and Tirole (1985), and Sobel and Takahashi (1983) model sequential
bargaining with one-sided incomplete information.
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The screening level is determined to be the type indifferent between taking the item off
the market in the current period and waiting one additional periodwhere the reserve
will be reducedbefore bidding.
Now consider the APA version of the sequential auction game. In the typical English
auction, an auctioneer announces the starting price and calls for bids. Say the starting
price was determined to be $100, the auction might very well begin with the auctioneer
announcing, One hundred dollars. Do I hear one hundred? If a bid is proffered, the
price is raised by some increment and the auctioneer calls out for further bids. In the
context of our example, the auctioneer might say, We have one hundred dollars. Do
I hear one twenty? The bidding continues in this manner until the auctioneer reaches
a price at which no buyers wish to continue bidding. But, if no bid is proffered at the
starting price, we assume, as in M&V, that the item is relisted at some point in the future
which we model as the subsequent period. The auction described by Cassady is a special
case of this setting, one in which the time between periods is innitesimally short. In
that case, the auctioneer, upon failing to nd any takers at $100, immediately retreats to
$80, say, and announces, Eighty dollars. Do I hear eighty?
Analogous to the sequential SPA game, the sequential APA game is characterized
by a marginal type in each period indifferent as to whether or not to bid at the starting
price. Consider then a buyer in the APA game who had planned to wait for a future
period before placing a bid. Once a bid is placed (by some other buyer) at the starting
price, the value of waiting vanishes as the item will be gone before the next period
arrives. Under these circumstances, such a buyer can do no better than to bid up to
his valuation in the current period. Such retaliatory bidding raises the price paid by
the initial bidder above what he would have paid were the sales mechanism a SPA. As
a result, the decision to bid at the starting price is more costly in the APA game, all
else equal, knowing that doing so invites bids from those who would have otherwise
abstained. Thus, the marginal bidder type in the SPA game prefers not to bid at the
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starting price in the APA game. This logic assumes that the sequence of starting prices
and screening levels in the APA game are equivalent to the sequence of reserve prices
and screening levels in the SPA game in all periods but the one in question, so that the
only difference between the APA game and SPA games is the retaliatory bidding.
The seller's strategy consists of choosing a starting price in each period giving rise
to the desired screening level. In the APA version of the game, the screening level
determines the set of buyers willing to bid at the starting price. These are the buyers
who nd it protable to bid without knowing whether others intend to do so. By the
logic of the previous paragraph, the retaliatory bidding by those who bid only after the
starting price is met makes the decision to place the initial bid more costly. As such,
the seller must reduce the starting price from what it would have been in a SPA if she
intends to induce bids by the same types.
I show that the seller in the APA game chooses a sequence of starting prices that
induces the identical sequence of screening levels as in the SPA game. This result gives
rise to the revenue equivalence of the two auction formats. However, the sequence
of starting prices in the APA game is shown to be no greater, term by term, than the
sequence of reserve prices in the SPA game. In any game lasting longer than one period,
the starting price in a given period is strictly less than the analogous reserve price in all
periods but the last.
The resulting difference between a starting price in an APA and the analogous re-
serve price in a SPA has interesting implications regarding the Coase conjecture. Coase
(1972) considered a durable good monopolist who could not commit to restricting sales
in a given period. He famously conjectured that as the time between periods becomes
very small, the price in the initial period should converge to the seller's marginal cost.
Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson (1986) went on to prove the Coase conjecture and in
doing so pointed out a mathematical equivalence between durable good monopoly and
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sequential bargaining with one-sided incomplete information models.4 Restated in the
terminology of the sequential bargaining literature, the Coase conjecture states that as
the time between periods becomes very small, the seller's initial offer converges to the
minimum valuation type.5
M&V proved a corollary of the Coase conjecture (Theorem 3) by showing that as
the discount factor approaches unity, the seller's revenue approaches that of a seller who
auctions the item without a reserve price in the initial period. I refer to this result as
a corollary as Coase's actual prediction was about prices, with the effect on revenue
a natural consequence.6 In fact, M&V show (Corollary 3) that in the sequential SPA
game, the seller's initial reserve price is bounded away from the minimum type. But
in the sequential APA game, as the discount factor approaches unity, the seller's initial
starting price converges to the minimum valuation type, thereby extending the Coase
conjecture to the sequential auction setting.
Returning to Cassady's account of opening-bid shing, Cassady appears to be de-
scribing the sequential APA process with a very short time to relisting. This makes the
sequential APA model appropriate for studying such behavior and the resulting price
dynamics. The price dynamic in which an auction started at S, say, fails to sell while
a subsequent auction started at a lower price ends with a price in excess of S; while
seemingly paradoxical, is in fact a natural consequence of the sequential process.
The explanation I provide follows directly from the description given by Cassady.
That is, if no bids are received at the initial starting price, the starting price is reduced
until a bid is received. Anticipating such behavior, rational consumers may wish to hold
off bidding in the current auction and instead wait for the subsequent auction where the
4See Waldman (2003) for a survey of durable goods theory.
5In fact, the result states that the seller's initial offer converges to the greater of the seller's valuation
and the minimum buyer valuation type. However, when the seller's valuation exceeds the minimum buyer
valuation type, the no gap case, there may be other equilibria that do not give rise to this convergence
result.
6See Coase (1972) pg. 143 for his famous twinkling of an eye argument.
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item can be obtained at a lower price. For instance, a buyer with a valuation of S, say,
gains nothing by winning an auction started at S. But should the item go unsold in
the initial auction, he earns positive expected surplus in the following period when the
starting price is reduced. Thus, buyers whose valuations just exceed S hold off bidding
in the auction started at S but bid up to their valuations when the item is subsequently
relisted with a lower starting price.
The preceding argument shows that the price dynamics described by Cassady is a
possible outcome. I propose to go further and show that it is in fact the likely outcome.
Toward that end, I ask whether an auction started at some price below S is more likely
to end above S; conditional upon having failed in a previous auction with a starting
price of S; than the initial auction with a starting price of S. Since this condition is
stronger than the mere possibility of such an outcome, I distinguish between strong
and weak start-price end-price gaps. For a given S; the weak start-price end-price gap
necessarily holds while the strong start-price end-price gap holds only under certain
parameterizations of the model. However, I show that in equilibrium the starting prices
chosen in the sequential APA game are such that the strong start-price end-price gap
results when the discount factor is close to unity i.e. when the time between auctions is
quite short. This result does not extend to the sequential SPA game.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic sequential SPA
model considered by M&V then extends it to APAs. Section 3 characterizes the equi-
librium of the sequential APA game and proves the Coase Conjecture. For purposes of
comparison, Section 4 presents the solution to the analogous game in which the seller
can commit to a predetermined starting price path. Section 5 derives some economic im-
plications of the no-commitment model, focusing primarily on the start-price end-price
gap. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Sequential Auction Model
The following describes the sequential APA model, which is an extension of the model
analyzed by M&V.
Consider an auction marketplace consisting of a single seller and n  1 potential
buyers indexed i = 1; 2; :::; n. The seller has one unit of a particular item to sell. Buy-
ers are risk neutral, have unit demands, and differ only in their valuation of the item.
Each buyer's valuation, denoted v, is private information. Valuations are assumed to be
independent and identically distributed according to F , a continuous distribution with
density f; bounded between zero and innity, over the support [v; v], where v> 0. The
seller has no value for the item, is risk neutral, and offers the item for sale using an
optimal auction.7 Assume the seller's valuation, the distribution of buyer valuations F ,
and n are common knowledge.
The optimal auction literature maintains that under the given assumptions over buyer
valuations, all the of the well-known auction formats are revenue-equivalent in a one-
period setting.8 M&V consider two of these formats, the second-price auction and the
rst-price auction (FPA), within the dynamic setting described below. In both of these
formats, bids are submitted in sealed envelopes which are only opened after the bidding
has concluded. In either format, the seller's strategy consists of an announced reserve
price rt in every period t. M&V show that there exists an equilibrium of the sequential
FPA game that is revenue equivalent to the unique equilibrium of the SPA game and that
has the seller choosing the identical sequence of reserve prices. The probability of sale
in each period and the allocation of the item are also equivalent across formats.
In the current setting, we consider another one of the well-known auction formats,
the English ascending-price auction. Analogous to a reserve price in the sealed bid
7The seller's valuation need not be zero. However, it is important for the analysis that it be strictly less
than v: This is known as the gap case in the literature.
8See McAfee and McMillan (1987) or Milgrom (1989) for a survey on auction theory.
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formats, the seller chooses a starting price st 2 [0;1), which is the price at which
the bidding begins. Beginning with st, the auctioneer calls for bids. If a bid is placed,
the price is raised by an innitesimally small increment and bids are solicited from the
remaining buyers. The price continues to rise as further bids are placed until a price
is reached at which the bidding stops. The item then goes to the last buyer to have
submitted a bid at the price of his last bid.9 As such, a buyer pays the starting price only
when he is the only potential buyer to have entered a bid.
To incorporate the sequential nature of the game, consider an innite horizon with
periods indexed t = 1; 2; :::. In period 1, the seller runs an APA (SPA) with a starting
(reserve) price of s1 (r1). Beginning with s1, the auctioneer calls for bids. If a bid
is placed, the auction proceeds as described previously. If no bids are placed at s1, the
seller may run an APA in period 2. If the item fails to sell in period 2, the game continues
on to period 3 and so on. As the game advances from one period to the next, all buyers
and the seller discount returns accrued in the following period by factor  2 [0; 1), which
is common knowledge.
M&V show that the seller's objective function need not be concave to insure a unique
equilibrium. Such considerations complicate the analysis without adding to the eco-
nomic substance and so I make the following concavity assumption.
Assumption 1 For any v 2 [v; v], 2f (v) + vf 0 (v) > 0.
The model describes a sequence of APAs, where each period's auction gives a buyer
the opportunity to take the item off the market. Should a buyer choose to bid, the auction
necessarily results in a sale and the game ends at the conclusion of the bidding. In the
literature on optimal auctions, it is commonly assumed that a seller can commit herself
9Note that this model of the ascending-price auction differs from the button push auction of Milgrom
and Weber (1982) commonly used to model English auctions. The difference is that in the current model,
a buyer may enter the bidding after the bidding has started, which is more congruent with reality. Within
the sequential setting, the outcome of the button push auction is equivalent to the SPA.
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against future sales in the event the item goes unsold in the initial offering. Relaxing
this assumption has the seller continue to relist as a sale to the lowest valuation buyer is
always preferred to keeping the item. It is important to note that the current setup pre-
cludes the existence of reputational equilibria (Ausubel and Deneckere 1989), in which
the seller reduces the starting price at an arbitrarily slow rate, given our assumption that
v> 0.
The sequential APA game is shown to have multiple equilibria. All of the equilibria
are equivalent in revenue, in the probability of sale in each period, and in the allocation
of the item. Using the appropriate equilibrium selection criterion, we settle on a most
reasonable equilibrium of the APA game that is outcome equivalent to the SPA game.
However, the sequence of starting prices in this equilibrium is strictly lower than the
sequence of reserve prices in the sequential SPA game in all periods but the last.
3 Equilibrium of Sequential APA Game
The equilibrium concept is perfect-Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). I show that a contin-
uum of equilibria in symmetric strategies exists. The equilibria differ in small ways so
that the allocation of the item as well as the probability of sale and the seller's expected
revenue are equivalent. Any equilibrium is a history-contingent sequence of the seller's
starting prices st, buyers' bidding decisions, and updated beliefs about the valuations of
existing buyers satisfying the typical consistency conditions.
To state this formally, let H = fs1; s2; :::sg denote the history through period
 of a game that has not ended prior to period  . Since a bid placed in any period
t <  necessarily results in the game ending in that period, H consists only of the
seller's starting prices with the implicit assertion that no bids have been placed to that
point. A strategy for the seller is a starting price s , optimal given her beliefs over buyer
valuations. A strategy for each buyer consists of a decision of whether or not to bid
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in a given auction and if so how high to bid. I restrict attention to monotonic bidding
strategies, a requirement of an equilibrium in symmetric strategies.
The dynamic of the game is governed by a buyer's decision to bid at the starting
price, that is when it is not known if other buyers intend to bid in that period. Until
such a bid is placed, the history of the game consists of a sequence of starting prices
that failed to induce bids. That all changes when a buyer starts the bidding in a given
period, thus insuring that the item will sell and the game will end at the conclusion of the
bidding. For this reason, I distinguish between initial bidders; those willing to bid at the
starting price, and interim bidders, those who bid only after the bidding has begun. Note
that there can be more than one initial bidder since the distinction is a counter-factual,
determined by what the buyer would do if no other buyers had submitted a bid.
Lemma 1 The following characterize the equilibrium in any PBE:
1. An initial bidder, when not currently the high bidder, has a unique weakly domi-
nant strategy calling for him to continue the bidding at any price up to his valua-
tion.
2. In any period t, there exists a marginal type t, such that every buyer whose
valuation exceeds t; bids at the starting price.
3. Regardless of the history, all buyer types bid at the starting price when the starting
price is at or below v.
4. There exists a period T <1 , endogenously determined, such that the game ends
in at most T periods.
Part 1 of the lemma extends Vickrey's result to the sequential SPA. This strategy is
the unique symmetric strategy amongst initial bidders and so we assume initial bidders
follow this strategy in what follows. The strategy of interim bidders is as yet undeter-
mined.
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Part 2 of the lemma is the successive skimming property, establishing the Coasian
nature of the game. Analogous to the dual literatures on sequential bargaining and
durable good monopoly, a buyer bids at a given starting price only if the starting price,
st; is below some endogenously determined maximum. The type t  st is the lowest
valuation type for which st is below such a maximum. Since any buyer whose valuation
exceeds t necessarily bids in period t, it follows that if the item remains unsold after
period t, it must be that all valuations are below t. This makes for a simple updating
rule in which t becomes the highest type in period t+1, denoted ut+1. In what follows,
we refer to u as the state in period  . Further, this result proves that initial bidders have
higher valuations than interim bidders. Since the screening level, t, is decreasing over
time, any interim bidder in period t must not have had a valuation above t, otherwise
he would have been an initial bidder.
It should also be noted that the term screening level takes on a new meaning within
the sequential APA game. In the sequential SPA and FPA games, the screening level t
serves as both the minimum type to bid in period t as well as the value such that F (t)
n
is the probability that the item remains unsold following the period t auction. Only the
latter extends to the sequential APA game.
The rst two parts of the lemma combine to indicate that the allocation of the item
amongst buyers will be unaffected by the strategies of interim bidders since the item can
only be obtained by the buyer with the highest valuation. What the bidding of interim
bidders can do is raise the price above what it would have been in a SPA, conditional
upon a sale taking place in a given period. To see this, consider the bidding decision of
an interim buyer after the bidding has begun. The fact that he was not an initial bidder
indicates to him that he will ultimately lose the bidding and so has no reason to bid.
On the other hand, he has no reason not to bid as doing so is costless. This leads to
a mixed strategy whereby an interim buyer mixes between bidding and not bidding at
any possible price below his valuation. After proving an equivalence amongst all mixed
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strategy equilibria, I justify a selection criteria that has all such buyers bid up to their
respective valuations.
The result that the screening level eventually reaches v (result 4), whereby the game
necessarily ends (result 3), implies that the equilibrium can be derived via backward
induction. The number of periods required for the starting price to reach v is determined
endogenously, thus complicating the analysis as the number of periods to be inducted
upon has yet to be determined. The approach taken in the literature (Fudenberg, Levine,
and Tirole 1985; McAfee and Vincent 1997) has been to dene a game that is arbitrarily
constrained to end in a predetermined number of periods with a starting price of (or
no greater than) v. Analysis of the arbitrarily constrained game then provides insight
into how the number of periods is endogenously determined in the equilibrium of the
unconstrained game. In particular, we show that there exists a sequence of cutoff values
fztgTt=1, such that if the seller believes the highest buyer valuation to be in the interval
(zt 1; zt], she chooses a starting price that has the game end in t  1 additional periods.
The interested reader can refer to Appendix A.2 for the formal analysis.
For a given T so dened, the equilibrium is characterized by the following se-
quences,
ftgTt=0 , ftgTt=0 , f tgTt=0 , fgtgTt=0
dened as follows.
Let t (x) denote the starting price that induces a screening level of x in period t.
Since the type-x buyer wins the auction only upon being the lone initial bidder, t (x)
satises
[x  t (t (x) ; x)]FY1 (x) = 
 
t+1   t+1

FY1
 
t+1

+
Z x
t+1
FY1 (Y1) dY1
!
:
(1)
The left-hand side of the expression indicates a type-x buyer's expected surplus from
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bidding at starting price t (x), when he is the lowest type to be an initial bidder. His
expected payment under the circumstance is t (t (x) ; x). In a SPA, absent interim
bidders, his payment would be t. However, since a bid at the starting price induces bids
from those who otherwise would have waited for a subsequent period prior to bidding,
his payment goes up. The term t (t (x) ; x) denotes the expected maximum bid of all
interim bidders, given that such a bid is no greater than x. Since all interim bidders
are indifferent between not bidding and bidding at any price up to their valuations, the
determination of  is completely arbitrary. We assume in what follows that the function
 (; ), strictly increasing in both arguments, is known to all players and that each buyer,
when contemplating the decision of whether to bid at the start, uses the same calculation
of .10
The expression FY1 (x) denotes the probability that buyer type x is the lone initial
bidder. Using conventional notation, let Y1 denote the maximum of n   1 other buyer
valuations. Since the vi are independent, FY1 (x)  F (x)n 1.
The right-hand side of equation (1) gives a type-x buyer's expected continuation
surplus, given a starting price of t+1 and a screening level of t+1 in the period to
follow.11 In the following period, since x  t+1, he receives an amount given by the
rst term, where t+1  
 
t+1; t+1

; in the event that he is the lone initial buyer and
an amount given by the second term when he is bidding against at least one other initial
bidder.
Let gt (u; x) denote the seller's revenue from period t onward, in state u;when choos-
ing a starting price that induces a screening level of x. We have that
10The assumption that  is increasing in both arguments is satised in the SPA game (see M&V) and
is later shown to be satised in the rened equilibrium of the APA game. The assumption that all buyers
believe  to be the expected payment to the marginal bidder type is no more restrictive than assuming
common beliefs.
11More precisely, the right-hand side of (1) gives the expected surplus to the indifferent type uncondi-
tional on the following period being reached. As such, the expression can be read as the expected surplus,
conditional on the following period being reached, multiplied by the probability that the following period
is reached, FY1 (x). Since the conditional expectation has as the denominator FY1 (x), the FY1 (x) terms
cancel.
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gt (u; x) = n (t (x) ; x)FY1 (x) [F (u)  F (x)] + n
Z u
x
Z X1
x
Y1dFY1f (X1) dX1
+ t+1 (x) :
The rst term represents the seller's revenue in the immediate period from having only
one initial buyer and the second from having at least two. The third term represents her
maximum discounted return from the following period on, at state x, in the event the
current auction fails to produce a sale.
The seller's problem in period t can be thought of as choosing x to maximize the
discounted sum of expected revenue from the current period on. In that case, we have
that
 t (u) = max
xu
gt (u; x) :
The seller's optimal screening level in period t, t, maximizes gt (u; x). Formally,
t = argmax
xu
fgt (u; x)g :
The equilibrium is unique for a given function . As mentioned earlier, the deter-
mination of  is completely arbitrary. As such any function that outputs a value over a
continuum from the starting price to the maximum of Y1 < t can be part of an equilib-
rium. Thus, we have a continuum of equilibria which are characterized by the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 A PBE of the sequential APA game consists of a sequence of screening
levels ftgTt=1 and corresponding starting prices fstgTt=1 such that:
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1. In any period t, t =  (ut) is chosen to satisfy
tf (t) + F (t)  F (ut)  0;
with a strict equality when t > v. The choice of t depends only on ut and the
density f , independent of , n, and .
2. The period-t starting price st =  (t) satises equation (1) and induces a screen-
ing level of t for a given .
3. The allocation of the item, the seller's revenue, and the probability of sale in a
given period are independent of .
The result that the seller's revenue is independent of  would seem unintuitive since
a higher value of  translates to a higher expected payment for a buyer in a given period,
holding constant the seller's starting price. However, the seller takes  into account when
selecting the starting price, ultimately selecting a starting price such that the screening
level is invariant to . Since  ( (t) ; t) equal to  (t) is a special case of our model,
the sequential SPAmechanism is revenue-equivalent to any equilibrium of the sequential
APA game.
Analysis of the stationary problem dened by Lemma 1 shows that the seller's prob-
lem in a given state is solved by a choice of t that depends only on the present state and
on the distribution of valuations. It then follows from the buyers' sequential rationality
condition, equation (1) ; that there is a unique ta function of  and n in each period
that makes a type t buyer indifferent between bidding at the starting price and waiting
for the following period. Having determined t, the starting price is some value of st
giving rise to t:
The indeterminacy of the equilibrium starting-price path can be broken with the ap-
propriate equilibrium selection criteria. In fact, we reduce the multiplicity of equilibria
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to a single point by considering the appropriately perturbed version of the game. The
perturbed game we consider is one in which, in a given auction, every possible move
is played by each buyer with positive probability.12 For any price in [st; v] called out
by the auctioneer, each buyer bids with some probability and does not bid with positive
probability. The limits of equilibria of such perturbed games as the tremble probabilities
go to zero are extensive-form trembling-hand-perfect equilibria (ETE).13
Lemma 2 There exists a unique ETE of the sequential APA game. In the ETE, each
interim buyer bids up to his valuation with probability 1:
Since the equilibrium characterized by Lemma 2 is the only one to meet our selection
criteria, we assume such behavior in our further discussion of the APA. Therefore, in
the APA, the expected payment made by a lone initial bidder is
 (st; t) = E [max fst; Y1g jY1 < t]
= t  
R t
st
FY1(Y1)dY1
FY1 (t)
: (2)
Perhaps the most profound difference between the sequential SPA model of M&V
and the APA considered herein, is in the derivation of the Coase conjecture. It was
mentioned in the introduction, that in the SPA, even as  ! 1, the seller's initial starting
price is bounded above v: In the APA, when buyers' bidding is consistent with Lemma
2, the starting price required to induce a given screening level is below that of a SPA and
is not bounded away from v.
12Trembles by the seller are uninteresting, since the starting price is known to all buyers before the
auction begins.
13The ETE is an extension, due to Selten (1983), of the trembling-hand-perfect equilibrium concept of
Selten (1975). A trembling-hand perfect equilibrium is one that takes the possibility of off-the-equilibrium
play into account by assuming that the players, through a tremble, may choose unintended strategies,
albeit with negligible probability. When extending this concept to extensive-form games, the modeler
may choose to interpret a tremble as a mistake in a player's choice of action at a particular information set
or as a mistake in a player's entire strategy choice. The ETE concept employs the former interpretation.
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Proposition 2 In the ETE of the sequential APA game, for every " > 0, there exists a
 < 1 such that for all   , and for any initial screening level, 1 =  (v) 2 [v; v],
the seller's initial starting price,  (1), is less than v+".
It is straightforward to see why the APA emits a Coase conjecture while the SPA
does not. In either model, the seller's optimal initial screening level, 1, is equal to the
optimal reserve in a one-shot auction, independent of . The seller is then charged with
the task of choosing a starting price to induce a screening level of 1: In the limit as 
approaches unity, this gives rise to the following equality:
lim
!1
(1   1)FY1 (1) =
Z 1
v
FY1 (Y1) dY1;
where 1 =  ( (1) ; 1) : In the ETE of the APA, 1 is given by (2) : Substituting this
value of 1 into the above yields
lim
!1
Z 1
(1)
FY1(Y1)dY1 =
Z 1
v
FY1 (Y1) dY1:
The only way for this equality to hold is for  (1) to be equal to v in the limit. Con-
versely, in the SPA 1 =  (1) ; so the limiting equality becomes
lim
!1
[1    (1)]FY1 (1) =
Z 1
v
FY1 (Y1) dY1:
It is evident that for this equality to hold in the limit,  (1) must strictly exceed v for
any 1 >v.14
The intuition is that the seller must guarantee the type-1 buyer a reservation level
14The right-hand side of the equality is the area under the FY1 curve over the domain [v; 1]. The
left-hand side of the equality is a rectangle with height FY1 (1) and base 1    (1). Since FY1 is
weakly increasing, if  (1) were to be equal to v, then the area under the curve would lie entirely inside
the rectangle so the equality fails. Thus, the value of  (1) must be sufciently above v to bring about
an equality.
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surplus to induce him to bid in the initial auction. For  close to unity, the buyer is
sufciently patient that his reservation surplus is close to the surplus he would otherwise
have gotten in the last period of the game, a one-shot auction with a starting price of v. In
the SPA, the seller screens out types in the interval [s1; 1) with a binding reserve price
of s1. Thus the type-1 buyer pays s1 for realizations of Y1 in [s1; 1). By choosing
a sufciently small s1, the seller can make bidding in the initial period protable for
the type-1. But in the APA, the seller cannot screen out buyer types in the interval
between the starting price and 1 since interim bidders are free to enter the bidding after
the opening bid. Thus the type-1 buyer pays Y1 > s1 for realizations of Y1 in [s1; 1).
Under those circumstances, the surplus earned by the type-1 buyer is equal to that of
a one-shot auction with starting price s1. A buyer comparing the surplus from a one-
shot auction with starting price s1 to that of a one-shot auction with starting price v will
choose the former only if s1 = v: Thus the only way the seller can guarantee the type-1
buyer his reservation surplus is by running an auction with a starting price close to v,
where v is the starting price in the last period of the game.
4 Commitment Solution
As a means of comparison, consider what happens when a seller can commit to a given
starting price or more generally to a sequence of starting prices. The purpose behind
this analysis is to show that a seller with commitment power limits sales to a take-it-or-
leave-it offer so that a seller would not sh for an opening bid.
Denition 1 A commitment equilibrium is a sequence of T^ starting price offers s1; :::; sT^
that maximize the seller's expected revenue, assuming buyers make their bidding deci-
sions to maximize expected surplus while taking fstgT^t=1 as given.
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The commitment solution requires the seller to choose T^ optimally along with the
sequence of starting prices. It would seem straightforward that a seller would want to
allow T^ > 1 and commit to a declining reserve-price plan. This way, she can hope to
capture a sale in a future period should the item fail to sell in the initial period. However,
the declining path creates an incentive, however small, for buyers whose valuations
exceed the initial starting price to delay bidding. This incentive reduces bidding and
consequently expected revenue in the initial period. As in the literature on sequential
bargaining (Sobel and Takahashi 1983), when buyers are at least as patient as the seller,
the cost to the seller in terms of lost revenue in the initial period is at least as great as
the future stream of revenue from following a declining path.
Proposition 3 In the commitment equilibrium of the sequential APA and SPA games,
the seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer, which is an offer to participate in an auction
with starting price s; and the game takes place over a single period. The optimal
starting price s maximizes the seller's revenue in a one-shot auction, satisfying:
sf (s) + F (s)  1 = 0:
Taking the seller's strategy as given, buyers have the following (weakly) dominant strat-
egy: at any price p  s, bid if p  v; do not bid otherwise.
That the seller limits sales to a single period extends the analogous result of Sobel
and Takahashi (1983) from sequential bargaining to sequential auctions. Similar re-
sults hold in the literature on intertemporal price discrimination (Stokey 1979) and with
respect to discrimination along the dimension of quality (Johnson and Myatt 2003).
Two things become evident from the equilibrium characterization. First, since sales
are limited to a single period, the strategic equivalence between the APA and the SPA
from static settings extends to the current setting. Second, the seller (or an auctioneer
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whose incentives are aligned with those of the seller) does not sh for an opening bid.
By limiting sales to a single period, the seller mimics the optimal auction prescribed by
Meyerson (1981) and Riley and Samuelson (1981).
5 Price Dynamics
The introduction described the (weak) start-price end-price gap, which appears to result
from the sale of a single item via a sequence of ascending-price auctions. Cassady ex-
plained that after failing to generate any bids in the initial auction, upon lowering the
starting price, the seller is able to generate bidding that escalates beyond the amount of
the initial starting price. The weak start-price end-price gap states that this is a possible
outcome. The strong start-price end-price gap is a probabilistic statement that the sub-
sequent auction is actually more likely to end with a price at least as high as the initial
starting price than is the initial auction. In this section, I show how both versions of the
start-price end-price gap can result in the equilibrium of the sequential APA game. This
result is compared to the sequential SPA game in which only the weak version results.
Before proceeding, it is useful to formalize the concept of a start-price end-price
gap. The weak version looks at the possibility of an auction ending above some price S
after an earlier auction with a starting price of S failed to result in a sale.
Denition 2 Dene the random variable pt as the end price in the period-t auction,
assuming equilibrium behavior. Let t denote an indicator function taking a value of 1
if the period-t auction fails to induce a sale, 0 if it does. We say that a weak start-price
end-price gap results if there exist values t and t+  ,   1, such that for S >v,
P

pt+  SjS = st; t+ 1 = 1
	
> 0:
The denition of a strong start-price end-price gap compares the probability of sale
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in some period-t auction, with a starting price of S; against the probability that some
future period's auction ends with a price of at least S, conditional upon that period
being reached.
Denition 3 We say that a strong start-price end-price gap results if there exist values
t and t+  , such that for S >v,
P

pt+  SjS = st; t+ 1 = 1
	
> P fpt  SjS = stg :
It is clear from Denitions 2 and 3, that the strong start-price end-price gap implies
the weak, but the converse does not hold. Implicit in the denitions of 2 and 3 is that S,
the period t starting price, may be chosen exogenously, as a parameter in the analysis.
The behavior of bidders in period t and the behavior of all players in the  subsequent
periods is assumed to be in equilibrium.
5.1 Weak Start-Price End-Price Gap
In contrast to the commitment equilibrium, the seller shes for an opening bid in the
no-commitment equilibrium. Should the previous period's auction fail to induce a sale,
the starting price is reduced and the seller again calls for bids. Buyers condition their
behavior on the assumption that the seller will behave as such. As a consequence, buyers
must be guaranteed a certain reservation level surplus to be induced to bid in a given
period. This results in a screening level that strictly exceeds the starting price in any
period except the terminal period. As such, the fact that a previous auction failed to sell
with a starting price of S does not imply that the highest buyer valuation is below S.
What it means is that the highest valuation is below the screening level in that auction.
Since the screening level in an auction with a starting price of S strictly exceeds S, it
may still be possible for a subsequent auction to end in a price exceeding S. This logic
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is formalized in what follows.
The equilibrium of the no-commitment game consists of a deterministic sequence of
the seller's starting-price path fstgTt=1 along with a corresponding sequence of screening
levels ftgTt=1 such that a buyer bids at the opening bid in period t < T if his valuation
falls in the interval [t; t 1). Since a player with valuation t wins the period t auction
only when Y1 < t and thus pays t, t must satisfy:
(t   t)FY1 (t) = (t) : (3)
Equation (3) expresses indifference between the payoff from bidding in the current pe-
riod and the discounted continuation payoff to a type-t buyer were he to wait for the
following period. Since the seller, in equilibrium, would never run an auction that did
not induce any buyer types to bid, st+1 will be such that all types greater than t+1 < t
are initial bidders. It follows that the continuation payoff for a type-t buyer (multiplied
by the probability that the period-t state is reached) is
(t) =
8><>:
 
t+1   t+1

FY1
 
t+1

+
R t
t+1
FY1 (Y1) dY1 if t < T   1R t
v
FY1 (Y1) dY1 if t = T   1
: (4)
In order to apply the results of the following lemma to both the SPA and APA games,
we write the expected payment by a lone initial bidder as
 (st; t;)  (1  ) st + 
"
t  
R t
st
FY1(Y1)dY1
FY1 (t)
#
;  2 [0; 1] :
In this way, the extreme cases of  = 0 and  = 1 denote the expected payment by the
lone initial bidder in the SPA and APA respectively.
Equations (3) and (4) dene a function  (t;) such that the seller chooses a start-
ing price of  in order to induce a screening level of t when the expected payment
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by the lone bidder is  (; t;). In this section, our purpose is to examine a sequence
of starting prices used by a seller and make an inference about the probability of sale
or the probability of a given price being reached in a given period. For that reason,
let b (ut; st;n; ; ) =  (ut) denote the inverse of , representing the screening level
as a function of the starting price, satisfying (3) and (4) : The interpretation is that
if a starting price of s1 is employed in the initial auction, the probability of sale is
1  F (b (v; s1; ))n.
It is important to note that equations (3) and (4) hold even when the current starting
price, st, is off of the equilibrium path. Since there is nothing unknown about the seller's
payoff, deviations from the equilibrium path are uninformative to buyers and can thus be
interpreted as random errors. Assuming that the seller follows the equilibrium path from
period t + 1 onward, b (ut; st;n; ; ) is the marginal consumer type in period t. This
type is indifferent between bidding in the current period and waiting for the following
period where the seller optimally chooses st+1 given that the highest possible type in
period t+ 1 is b (ut; st;n; ; ).15
Whether on or off the equilibrium path, the function b () has some interesting eco-
nomic properties that are laid out in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Following any history of the game, the screening level in the current period,
t = b (ut; st;n; ; ) ; is:
1. Increasing in st;
2. Greater than st, strictly so for st >v;
3. Increasing in ;
4. Decreasing in n: lim
n!1
b (ut; st;n; ; ) = st;
15Since the equilibrium for the game itself was solved assuming a generic initial prior v, there exists an
equilibrium of the subgame with initial state t.
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5. Increasing in : lim
!0
b (ut; st;n; ; ) = st:
Property 1 says that the screening level is increasing in the starting price. This
property is fairly trivial as it holds in the one-shot auction where the starting price and
screening level are equal. More interestingly, property 2 says that there exists a gap
between the starting price and the screening level for any starting price greater than v.
This is the result that allows for the price to exceed st in a subsequent auction after the
auction started at st fails to result in a sale. To see this, suppose that after failing to sell
the item at st, the seller reduces the starting price in such a way that t+1 is the screening
level in the following period. We know that t+1 < t. Thus, if the two highest buyer
valuations are between max

t+1; st
	
and t, then the following period's auction ends
with a price exceeding st while the auction started at st fails to generate a sale.
The preceding argument applies equally to the SPA as well as the APA indicating
that the weak start-price end-price gap results in either format.
Proposition 4 In either the sequential APA or sequential SPA games in which T > 1,
there exists a  > 1 such that for any    and for any S >v,
P

pt+ > SjS = st; t+ 1 = 1
	
> 0:
Proposition 4 says that if we consider any period t < T in which the period-t auction
fails to induce a sale, the following period's auction may end in a price of at least S with
positive probability. In fact, any subsequent period's auction, say period t +  , may
end in a price of at least S as long as t+ 1 exceeds S: It follows then that  is the
highest value of  such that t+ 1 exceeds S. In what follows, I show that along the
equilibrium path, Cassady's outcome is in fact more likely to occur in the APA than in
the SPA game. The result is due in large part to property 3 which shows that for a given
starting price, the screening level is higher in the APA than in the SPA. Conversely, for
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a given screening level, the equilibrium starting price in an APA is below that of the
equilibrium reserve price in a SPA. The reduced equilibrium starting price in the APA,
in essence, lowers the threshold that must be met for the strong start-price end-price gap
to occur. Fixing the sequence of screening levels, the initial starting price in the APA
game is more likely to be reached in some subsequent period than is the initial reserve
in the SPA game. This logic is formalized in the following subsection.
Before proceeding, we note how the number of bidders and the common discount
factor affect the equilibrium starting price path. Proposition 1 showed that the equi-
librium sequence of screening levels is chosen independent of n and independent of .
Property 4 of Lemma 3 shows that in each period, the starting price required to induce
the chosen screening level is higher with more buyers. Having more buyers in the auc-
tion increases competition for the item and reduces the reservation level surplus of a
given buyer type. Thus the magnitude of the current period's surplus required to induce
a given type to bid is reduced. As the number of buyers goes to innity, the reservation
level surplus goes to zero and so the starting price is chosen so as to give the indifferent
bidder type zero surplus in the current period. In this limit, the starting price path of the
APA game and the reserve price path of the SPA game each converge to the sequence of
screening levels.
Property 5 of Lemma 3 shows that in each period, the higher is the discount factor
the lower is the starting price required to induce the chosen screening level. As the
discount factor goes to unity, Proposition 2 showed that the starting price converges to
v. Conversely, for a given screening level, the lower is the discount factor the higher is
the starting price. A lower discount factor, interpreted as a greater time to the subsequent
relisting, reduces the reservation level surplus for each buyer type. Thus, the surplus in
the current period required to induce a given type to bid is reduced. As the discount
factor goes to zero, so does the reservation level surplus. Thus, the starting price is
set equal to the screening level, giving the indifferent buyer zero surplus. This result,
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consistent with the commitment solution, applies equally to the APA and SPA games.
In the commitment solution, since sales are limited to a single period, buyers behave as
though  = 0. As such, the starting price in the APA game is equivalent to the reserve
price in the SPA game.
5.2 Strong Start-Price End-Price Gap
Returning to the issue of the strong start-price end-price gap, we focus attention not
on some arbitrary starting price, S, but rather on equilibrium starting prices  (t;),
 2 f0; 1g. Denition 3 illustrates how the probability of reaching a price of  (t;)
differs across the two auction formats in question. LettingX1 andX2 denote the highest
and second-highest buyer valuations respectively, we have that
P fpt  SjS =  (t;)g = P fX1  tg : (5)
That is, the item sells in period t if the highest valuation exceeds the screening level,
which is the same in both the APA and the SPA games. However, once the item fails
to sell in period t, the probability that a subsequent auction reaches S differs across the
two auction formats. We have that for any   1;
P

pt+  SjS =  (t;) ; t+ 1 = 1
	
=
8><>: P

X2  S;X1  max

t+ ; S
	 jX1 < t+ 1	 in APA
P

X2  max

t+ ; S
	 jX1 < t+ 1	 in SPA : (6)
In equation (6), the discrepancy between the SPA and APA stems from the fact that in
the SPA, a buyer bids only when his valuation is above the screening level. But in the
APA, once a bid is placed, indicating that some buyer's valuation is above the screening
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level, then all buyers bid as long as the price is below their valuation. Thus for the APA
to reach some threshold S requires that the highest valuation exceed max

t+ ; S
	
,
while the second highest valuation exceeds S. But in the SPA, both the highest and
second-highest valuations must exceed max

t+ ; S
	
for this to occur.
We are interested in exploring the conditions under which the strong start-price end-
price gap results in the sequential APA and SPA games respectively. In doing so, it is
important to note that the sequence of starting prices used in the APA game differ from
the sequence of reserve prices used in the SPA game. In fact, they are lower, term by
term, in all periods but the terminal period. In the terminal period, the starting price in
the APA and the reserve price in the SPA are relevant only insomuch as each induces
a screening level of v.16 Suppose the period-t starting price in the APA game is S and
the period t reserve in the SPA game is R > S. The APA in period t +  ends with a
price at least S ifX1 > max

t+ ; S
	
andX2 > S. The SPA in period t+  ends with
a price at least R if both X1 and X2 exceed max

t+ ; R
	  maxt+ ; S	. We see
then that a strong start-price end-price gap occurs under a larger set of parameterizations
in the APA game because: 1. the APA induces bids from a larger set of bidder types;
and 2. the fact that the period-t starting price in the APA game is less than the period-t
reserve price in the SPA game, for t < T , makes a price of S easier to achieve than R in
some subsequent period.
To simplify notation in what follows, dene G (S; t; ) such that,
G (S; t; ) = P

pt+  SjS =  (t;) ; t+ 1 = 1
	 P fpt  SjS =  (t;)g ,
 2 f0; 1g
16Result 1 of Proposition 1 says that the sequence of screening levels is independent of . As such,
both the APA and SPA games end in the same number of periods. By Property 3 of Lemma 1, the starting
price or reserve price giving rise to a screening level of v in the terminal period can be no greater than v.
Thus the period T starting price in the APA game needn't be lower than the period T reserve price so
long as both are no greater than v.
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Following from Denition 3, we say that the strong start-price end-price gap results
in the sequential APA game if G1 (S; t; ) > 0; and in the sequential SPA game if
G0 (S; t; ) > 0: The expressions G1and G0 provide us with a shorthand to express the
relative probabilities contained in Denition 3.
The following result formalizes the argument that a start-price end-price gap neces-
sarily occurs in a larger class of parameterizations for the APA game.
Proposition 5 For any period t < T such that  (t; 1) and  (t; 0) are the period-t
starting and reserve prices in the sequential APA and SPA games respectively, and for
any   T   t; G1 ( (t; 1) ; t; ) > G0 ( (t; 0) ; t; ) :
Though showing that it occurs in a larger parameter space in the APA game, Propo-
sition 5 does not guarantee that a strong start-price end-price gap does, in fact, result.
For this, we require G1 (S; t; ) to be positive. In either format, a strong start-price end-
price gap becomes easier to achieve when the starting price in question, S, is lower. The
Coase conjecture (Proposition 2) showed that as the time to relist becomes short, the
sequence of starting prices in the APA game are such that they all lie within a neigh-
borhood of the lowest valuation type. Thus, while the probability of a sale in the initial
period is unaffected by , the fact that the initial starting price is decreasing in  makes
it more likely for that price to be reached in some subsequent period for  close to unity.
The following result shows that the strong start-price end-gap results in the sequen-
tial APA game when  = T   t:
Proposition 6 In the equilibrium of the sequential APA game, there exists some ~ < 1
such that for any   ~, and for any t < T , G1 ( (t; 1) ; t; T   t) > 0; regardless of
T , the number of periods required for the starting price to reach v.
The intuition for why the result holds for  = T   t; while not necessarily for
 < T t is as follows: Consider the probability that the auction in period t+1 achieves a
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price of S after the period-t auction failed to induce a sale. For S to be reached in period
t+1 requires the highest buyer valuation to be at leastmax

t+1; S
	
: For a large t+1,
the probability of sale and hence the probability of S being reached may still be low.
Recall that the sequence of screening levels is invariant to the discount factor. The same
reasoning extends to all subsequent periods but the terminal period. In the terminal
period, the screening level is equal to v so the probability of sale is equal to one. Thus,
if there exists a buyer with a valuation of at least S, and the item has remained unsold to
that point, the period-T auction will necessarily end with a price of at least S. And for
S close to v, the probability of there being a buyer with a valuation of at least S is close
to unity.
By Proposition 6, we should not be surprised to see the price dynamic described by
Cassady when the auctioneer lowers the start price in quick succession. This is because
when doing so, the initial starting price becomes quite small. As such, upon failing to
sell in the initial auction, and the T  2 subsequent auctions, the auction in period T will
necessarily end in a price of at least  (1; 1). Proposition 6 shows that the period T
auction is in fact more likely to end with a price of at least  (1; 1), conditional upon
having reached period T , than is the initial auction. The reasons for this are: 1. the
start-price end-price gap becomes easier to achieve when the initial starting price is
quite small; and 2. when the time to relist is very short, the seller chooses the initial
starting price sufciently small so that the start-price end-price gap results. This result
continues to hold when the period-1 starting price is replaced with period t starting
price for any t < T . This result needn't hold in the sequential SPA game as each non-
terminal period's reserve price, in general, is bounded above v even for  close to unity.
The difference in outcomes across auction formats is illustrated in the following
parametric example.
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5.2.1 Parametric Example
For the purposes of this example, let n = 2 and suppose that buyer valuations are drawn
from a uniform [a; 1 + a] distribution for a 2 (0; 1).
The equilibrium of the sequential auction game is derived as follows. At any state
u, the seller's choice of screening level satises the rst-order condition
f () + F ()  F (u)  0:
Since F (x) = x  a in this example, we have
 (u) =
8><>: u=2 if u  2aa otherwise : (7)
At any state u, the seller cuts the demand curve in half, serving the top half, until u be-
comes sufciently small so that u=2 falls below a, whereby the screening level becomes
a and all types are induced to bid.
The class of uniform [a; 1 + a] distributions makes for a useful example in that a
game of any duration can be constructed by the appropriate choice of a. For a  1, the
seller ends the game in one period with a starting price of a. As a ! 0, the number
of periods goes to innity. Of course, when a = 0, result 4 of Lemma 1 no longer
holds so the equilibrium characterized by equation (7) may no longer be unique. It
follows from equation (7) that the game can be constructed to last T periods by choosing
a 2  1
2T 1 ;
1
2T 1 1

:
We begin our examination of the strong start-price end-price gap with a two period
example, so that a 2 [1=3; 1). The sequence of screening levels in these games is
1+a
2
; a
	
and the period-2 starting/reserve price is a in either the APA or SPA game. In
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the APA game, the period-1 starting price, s1, satises
Z 1+a
2
s1
(y   a) dy = 
Z 1+a
2
a
(y   a) dy
so that
s1 = a+
1  a
2
p
1  :
Notice that as  ! 1, s1 goes to a; just as predicted by the Coase conjecture: The
sequence fs1;ag of starting prices gives rise to a strong start-price end-price gap if
G1 (s1; 1; 1) > 0; where,
G1 (s1; 1; 1) =
R 1
s1
R x1
s1
2dx2dx1R 1
a
2 (x  a) dx1
 
"
1 

1  a
2
2#
:
The result of Proposition 6 can be seen in this expression by setting s1 equal to a. The
term in front of the minus sign goes to 1 as s1 ! a, while the term after the minus sign
remains bounded below 1 for any a < 1.
Figure 1.1 shows how G1 (s1; 1; 1) varies with  for various values of a. Notice that
for all values of a, there exists a ~ (a) such that G1 (s1; 1; 1) is positive for all   ~ (a) :
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
Figure 1.1: G1 as a function of  for a 2 f1=3; 1=2; 2=3; 3=4g :
Now consider the SPA game within the same environment. As in the APA game, the
sequence of screening levels is

1+a
2
; a
	
and the period-2 reserve price is a. The only
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difference is that the period-1 reserve, r1; satises

1 + a
2
  r1

1 + a
2
  a

= 
Z 1+a
2
a
(y   a) dy;
so that
r1 =
1 + a
2
  1  a
4
:
Notice that as  ! 1, r1 goes to 3a+14 , strictly greater than a. The sequence fr1; ag of
reserve prices gives rise to a strong start-price end-price gap if G0 (r1; 1; 1) > 0, where
G0 (r1; 1; 1) =
R 1
r1
R x1
r1
2dx2dx1R 1
a
2 (x  a) dx
 
"
1 

1  a
2
2#
:
Figure 1.2 shows how G0 (r1; 1; 1) varies with  for various values of a. Notice that
for all values of a, G0 is negative for all values of  2 [0; 1):
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
-0.95
-0.85
-0.8
-0.75
-0.7
-0.65
Figure 1.2: G0 as a function of  for a 2 f1=3; 1=4; 1=2; 3=4g :
To show that the results derived from the two-period game extend to games of ar-
bitrary length, we consider the game in which a 2 [1=7; 1=3) so that the game lasts 3
periods: The three-period game consists of a sequence of screening levels

1+a
2
; 1+a
4
; a
	
:
The sequence of starting/reserve prices can be solved inductively beginning with the
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period-3 starting price of a: In the SPA version of the game, the period-1 reserve is
r1 =
1 + a
2
  
16 (1  a)

(3  5a) (1 + a) +  (1  3a)2 :
We then ask which auction is more likely to end with a price of at least r1, the auction
started at r1 or the auction started at a after having failed to sell at both r1 and r2? In
order for the auction in period 3 to end in a price exceeding r1, it must be the case that
the screening level in period 2 is at least as high as r1. If not, the fact that the period-2
auction failed to result in a sale implies that the highest buyer valuation is below r1.
Therefore, a necessary condition for the strong start-price end-price gap is 2 > r1.
Since the limiting value of r1 as  ! 1 is (3a+ 1) =4, we have that r1  (3a+ 1) =4:
We have that
2 = (1 + a) =4
< (3a+ 1) =4
 r1;
thus precluding the possibility of a strong start-price end-price gap within the SPA game.
This result can be extended to a game of any length. Since the seller uses the sta-
tionary strategy given by (7), we know that the screening level in the next-to-last period
of a k period game is

(k)
k 1 =
(1 + a)
2k 1
;
for a 2
h
1
2k 1 ;
1
2k 1 1

. Now consider the initial reserve price in a k-period game when
 is arbitrarily close to 1: The limiting value of the initial reserve price, r1, as  ! 1
satises 
1 + a
2
  r1

1 + a
2
  a

=
Z 1+a
2
a
(y   a) dy:
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This is the indifference condition for the type 1+a
2
buyer in the initial period when the
discount factor is set equal to 1. The expression simplies to
r1 =
3a+ 1
4
:
We have that (k)k 1 is less than the limiting value of (3a+ 1) =4 for any k  3. Since the
screening level in the next-to-last period falls below the initial reserve, the probability is
zero that the SPA run in the terminal period can end with a price of at least r1.
Contrast this to the k-period APA game. The sequence of screening levels is the
same as in the SPA game. Therefore, the screening level in the next-to-last period is
still (1 + a) =2k 1: In contrast to the SPA game, the limiting value of the initial starting
price as  ! 1 is the minimum valuation type, a. In the last period, all buyer types
bid their valuations and so the price is determined by the second-highest valuation. The
probability that the second-highest valuation exceeds a, conditional upon having failed
to sell in all previous periods, is 1. Meanwhile, the probability that the price exceeds
a in the initial period is equal to the probability that the highest valuation exceeds (k)1 .
This event has probability less than 1, thus giving rise to a strong start-price end-price
gap.
6 Conclusion
This paper began with the task of understanding the pricing dynamics that result when
a seller (or auctioneer) goes shing for the opening bid. I have developed a model
of an English ascending-price auction in which the seller goes shing for an opening
bid when she cannot commit to a predetermined starting-price path. The weak start-
price end-price gap described by Cassady is shown to be a natural consequence of the
model and the strong start-price end-price gap results when the time between auctions
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is sufciently short.
Along the way, I distinguished the English ascending-price auction from the second-
price auction within the sequential environment by reconsidering the manner in which
the English auction is modeled. In much of the literature, the English auction is modeled
using either the Milgrom and Weber (1982) button-push auction or simplied as a
second-price auction. The button push-auction requires each buyer to keep a thumb on
a button to signify their continued participation in the auction as the price, shown on
an electronic board, escalates. A buyer that releases the button at any time or who fails
to have their button depressed at the opening is precluded from bidding later. Within
the sequential setting, the button-push auction is strategically equivalent to the second-
price auction when buyers' valuations are independently drawn.17 Modeling the English
auction in such a way as to allow bidders who were unwilling to bid at the opening to
enter the bidding later, breaks the strategic equivalence between the English auction and
the second-price auction.
Studying this more realistic model of the English auction, we see that in the sequen-
tial setting, the English auction induces bids from a larger set of buyer types than does
the second-price auction. The difference is in the participation of interim bidders. In re-
sponse, the seller in the sequential English auction model lowers the sequence of starting
prices from what it would have been in the second-price auction game. The sequence
of starting prices is set in such a way as to equalize revenues across the two formats as
well as to make the probability of sale and the allocation of the item identical. Since
the participation of interim bidders in the English auction allows the seller to lower her
starting price while keeping revenues unchanged, one could say that the interim bidders
are doing the seller's bidding.
This paper also contributes to the literature on the Coase conjecture by extending
17Izmalkov (2004) shows that the button-push auction is not equivalent to an English auction in which
bidders may enter after the start of the auction, or re-enter, when buyers are asymmetrically informed and
valuations are not independent.
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the result from the monopoly setting and the bargaining setting to the auction setting. In
the second-price and rst-price auctions considered by M&V, the seller's initial reserve
price is (generally) bounded away from the minimum valuation type.18 In the English
ascending-price auction game considered herein, as the time to relisting becomes short,
the initial starting price converges to the minimum valuation type.
A parametric example further highlights the differences between the English and
second-price auction games when the time to relisting is quite short. In particular, when
the discount factor is close to unity, the seller in the English auction begins with a low
starting price and subsequently drops it in small increments. In contrast, the seller in
the second-price auction begins with a higher reserve, which is subsequently reduced
in larger jumps. It is under these conditions that the strong start-price end-price gap
is shown to result in the English auction game whereas it does not in the second-price
auction game.
From an empirical standpoint, we should be interested in testing whether shing for
the opening bid is responsible for the price dynamic described by Cassady and not some
form of irrational exuberance. The model provides a testable prediction relating the
size of the increment used by the seller to lower the opening bid and the comparative
probability of having a subsequent auction end in a price of at least S after the initial
auction started at S fails to sell. From our comparison of the English and second-price
auctions, we see that the smaller is the increment, the more likely is a subsequent auction
to achieve a price of S. The empirical investigation of this relationship is left to future
research.
18The exception to this is in cases where the initial screening level is equal to the minimum valuation
type. This was seen in the parametric example where a  1.
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APPENDIX
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The proof of parts 1 and 2 closely follow that of Lemma 0 of McAfee and Vincent
(1997).
1. Fix a starting price st and for bidder 1, say, let dB1 denote the density of the
highest of maximum bid prices of all other n   1 buyers should buyer 1 submit a bid.
Upon bidding at the starting price, the auction will necessarily result in a sale. The
expected return to bidder 1 of playing a strategy of bidding up to some amount b is
(v   st)
Z st
0
dB1 +
Z b
st
(v  B1) dB1;
where we let v denote buyer 1's valuation. This expression is maximized at b = v for
any set of strategies giving rise to the arbitrary density dB1.
2. The proof proceeds to show that if some type v > st is an initial bidder, then so
too is any type v0 > v. Assuming that buyer 1, upon bidding at the starting price, bids
up to v and let dB1 denote the highest of maximum bid prices of all other n  1 bidders
in the current period. Let VB (z; v;Ht) denote the continuation payoff of a type v buyer
from the following period on, given historyHt, playing the strategy of a type-z buyer in
what follows. Further, let dA1 denote the density of the highest of maximum bid prices
of all other buyers should buyer 1 abstain from bidding. If a type-v buyer is an initial
buyer in period t, then
(v   st)
Z st
0
dB1 +
Z v
st
(v  B1) dB1  VB (v; v;Ht)
Z st
0
dA1: (8)
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Equation (8) states that the surplus from bidding up to the buyer's valuation must exceed
the expected value of not bidding.
Now suppose, by way of contradiction, that some type v0 > v nds it unprotable to
bid at the start price in period t. This implies that
(v0   st)
Z st
0
dB1 +
Z v
st
(v0  B1) dB1 < VB (v0; v0; Ht)
Z st
0
dA1. (9)
Since a type v buyer can always adopt the strategy of type v0, it must be the case that
VB (v; v;Ht)  VB (v0; v;Ht)
=
1X
j=0
jt+1+j (v
0) [v  mt+1+j (v0)] ;
where t+1+j (v0;Ht) denotes the probability, conditional on Ht+j , that the item is ob-
tained in period t + 1 + j playing the strategy of type v0 and mt+1+j (v0;Ht) is the
analogous expected payment. It follows that
VB (v
0; v0; Ht)  VB (v; v;Ht)  (v0   v)
1X
j=0
jt+1+j (v
0;Ht) : (10)
From (8) and (9) ; we have that
(v0   v)
Z v
0
dB1 <  [VB (v
0; v0; Ht)  VB (v; v;Ht)]
Z st
0
dA1
< (v0   v) 
1X
j=0
jt+1+j (v
0;Ht)
Z st
0
dA1; (11)
where the second inequality follows from (10) : Equation (11) necessarily leads to a con-
tradiction as long as
R v
0
dB1 
R st
0
dA1 since
P1
j=0 
jt+1+j (v
0;Ht) can be no greater
than 1:
Now
R v
0
dB1is the probability of obtaining the item for the type v buyer and
R st
0
dA1
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is the probability that the item goes unsold when the buyer in question abstains from
bidding. So too,
R st
0
dB1 is the probability of obtaining the item for a type st buyer.
Since a type st buyer wins only when he is the lone bidder, we have that
Z st
0
dB1 =
Z st
0
dA1: (12)
It follows from (12) ; that if we choose v to be some increment greater than st and
increase the upper integrand on the left-hand side of (12) by that increment, we have
that
R v
0
dB1 
R st
0
dA1:
Since v0 was chosen arbitrarily, it must be the case that if some type v submits a bid
in period t, then so does every buyer whose valuation exceeds v:
3. We begin by asserting that there exists a minimum starting price such that all bid-
der types bid whenever the starting price is less than or equal to the minimum, regardless
of the history. I claim that v-v is one such starting price. We know that in equilibrium,
the seller's expected receipts must be nonnegativesince she can always opt not to sell
and that a buyer's expected surplus cannot exceed v by the same token. Therefore, the
expected surplus for a buyer with valuation v is at most v minus the starting price. This
is less than v as long as the starting price is less than v-v. Thus, all types bid when the
starting price is less than or equal to v-v:
We now calculate a buyer's expected surplus at the minimum starting price. When
all buyer types bid and the starting price is less than v, a given buyer's expected surplus
is
R v
v
FY1 (y) dy  0: Notice that a buyer's expected surplus is independent of the actual
starting price as the price will necessarily be determined by the bid of the second-highest
valuation buyer. This is crucial in what follows.
We now use recursive logic to show that the minimum starting price is in fact v.
Consider a starting price, s" =v v + "; just slightly greater than v-v; such that if the
auction started at s" fails to sell, the starting price is reduced to v-v in the following
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period. When the starting price is s", a given buyer bids at the start as long as the surplus
gained in the current period exceeds the surplus gained in the following period should
the item go unsold. Assume by way of contradiction that there exists some " >v that
is the lowest type to bid at the starting price. The payoff to bidding for some valuation-v
buyer, in the current period, is
(") = ["    (s"; ")]FY1 (") +
Z v
"
FY1 (Y1) dY1;
where  (s"; ") denotes expected payment conditional on being the lone initial bidder,
taking into account the bidding of interim bidders. Since the value of waiting for the fol-
lowing period is 
R v
v
FY1 (Y1) dY1; a buyer with valuation v > " bids in the following
period as long as
["    (s"; e)]FY1 (") +
Z v
"
FY1 (Y1) dY1  
Z v
v
FY1 (Y1) dY1: (13)
From Lemma 1, if this condition holds for the lowest buyer type ", it holds for all
higher types. Thus it is sufcient to show that this condition holds for v = ", for which
it is sufcient that,
Z "
v
FY1 (Y1) dY1  
Z "
v
FY1 (Y1) dY1: (14)
Equation (14) follows from (13) where the left-hand side of (13) has been minimized
by setting v equal to its minimum " and  (s"; ") equal to
R "
v
Y1dFY1=FY1 (") its
maximum. This condition clearly holds for all " v which contradicts the assumption
that " >v, so we conclude that all buyer types bid when the starting price is s" or less.
Now consider a starting price s"1 =  v+ "1, "1 > " such that if the item fails to sell
at s"1 the seller reduces the starting price to s" in the following period. When the seller
sets a starting price of s"1 in the current period, buyers bid at the start only if the payoff
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from doing so exceeds the payoff of waiting for the following period. Assume by way
of contradiction that there exists some "1 >v that is the lowest type to bid. Since all
buyer types bid when the starting price is s", a buyer with valuation v > "1 bids when
the starting price is s"1 as long as

"1   
 
s"1 ; "1

FY1
 
"1

+
Z v
e1
FY1 (Y1) dY1  
Z v
v
FY1 (Y1) dY1:
As before, the left-hand side can be minimized with v equal to "1 and 
 
s"1 ; "1

equal
to
R "1
v
Y1dFY1=FY1
 
"1

, leading to condition (14) only with "1 playing the role of
". This condition holds for all "1 v, once again contradicting the assumption that
"1 >v. We then conclude that all types bid when the starting price is s"1 or less.
Continuing recursively in this manner, we see that for any s"k v such that all buyer
types bid whenever the starting price is s"k or less, for an arbitrary k; then all types also
bid when the starting price is s"k+1 2 [s"k ; v]. This establishes the result. Note that the
recursion does not extend to s"k+1 > v since such starting prices may actually determine
the price with the consequence that a buyer's participation decision does not give rise to
equation (14).
4. Let g
 
ut; t; t+1

denote the seller's expected return with beliefs ut, when
choosing a starting price in the current period that induces a screening level of t, which
subsequently induces a screening level of t+1 in the following period. Note that from
part 2 of the lemma, t exceeds t+1 and from part 3,  is equal to v if s v. We have
that
g
 
ut; t; t+1

= n (st; t) [F (ut)  F (t)]FY1 (t)
+n
Z ut
t
Z X1
t
Y1dFY1f (X1) dX1
+ t+1 (t) ;
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where  t+1 (t) is the seller's optimal payoff from period t + 1 on, beginning at state
t. The rst-order condition for the seller's optimal choice of t reduces to
(1  ) [F (ut)  F (t)  tf (t)]FY1 (t)  0:
Since f () is positive, there exists some u >v such that for ut < u, F (ut) F (t) 
tf (t) is strictly negative. Thus for u < u, it is optimal for the seller to induce bids
from all types thus ending the game.
Next we show that the seller's beliefs fall below u in nite time. For this, we again
examine the seller's rst-order condition for the optimal screening level. Solving for an
interior optimum and rearranging terms yields
F (ut)  F (t) = tf (t) :
Since f is bounded away from zero, so too is the distance between ut and t. So in an
interior optimum, implying ut > u, the screening level jumps down in discrete steps so
that some u >v is eventually reached. If the optimum is not interior, then by denition,
ut < u
:
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
We begin by dening a k period game in which the seller and each buyer behaves
optimally given the constraint that should the item fail to sell, the game necessarily ends
after k 1 periods. For this constrained game, denote the screening level, seller's starting
price, and expected revenue in the terminal period:
0  v, s0  v,  0 (u)  n
Z u
v
Z X1
v
Y1dFY1f (X1) dX1.
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Expected revenue is calculated by considering rst the expected payment of some buyer,
say buyer 1, with valuationX1. Since the auction in the nal period is run with a starting
price of v; buyer 1's price will be determined by the maximum of n   1 valuations of
other buyers, denoted Y1: Buyer 1's expected payment is the expectation of Y1 over
[v;X1], where FY1  F n 1 denotes the distribution of Y1: The seller's expected revenue
is simply n-times the expectation of a given buyer's expected payment.
Dene the sequences

j
	k
j=0
, fjgkj=0 , f jgkj=0 , fgjgkj=0
iteratively in what follows.
Let j (x) denote the starting price that induces a screening level of x in the jth-to-
last period of the k-period game. Since the type-x buyer wins the auction only upon
being the lone bidder, j (x) satises
[x   (j (x) ; x)]FY1 (x) = 
 
j 1   j 1

FY1
 
j 1

+
Z x
j 1
FY1 (Y1) dY1
!
(15)
The left-hand side of the expression indicates a type-x buyer's expected surplus from
bidding at starting price j (x), when he is the lowest type to be an initial bidder. His
expected payment under the circumstance is  (j (x) ; x). In the SPA game, absent
interim bidders, his payment would be j . However, since a bid at the starting price
induces bids from those who otherwise would have waited for a subsequent period prior
to bidding, his payment goes up. The term  (j (x) ; x) represents the expected maxi-
mum bid price of all interim bidders, given that such a bid is no greater than x. Since all
interim bidders are indifferent between not bidding and bidding at any price up to their
valuations, the determination of  is completely arbitrary. We assume in what follows
that the function  (; ), strictly increasing in both arguments, is known to all players
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and that each buyer, when contemplating the decision of whether to bid at the reserve,
uses the same calculation of .
The right-hand side of the expression gives a type-x buyer's expected continuation
surplus, given a starting price of j 1 and a screening level of j 1 in the period to
follow. In the following period, since j  j 1, he receives an amount given by the
rst term, where j  
 
j 1; j 1

; in the event that he is the lone initial buyer and
an amount given by the second term when he is bidding against at least one other initial
bidder.
Let gj (u; x) denote the seller's revenue in the jth-to-last period, at state u; when
choosing a starting price that induces a screening level of x. We have that
gj (u; x) = n (j (x) ; x)FY1 (x) [F (u)  F (x)] + n
Z u
x
Z X1
x
Y1dFY1f (X1) dX1
+ j 1 (x) : (16)
The rst term represents the seller's revenue from having only one initial buyer and the
second from having at least two. The third term represents her maximum discounted
return from the following period on, at state x, in the event the current auction fails to
produce a sale. Therefore,
 j (u) = max
xu
gj (u; x) (17)
and
j = argmax
xu
fgj (u; x)g : (18)
Lemma 4 For a given k > 1, the sequences

j
	k
j=0
,

j
	k
j=0
, f jgkj=0 are such that:
1. The j < x satisfying (15) are unique and increasing in x for x > v.
2. The  j (x) satisfying (17) are increasing and continuous.
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3. The j (u) satisfying (18) are strictly less than u and increasing.
Proof. Property 1 is proven directly from (15) : Uniqueness follows from the fact that
the left-hand side of (15) is strictly decreasing in  while the right-hand side is constant
in  for x > v: Differentiating both sides of (15) with respect to x yields
@ (j; x)
@j
dj
dx
FY1 (x) = (1  )FY1 (x) +

x  j (j; x)

fY1 (x) :
The right-hand side of this expression is positive by the fact that j  x:
We prove properties 2 and 3 by induction. It is straightforward to show that proper-
ties 2 and 3 are satised for j = 2. Now assume, by way of induction, that 2 and 3 are
satised for j = k 1: Since  (k (x) ; x) is continuous in both arguments and k (x) is
continuous in x, then gk (u; x) is continuous in both arguments. It follows from standard
arguments that  k is continuous and increasing.
For property 3, consider u < u0 and let x 2 argmax
y
fgk (u; y)gand let x0 2
argmax
y
fgk (u0; y)g : Suppose, by way of contradiction, that x0 < x. We have that
gk (u
0; x) = gk (u; x) + n (k (x) ; x)FY1 (x) [F (u
0)  F (u)]
+n
Z u0
u
Z X1
x
Y1dFY1 (Y1) f (X1) dX1 (19)
and
gk (u
0; x0) = gk (u; x0) + n (k (x0) ; x0)FY1 (x) [F (u
0)  F (u)]
+n
Z u0
u
Z X1
x0
Y1dFY1 (Y1) f (X1) dX1: (20)
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Subtracting (20) from (19), we have
gk (u
0; x)  gk (u0; x0)  [gk (u; x)  gk (u; x0)] =
n

 (k (x) ; x)FY1 (x)   (k (x0) ; x0)FY1 (x0) 
Z x
x0
Y1dFY1 (Y1)

[F (u0)  F (u)] :
(21)
The left-hand side of (21) is non-positive since x is a maximizer of gk (u; ) and x0 is a
maximizer of gk (u0; ) :We now want to show the right-hand side of (21) to be positive,
so resulting in a contradiction.
For ease of notation, let    (k (x) ; x)FY1 (x) and 0   (k (x0) ; x0)FY1 (x0).
Using this notation, the right-hand side of (21) is positive if
 0  
Z x
x0
Y1dFY1 (Y1)  0: (22)
From the period k analogue of (16) ; we have
 = (1  )xFY1 (x) + k 1 + 
Z x
k 1
Y1dFY1 (Y1) ,
where k 1  
 
k 1
 
k 1

; k 1

FY1
 
k 1

and k 1  k 1 (x). Using the fact
that, from (16), d=dk 1  0,
  (1  )xFY1 (x) + 0k 1 + 
Z x
0k 1
Y1dFY1 (Y1)
= 0 + (1  ) [xFY1 (x)  x0FY1 (x0)] + 
Z x
x0
Y1dFY1 ,
where 0k 1 < k 1 and so too 0k 1 < k 1 by the assumption that x0 < x: It follows
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that (22) holds if
(1  )

[xFY1 (x)  x0FY1 (x0)] 
Z x
x0
Y1dFY1

 0.
The above is true under the assumption that x0 < x, thus yielding the desired contradic-
tion.
Having characterized the equilibrium to the arbitrarily constrained k-period game,
we can extend the results of Lemma 4 to the unconstrained game. In fact, we show that
at any stage of the game, the number of remaining periods is determined solely by u, the
highest potential buyer valuation. This is done by constructing a sequence of numbers
fzjgTj=0 iteratively as follows. Let
z1 = sup fuj1 (u) = vg
denote the largest value of u such that the seller chooses to end the game immediately
and
zj = min

sup

ujj (u)  zj 1
	
; v
	
denote the largest value of u such that the seller chooses a screening level in the current
period such that the optimal policy from the following period onward has her end the
game in j   1 periods. The proof of Part 4 of Lemma 1 demonstrated that z1 is the
largest value of u such that F (ut) F (t) tf (t) is negative. The following Lemma
formalizes the argument and shows that there exists some T such that when u = v, the
seller chooses a screening level such that the optimal policy from the following period
onward has her end the game in T   1 periods.
Lemma 5 There exists an " > 0 such that for all , , and n, z1  1 + ". Further, there
exists a T <1 such that zT = v:
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The proof is identical to that of Lemma 2 in M&V, only with  taking the place of
, so there is no need to repeat it here.
With the zj so dened, we can dene the seller's problem uniquely by u, indepen-
dent of j. In this way, if u 2 (zj 1; zj], the seller chooses the optimal screening level
independent of j; it just so happens that such a screening level will lead, assuming op-
timal behavior in what follows, to the game ending in j   1 more periods should the
item fail to sell. In what follows, we change our notational convention so that a sub-
script t denotes (t  1) periods after the initial period as opposed to t periods before the
terminal period. In this way, given u1 = v, we have that u2 =  (v), ut =  (ut 1) and
st =  (t) for any t > 1:
The following addresses the three individual components of Proposition 1.
1. Using the same techniques developed in the solution to the k period constrained
problem, we solve for the PBE sequence of screening levels and corresponding starting
prices through backward induction. By construction, the screening level in the terminal
period is v. In any period prior to the last, the seller chooses t to maximize g (u; x)
subject to the sequential-rationality constraint imposed by equation (1) : This gives rise
to the rst-order condition
tf (t) + F (t)  F (ut)  0
which characterizes a solution in u, independent of n, ; and .
2. For a given sequence of screening levels, ftg is the sequence of the expected
payment made by the marginal bidder type in each period. Using (1), T 1 satises
 
T 1   T 1

FY1
 
T 1

= 
Z T 1
v
FY1dY1:
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In any period t < T   1, t satises
(t   t)FY1 (t) = 
 
t+1   t+1

FY1
 
t+1

+
Z t
t+1
FY1 (Y1) dY1
!
; (23)
so that the sequence ftg is unique to a given sequence of ftg. The payment by
the marginal type is a known function,  (; ) of the starting price and screening level.
Therefore, for the optimal sequence of screening levels ftg and the corresponding se-
quence of payments ftg, an equilibrium starting price  (t) is some price such that
 ( (t) ; t) = t. Under the assumption that  be increasing in both arguments,  (t)
is unique and increasing in t:
3. Since the seller continues to relist until a sale is transacted, for any value of ,
the item is allocated to the buyer with the highest valuation. The probability of sale in
some period t is F
 
t 1
  F (t). Since the sequence of screening levels is the same
for each value of , so is the probability of sale in each period. The seller's revenue in a
given period is given by the rst two terms in g (ut; t). Using the fact that ut = t 1,
after some simplication, we have the seller's period-t revenue is
R
 
t 1; t

= n
Z t 1
t

vf (v) + F (v)  F  t 1FY1 (v) dv
 n F  t 1  F (t) (t   t)FY1 (t) :
Substituting in from (23) recursively (T   t) times, we have
R
 
t 1; t

= n
Z t 1
t

vf (v) + F (v)  F  t 1FY1 (v) dv
 n F  t 1  F (t) T tP
j=0
j+1
Z t+j
t+j+1
FY1 (Y1) dY1;
which is independent of .
49
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
The effect of the trembles on an interim bidders is to create the possibility of winning
the auction when bidding no more than his valuation. This is because 1. the buyer
who bid at the starting price may simply be an interim bidder who bid by mistake; or
2. all true initial bidders may mistakenly drop out of the bidding before their valuations
are reached. It is sufcient to show that given the possibility of obtaining the item, all
interim bidders' strategies other than the one proposed are weakly dominated.
Consider bidder 1, an interim bidder with valuation v  st, and let dB" denote the
density of the highest maximum bid price of all n  1 other buyers, given that a bid was
placed at the starting price. Note that if the probability of all trembles were zero to be
zero, dB" would be equal to dFY1 . Suppose buyer 1 chooses some maximum price b at
which to drop out. His expected payoff from that strategy is
Z b
st
(v  B") dB":
This expression is maximized at b = v for any prole of behavioral strategies played by
the other bidders which gives rise to dB":
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose the seller wishes to induce a screening level of 1 in the initial period. If
1 =v, then she simply chooses a starting price no greater than v and we're done.
Assume then that 1 >v: To induce 1, the seller chooses a reserve  (1) giving rise to
1   ( (1) ; 1), solving
(1   1)FY1 (t) = 
Z 1
2
FY1dY1 + (2   2)FY1 (2)

; (24)
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where 2 =  (1) and 2 =  ( (2) ; 2). By the same logic, the second term on the
right-hand side of (24), assuming 2 >v satises
(2   2)FY1 (2) = 
Z 2
3
FY1dY1 + (3   3)FY1 (3)

:
Following this logic recursively, and noting that
 
T 1   T 1

FY1
 
T 1

= 
Z T 1
v
FY1dY1;
since T = v; (24) becomes
(1   1)FY1 (t) = 
T (t+1)P
j=0
j
Z t+j
t+j+1
FY1dY1: (25)
Using (2) on the left-hand side of (25),
(1   1)FY1 (t) =
Z 1
(1)
FY1dY1: (26)
We are interested in the value of  (1) as  gets arbitrarily close to unity. Therefore,
in (25) ;
lim
!1

T (t+1)P
j=0
j
Z t+j
t+j+1
FY1dY1 =
Z 1
v
FY1dY1: (27)
Putting (26) together with (27), (25) implies
lim
!1
Z 1
(1)
FY1dY1 =
Z 1
v
FY1dY1:
The only way this can hold is if  (1)!v.
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A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
In the commitment equilibrium, the seller chooses a sequence of screening levels
n
^t
o
T^
t=1
to maximize the discounted revenue stream subject to sequential rationality constraints.
Of course, in order to be talking about screening levels, one must rst prove the succes-
sive skimming property for the commitment solution. The proof is identical to that of
the no-commitment equilibrium and so is omitted here. We begin by considering a two
period problem and characterize the solution. It is then straightforward to extend the
results of the two-period game to a game of arbitrary duration.
Fix the sequence of screening levels
n
^1; ^2
o
and consider the starting prices re-
quired to induce such an outcome under sequential rationality. As in the no-commitment
equilibrium, it is straightforward to show that conditional on bidding, an initial bidder
bids his valuation. In period 2, a buyer is an initial bidder as long as s2  v. Therefore
^2 = s2 = 2. Assuming a period-2 starting price of s2, the value of s1 inducing a
screening level of 1  s2 satises

^1   1

FY1

^1

= 
Z ^1
s2
FY1 (Y1) dY1;
where 1  

s1; ^1

as in the no-commitment equilibrium.
Given the sequence
n
^1; ^2
o
, the seller's period-1 receipts are
R

v; ^1

= n
h
1  F

^1
i
FY1

^1

+ n
Z v
^1
Z X1
^1
Y1dFY1f (X1) dX1
= n
Z v
^1
[vf (v) + F (v)  1]FY1 (v) dv
 n
h
1  F

^1
i
^1   1

FY1

^1

:
where the term
n
Z v
^1
[vf (v) + F (v)  1]FY1 (v) dv
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is a seller's revenue in a one-shot auction where the highest type is v and the starting
price is ^1. This expression is maximized at s such that
sf (s) + F (s)  1 = 0:
As this expression plays an important role in what follows, we dene  (v) such that
 (v) = n [vf (v) + F (v)  1]FY1 (v) :
Since the game is articially constrained to end after period 2, the period-2 auction
is like a one-shot auction where the highest type is ^1. As such, the (unconditional)
expected revenues are
R ^1
s2
 (v) dv: The seller then chooses ^1 and s2 to solve
max
^1;s2
Z v
^1
 (v) dv   n
h
1  F

^1
i
^1   1

FY1

^1

+
Z ^1
s2
 (v) dv:
subject to

^1   1

FY1

^1

= 
Z ^1
s2
FY1 (Y1) dY1
and v  ^1  s2  v.
Since the sequential rationality constraint is satised with equality, we can substitute it
into the objective function. After rearranging terms, the seller's problem becomes
max
^1;s2
(1  )
Z v
^1
 (v) dv + 
Z v
s2
 (v) dv
subject to v  ^1  s2  v.
This expression is maximized, term by term, by setting ^1 = s2 = s.
Now consider a solution with some arbitrary number of periods. As before, x
the sequence of screening levels
n
^1^2;:::^T^
o
and consider the sequence of starting
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prices required to induce the sequence of screening levels. In the nal period, sequential
rationality implies that a buyer bid his valuation as long as it exceeds the starting price;
thus ^T^ = sT^ . In the second-to-last period, sequential rationality requires that sT^ 1
satisfy

^T^ 1   

sT^ 1; ^T^ 1

FY1

^T^ 1

= 
Z ^T^ 1
sT^
FY1 (Y1) dY1.
In any period t < T^   1, for a given sequence of starting prices fst+1; :::; sT^g and
screening levels
n
^t+1; :::; sT^
o
, sequential rationality requires st satisfy

^t   

st; ^t

FY1

^t

= 
 
^t+1   t+1

FY1

^t+1

+
Z ^t
^t+1
FY1 (Y1) dY1
!
:
The seller's revenue in the nal period is
R ^T^ 1
sT^
 (v) dv: In any period t < T^ , her
revenue is
R

ut; ^t

=
Z ut
^t
 (v) dv   n
h
F (ut)  F

^t
i
^t   t

FY1

^t

;
where ut = ^t 1. The sequence of screening levels
n
^t+1; :::; sT^
o
is chosen to solve
max
^t+1;:::;sT^
T^P
t=1
t 1R

^t; ^t+1

subject to sequential rationality constraints
and v  ^1      sT^  v:
Substituting in for the sequential rationality constraints and rearranging terms in the
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same manner as in the two-period game, the seller's problem becomes
max
^t+1;:::;sT^
(1  )
T^ 1P
t=1
t 1
Z v
^t
 (v) dv + T^ 1
Z v
sT
 (v) dv
subject to v  ^1      sT^  v:
Once again, each term is individually maximized by setting ^1 =   ^T^ 1 = sT^ 1 = s.
A.6 Proof of Lemma 3
1. From (3) and (4), differentiating with respect to st yields:
@bt
@st
= FY1 (bt) = [(1  )FY1 (bt) + (1  ) (bt   t) fY1 (bt)] > 0
2. When st v, t+1  
 
t+1

is necessarily zero by result 3 of Lemma (1). This
requires that the left-hand side of (3) also be zero, which implies bt =v. When
st >v, t+1 > 0, which requires the left-hand side of (3) to be positive, implying
bt > t > st:
3. Differentiating (3) and (4) with respect to ,
@bt
@
=

@t
@t

FY1 (bt) = [(1  )FY1 (bt) + (1  ) (bt   st) fY1 (bt)] > 0:
4. The indifference condition can be re-written as
bt   t = 
(bt)
FY1 (bt)
:
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The right-hand side can be interpreted conveniently as an expectation where
(t)
FY1 (t)
= E

t   t+1I fY1 < bt+1g   Y1I fY1 > bt+1g jY1 < bt

:
This is the expected period-t + 1 payoff for a type v buyer, conditional on the
period being reached. This is smaller for larger values of n due to the stochastic
dominance of a given order-statistic from a larger sample, where I represents
an indicator function. Intuitively, it should follow that a buyer bidding against a
larger set of competitors should be worse off. It then follows from (3), that bt t
is smaller for larger values of n. As n goes to innity, the probability that period
t+1 is reached, F (bt)n, goes to zero for any value of bt. Since the right hand side
of (3) goes to zero, so too must the left. This requires that t = t = st in the
limit.
5. From (3) and (4), differentiating with respect to  yields:
@bt
@
= (bt) = [(1  )FY1 (bt) + (bt   t) fY1 (bt)] > 0:
As  goes to zero, so does the right-hand side of (3) :This requires that t = t =
st in the limit.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 4
Consider period t+1 following the period t auction, with starting price S and screening
level b (u; S;), that failed to induce a sale. From property 2 of Lemma 3, b (u; S; a) >
S. As such, the distribution of buyer valuations is truncated from above at b (u; S;)
and has positive density at all values in [v; b (u; S;)]. The probability that the auction
in period t + 1 ends in a price of at least S is equal to the probability that X1 exceeds
the screening level in period t+ 1 and that both X1 and X2 exceed S. This occurs with
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positive probability by the fact that b (u; S; a) > S. This establishes that there exists
some   1, such that
P

pt+  SjS = st; t+ 1 = 1
	
> 0:
A.8 Proof of Proposition 5
For a period-t starting price of S =  (t; 1) ;
G1 (S; t; ) = P

X2  S;X1  max

t+ ; S
	 jX1 < t+ 1	  P fX1  tg :
For a period-t reserve price of R =  (t; 0) ;
G0 (R; t; ) = P

X2  max

t+ ; R
	 jX1 < t+ 1	  P fX1  tg
= P

X2  max

t+ ; R
	
; X1  t+ jX1 < t+ 1
	  P fX1  tg :
It is enough to show that max

t+ ; R
	  R > S, which was shown by property 3 of
Lemma 3.
A.9 Proof of Proposition 6
Consider the equilibrium of a game with an arbitrary number of periods, with the number
of periods denoted T . Conditional upon period T being reached, in which the starting
price is reduced to v, the highest possible valuation type must be below T 1. Condi-
tional upon the state being T 1, the probability that the period T auction ends with a
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price exceeding  (t; 1), the period-t starting price, is
P

price  SjS =  (t; 1) ; T 1 = 1
	
=
Z T 1
(t;1)
Z x1
(t;1)
fX1;X2 (x1; x2) dx2dx1=F
 
T 1
n
; (28)
where fX1;X2 is the joint distribution of hX1; X2i. In period t, the probability that the
auction ends in excess of  (t; 1) is
P fprice > SjS =  (t; 1)g =
Z v
1
Z x1
s1
fX1;X2 (x1; x2) dx2dx1: (29)
G1 (S; 1; 1) is the difference between (28) and (29).
As  ! 1, from Proposition 2  (t; 1)! v. Thus for a given sequence of screening
levels, as  ! 1, the numerator in (28) goes to F  T 1n, so that the probability that
the price in period T exceeds  (t; 1) goes to 1: However, as  ! 1, the term in (29)
goes to 1  F (1)n, which is less than 1 for any 1 > v.
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CHAPTER 2
NON-STANDARD PREFERENCES AND
IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR IN AUCTIONS
1 Introduction
A large literature has emerged over the last two decades that indicates that many bidders
in auctions exhibit irrational behavior and non-standard preferences. A common nding
is that some buyers overbid relative to contemporaneous auctions for similar items and
xed-price alternatives and consequently pay too much. A general lesson that can be
inferred from this literature is that the standard rational model has shortcomings that are
serious enough to warrant a richer approach to modeling bidder behavior.
While incorporating insights from psychology and related elds into traditional mod-
els of preferences has been shown to be important in many economic settings (e.g.,
DellaVigna 2009), the current study nds that bidders in auctions behave in ways that
appear more consistent with standard rational behavior than some recent evidence might
suggest. Using data we collected in a eld experiment on eBay and supplemented with
observational data from eBay, we test a range of non-standard and irrational behaviors
that have been attributed to bidders and do not nd evidence that they are important in a
eld setting.
We start by providing a benchmark theoretical model of what we will consider as
standard rational bidder behavior. The model captures many of the important elements
of the eBay auction environment for the product we examine  new DVDs for popu-
lar movie titles. The framework involves simultaneous auctions for identical items that
differ only in their starting prices. The model follows closely the model in Peters and
Severinov (2006) (P&S hereafter), with the main difference being to include non-zero
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and heterogeneous information acquisition costs that potential buyers incur to identify
and track the auctions in which the items of interest are being sold (P&S assume a fric-
tionless environment). Given that many items on eBay including popular DVD movie
titles are often sold in dozens or even hundreds of non-homogenous auctions running si-
multaneously, we believe that many buyers may reasonably not be aware of all relevant
auctions and their current characteristics. Thus we expect these costs, which may result
from factors such as differing facilities with internet use, values of time, and disutility
of searching for and monitoring competing auctions, to affect how closely the bidder
comes to obtaining the lowest available price.
An important prediction of the model is that ending prices across the two auctions
are equal in expectation.1 Overbidding relative to contemporaneous auctions can occur
since some buyers are not aware of the alternatives. However, under the assumption
that bidders are equally likely to nd low versus high starting price auctions during
their search, the incidence of overbidding is insensitive to starting price. In contrast,
for reasons we describe below, the behavioral theories that we consider, predict that
ending prices are decreasing in starting prices, in expectation, and that overbidding is
more likely to occur in auctions with lower starting prices. These differing predictions
regarding the effect of starting price offer a simple way to distinguish between these two
sets of theories.2
We consider the following behavioral mechanisms. First is irrational herding, pro-
posed in Simonsohn and Ariely (2008) (S&A hereafter), where bidders herd into auc-
tions with a greater number of existing bids even though existing bids provide no valu-
able information. The implication is that winners overpay relative to contemporaneous
auctions with fewer bids.3 Second are opponent effects, which encompass a range of
1This result is subject to certain conditions that we expand upon in Section II. P&S provide a stronger
result that ending prices equate exactly.
2This starting price prediction is not new. For example, it provides a central test in Simonsohn and
Ariely (2008). However, the results we present are new.
3This mechanism stands in contrast to rational herding (Banerjee 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and
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behaviors in which bidders respond to opponents in ways that represent non-standard
preferences. Opponent effects include spite, in which a bidder receives disutility from
the surplus of opponents; joy of winning, in which the bidder receives utility from win-
ning independent of her valuation for the item; or competitive arousal, in which the
bidder is caught up in the heat of the moment and overbids. All of these behaviors cause
overbidding relative to the bidders' initial valuations.4 Third is the quasi-endowment
effect, proposed in Heyman, Orhun, and Ariely (2004), where active bidders develop a
sense of ownership over the item even before the auction has closed. In the spirit of the
endowment effect (Thaler 1980), this sense of ownership causes bidders to bid beyond
their initial valuations. A related fourth behavior is escalation of commitment, proposed
by Ku, Galinsky, and Murninghan (2006), where bidders continue to participate in an
auction beyond their valuations in order to justify the sunk costs of the time they have
already committed to the auction.
While all of these behavioral theories differ as to the mechanism proposed, they offer
a common prediction: A low starting price facilitates bidding activity at low prices, and
this activity itself becomes a trigger for heightened bidding activity at higher prices.
This trigger then leads auctions with lower starting prices to: (i) receive further bids at
higher prices; (ii) close with higher ending prices; and (iii) result in a higher incidence
of overbidding.
To test the competing predictions provided under standard and non-standard prefer-
ences, we conducted a eld experiment on eBay in which we sold 210 matched pairs of
movie-DVDs where the two DVDs in each pair were auctioned simultaneously from the
same seller (us) but in separate auctions, one with a low starting price ($0.99) and one
Welch 1992), whereby the observed behavior of previous movers reveals valuable information in settings
of incomplete information, and can imply that herding is rational.
4Kagel, Harstad, and Levin (1987) and Kagel and Levin (1993) are early papers that show that subjects
in lab experiments overbid in second-price auctions. Morgan, Steiglitz, and Reis (2003), Heyman, Orhun,
and Ariely (2004), Ku, Malhotra, and Murninghan (2005), Ku, Galinsky, and Murninghan (2006) and
others provide more recent evidence in support of the individual mechanisms.
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with a high starting price (average starting price of $6.85).5 This simple treatment gen-
erates exogenous variation in starting prices that allows us to estimate the causal effect
of starting price on bidding outcomes. Exogeneity is important to ensure that the start-
ing price is not being chosen in response to expected demand.6 For example, since the
starting price effectively functions as a reserve price, a seller may adjust starting price
in response to expected demand. If starting price is endogenous to unobserved demand,
the estimated effect of starting price may capture variation in demand, and hence varia-
tion in bidding outcomes that are correlated with but not caused by starting price itself.
The matched-pairs aspect of the experiment allows us to include a xed effect for each
matched pair to control for time-varying unobserved demand for the particular movie
title, thereby helping to isolate the causal effect of starting price.
We conduct three sets of tests based on this starting price variation. First, we inves-
tigate the relationship between starting price and ending price directly. We nd that the
average ending price of the low starting price auction is not statistically different than
the average ending price of the matched high starting price auction conditional on both
auctions exceeding the starting price in the high starting price auction. We also nd
that conditional on the high starting price auction failing to result in a sale, the average
ending price of the low starting price auction is less than the starting price of the high
starting price auction. These results support the standard model and are inconsistent
with the behavioral mechanisms.
Next, we identify the 96 individual incidences of overbidding among the 210matched
5Auctions on eBay typically follow the dynamic second price auction (DSPA) format. In a DSPA,
buyers are free to bid as many times as they choose and at any time they choose during a predetermined
window set by the seller. At any point during the auction, buyers can observe the standing price, which is
equal to: (i) the starting price if one or fewer bids have been received; or (ii) the second-highest bid plus
a small increment if two or more bids have been received. Buyers also observe the number of bids at any
point during the auction. The standing price is updated in real time until the time runs out. The winner is
the high bidder when the time runs out and pays a price equal to the standing price at that point in time.
6Variations in demand in any particular auction may arise due to a range of factors; for example,
differences in the number of contemporaneous competing auctions for the same DVD or the amount of
time since the movie title was initially released on DVD.
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pairs, and test directly for patterns of behavior consistent with each of the behavioral
mechanisms.7 Again we nd little evidence of these behaviors.8 Evidence of over-
bidding appears to be consistent with heterogeneous search costs, whereby a subset of
buyers are aware of only one auction within the pair and bid rationally in that auction,
given their limited awareness of alternatives.
Finally we investigate the effect of starting price on the likelihood that an auction re-
ceives an additional bid. Since auctions with lower starting prices have a greater number
of bids on average upon reaching a given standing price than would an auction with a
higher starting price, under irrational herding, subsequent bidders are more likely to bid
in the auction with the lower starting price. Further, since auctions using lower starting
prices tend to receive bids earlier, the high bidder in an auction started at a lower price
is more likely to have been the high bidder longer than the high bidder in an auction
with a higher starting price. It follows that under the quasi-endowment and escalation of
commitment effects that the high bidder in the low starting price auction is more likely
to increase his bid in response to being outbid. Lastly, to the extent that increased ac-
tivity at lower prices can increase the intensity of motives such as spite, joy of winning
or competitive arousal, so too do opponent effects predict greater bidding in lower start-
ing price auctions. Given its consistency across the different mechanisms, we test the
hypothesis that, controlling for standing price, an auction with a lower starting price is
more likely to receive an additional bid.
The results of our test using experimental data indicate that starting price has no
effect on the probability that the auction receives additional bids, providing further ev-
idence that the behavioral mechanisms are not important among eBay participants. To
demonstrate that our experimental results are not an artifact of our experimental pro-
7Overbidding is identied when the winning prices of one of the paired auctions exceeds the other by
at least one bid increment (fty cents).
8Section V presents more specic tests of non-standard behavior using evidence of overbidding across
matched pairs.
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cedures, we replicate our analysis using observational data we collected from eBay and
nd very similar results (the collected data are similar to data used by previous empirical
studies).
The study that is closest to our is Lee and Malmendier (2010) (L&M hereafter),
who also nd that overbidding is common, and that opponent, quasi-endowment and es-
calation of commitment effects are unlikely to be the cause. Given that the two studies
use different datasets and methodologies but arrive at the same conclusions, we believe
the evidence against these behavioral mechanisms in the eBay setting is strong. Regard-
ing explaining the overbidding that is observed, we offer an alternative explanation than
L&M:While they argue that some bidders irrationally overlook lower-priced xed-price
options, and hence exhibit irrational limited attention, we believe that overbidding could
naturally be explained within a standard rational model such as ours.
A key difference in interpretation between the two studies is whether all bidders
are aware of all listings upon entering an auction. L&M assert that all bidders can be
expected to have identied most or all listings for the desired item but sometimes over-
look the more attractive options. We believe the task of identifying the most attractive
options is likely to be quite costly in terms of time and effort given the large amount
of information to search through. Once we allow some bidders to be unaware of some
options, it may no longer be irrational for the bidder not to switch to a lower-price com-
peting xed-price option after entering an auction, or to enter the auction with a higher
expected price than a xed price option in the rst place.9 We also do not nd support
for the irrational herding empirical ndings in S&A, which conduct tests very similar
to those in the current study. A possible explanation for the difference in ndings is
that our estimation strategy allows us to more precisely control for time-varying unob-
9Note also that the focuses of the two papers differ somewhat. L&M investigate bidder behavior with
respect to xed-price alternatives while we focus on bidder behavior regarding simultaneous competing
auctions, and hence we also explore issues specic to competing auctions such as cross-bidding and
herding behavior.
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served demand, and hence more accurately isolate the direct effect of starting price on
ending price. We discuss our results in relation to these previous studies in more detail
in Section VII.
The current results have implications for the literature on overbidding in auctions
conducted in the laboratory and speak to the question of the applicability of laboratory
ndings to the eld setting (List 2006, Levitt and List 2007 and Levitt and List 2008).
Furthermore, List (2003) shows that certain irrational biases are reduced with market
experience, and Cooper and Fang (2008) show that laboratory subjects learn through
experience to avoid behaviors that lead to overbidding and speculate that those who
do not are weeded out with time. These previous ndings may help to explain the
differences between previous laboratory results and our ndings from the eld.
The rest of the article proceeds as follows: Section II discusses the testable implica-
tions of our theoretical model of rational behavior under standard preferences and dis-
tinguishes these predictions from those of the behavioral models; Section III discusses
the experimental and observational data, Section IV describes the results of our test re-
garding the effect of starting price on ending price, Section V presents more specic
tests of non-standard behavior using evidence of overbidding across matched pairs, Sec-
tion VI describes results regarding the effect of starting price on the probability of the
auction receiving additional bids, Section VII discusses the applicability of our results
to previous studies and Section VIII concludes.
2 Theoretical Predictions
We derive empirical predictions from a model of simultaneous auctions under two alter-
native sets of assumptions. Under the rst, buyers are perfectly rational, though some
buyers are imperfectly informed about one of the auctions. Under the second, buyers
do not have standard rational preferences but instead earn additional utility from win-
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ning an auction with a lower starting price. The added utility from winning an auction
with a lower starting price captures the empirical predictions of the behavioral theo-
ries of irrational herding, opponent effects, quasi-endowment effect, and escalation of
commitment while abstracting away from the underlying mechanism that generates this
premium.10 We provide the two models in the following subsections, and highlight the
distinguishing testable predictions.
2.1 Standard Rational Model with Unaware Buyers
The following provides the underlying framework for analyzing the outcomes of our
matched-pairs eld experiment under the assumption that buyers are rational. Consider
two auctions, L and H , selling identical items simultaneously. The auctions, differ
only in their starting prices denoted SL and SH respectively, where SL  SH . The de-
mand side of the market consists of m  2 buyers, each with unit demand for the item.
Buyers' valuations, denoted v, are private information, independent and identically dis-
tributed according to some distribution F , assumed to have full support over the grid

 = fSL; SL+ d; SL+2d; : : : ; vmaxg, for some step size d > 0. A buyer with valuation
v who obtains a single unit at price p receives surplus v   p.
The model as described thus far, as well as the description of the auction mechanism
employed herein, follows closely to that of P&S. In P&S, buyers move sequentially,
having the opportunity to bid any amount in any available auction when it is their turn to
bid.11 The bidding continues up to a point at which all bidders decline to place additional
bids. P&S show that there exists a perfect-Bayesian equilibrium of the game in which
buyers follow a strategy in which each bid is one step above the standing price in the
auction with the lowest standing price. P&S call this an efcient strategy as it allocates
10Lee and Malmedier (2010) employ a similar utility-of-winning modeling assumption.
11P&S model an arbitrary number of auctions. We simplify their analysis in restricting attention to just
two auctions to provide a closer analogy to our experimental setup.
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the items to the participants with the highest valuations. Furthermore, this strategy leads
to all winning bidders paying the same price.
Thus, the efcient strategy of P&S supports an outcome under rational bidding con-
sistent with the Law of One Price. A limitation of the efcient equilibrium in P&S
is that it does not allow for ending prices to differ across auctions in a given pair and
hence does not allow us to understand the observed instances of overbidding. To allow
for variation in prices, we introduce the concept of unaware bidding, whereby some
subset of buyers only considers bidding in one of the two auctions within a pair.
Unaware bidding can be attributable to rational considerations such as search costs,
which could lead to certain buyers not being aware of the second auction, choosing to
forgo additional search when the expected gain from seeking out all of the contempo-
raneous alternatives is smaller than the time cost of additional search. Though our ex-
periment was designed so as to minimize the effort of nding and bidding in the paired
auction, time constraints may still prevent rational buyers from implementing the ef-
cient strategy of P&S.12 This behavior serves as a rational counterpart to the irrational
limited attention, which L&M use to explain their results. Whatever the root cause of
unaware bidding, we assume that unaware buyers bid rationally given they are aware of
only one of the two auctions in the pair. We incorporate unaware bidding into the model
by assuming that with some probability, each of the m buyers is aware of only one of
the two auctions in a pair, and is equally likely to be aware of auction L versus auction
H. In this way, some subset of buyers will only bid in one auction, irrespective of the
bidding in the competing auction.
The game proceeds as follows. First, the starting prices of the two auctions are
announced simultaneously. Buyers then arrive sequentially. Upon arriving, a buyer is
given an opportunity to bid in either auction. A bid may be any amount on the grid, 
,
12For example, since the listings of our paired auctions were identical except for the starting price, the
auctions would appear next to each other when search results are sorted by time remaining in the auction
or most relevant results, but may appear far from each other when sorted by current standing price.
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at least some minimum increment, e > 0, greater than the standing price in the chosen
auction, if the auction has received at least one bid, or at least as high as the auction's
starting price, otherwise. After receiving a bid, the standing price and identity of the
high bidder of the auction are updated.13 After the buyer that has entered most recently
nishes submitting bid(s), each buyer that had entered earlier is given the opportunity,
in order of his or her entry, either to submit new bid(s) (in either auction) or to pass.
Once each buyer in the market chooses to pass, a new buyer can enter. After all m
buyers have entered, the bidding process continues as bidders update their bids one after
another. The order of bidding at this stage is the same as the order of entry: after the
last buyer to enter submits bid(s), the rst buyer to enter is called upon next, followed
by the second buyer and so on. Bidding continues until all buyers pass. Then the high
bidder in each auction obtains the item at a price equal to the auction's standing price as
of the last bid. This nal standing price is the ending price.
Having specied the model, we now establish a perfect-Bayesian equilibrium in
which aware buyers bid up prices of the two auctions incrementally while unaware buy-
ers bid only in the auction they are aware of. The bidding strategies are formalized as
follows.
Denition 1 The bidding strategy of aware buyers is , dened as:
(a) If the buyer is the current high bidder in either auction, or if the buyer's valuation
is less than or equal to the lowest standing price, the buyer passes.
13Additional details that correspond to eBay exactly are: In determining the standing price, the second-
highest bid in an auction refers to the second-highest bid received by a distinct bidder and if two or more
bidders submit the same high bid, the rst submitter is the high bidder. A condition in P&S and our model
that differs from the eBay setting but greatly simplies the analysis is that the standing price is equal to
the current second-highest bid when at least two bids have been placed. On eBay, the standing price when
at least two bids have been placed is the second-highest bid plus the minimum bid increment, e, which
is fty cents for most of the relevant range. This simplication is equivalent to assuming that bidders
only consider bid increases of at least one dollar, perhaps because bidders incur a small time/effort cost to
placing a bid that makes it not worthwhile to bid in very small increments. We expect the same (or very
similar) predictions would hold if this incrementing were accounted for precisely.
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(b) Otherwise, if one auction has a lower standing price, the buyer bids in this auction.
If both auctions have the same standing price, the buyer bids in the auction in
which it is more likely that the high bid equals the standing price, where the infer-
ence over the high bid is derived from Bayes' rule accounting for the equilibrium
strategies. If both auctions have the same standing price and the high bids are
equally likely to equal the starting price, the buyer bids in one of the two auctions
with equal probability. The bid amount is the smallest value on the grid above the
standing price.
Note that strategy  is the efcient strategy in P&S for the two-auction setting.
While part (a) of the denition of  is straightforward, the rationale for part (b) requires
further explanation. Upon choosing between two auctions that have the same standing
price, a buyer prefers to bid in the auction in which she is more likely to become the high
bidder. Bidding in accordance with part (b) requires the buyer to identify the auction
that gives her the greatest chance of becoming a high bidder.
Denition 2 The bidding strategy of unaware buyers is , dened as:
(a) If the buyer is the current high bidder or if the buyer's valuation is less than or equal
to the standing price in the auction the buyer is participating in, the buyer passes.
(b) Otherwise, the buyer bids an amount equal to his valuation in the auction he is
participating in.
Note that we use female pronouns to indicate aware buyers and male pronouns to
indicate unaware buyers. Since unaware buyers participate in one auction only, the
game from their perspective resembles a Vickrey auction (Vickrey 1961 ). In such a
game, any strategy that has the buyer obtain the item at a price up to but no higher than
his valuation is weakly dominant;  is one such strategy. However, given that aware
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buyers make inferences about the magnitude of the high bid, which in turn governs
their bidding decisions, the game is not equivalent to a Vickrey auction. Specically, an
aware buyer bids in auction j, conditional upon both auctions having the same standing
price, if she believes that the high bidder in auction j is more likely to be an aware buyer.
Bidding in accordance with in auction j minimizes the probability that an aware buyer
bids in j when the two auctions have the same standing price.14
Proposition 1 It is a perfect-Bayesian equilibrium for aware buyers to use strategy 
and for unaware buyers to use strategy .
All proofs are contained in the Appendix. In deriving our empirical predictions of
the model, let PH and PL denote the standing prices in auction L and H respectively
upon the close of the auction. As such, if auction j results in a sale, Pj denotes its
ending price, while if auction j fails to sell, Pj denotes its starting price, Sj . Further, let
E represent the expectation operator.
Corollaries 1 and 2 provide empirical predictions regarding expected ending prices
and incidences of price divergence. As we will see in the next subsection, each of these
predictions has a behavioral counterpart that distinguishes the two models.
Corollary 1 Expected prices. For a given matched pair of auctions in the equilibrium
characterized by a and :
1. Conditional upon Pj  SH + e for each j 2 fL;Hg, E[PH ] = E[PL];
2. Conditional upon auction H receiving zero bids, E[PL] < SH .
In understanding the logic behind Corollary 1, it is important to recognize that the
difference in starting prices across the two auctions serves as an exogenous source of
variation, which gives rise to increased bidding activity in auction L at lower standing
14For further explanation of this result, see the proof of Theorem 1 in the Appendix.
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prices. This increased bidding activity in auctionL leads to distinct predictions under the
rational and behavioral models. At the same time, the difference in starting prices can
differentially affect the ending prices, even in the absence of the behavioral mechanisms,
by requiring that the ending price in auction H be at least SH . Therefore, in order to
isolate the effect of the behavioral mechanisms relative to the standard rational model,
it is necessary to restrict attention to pairs in which the presence of the high starting
price does not bind on the ending price. By restricting attention to pairs in which both
auctions have ending prices of at least SH + e, the comparison of ending prices amounts
to a comparison of the second-highest valuation of all buyers in each auction. Under the
standard rational model, the expectation of the second-highest valuation in auction L is
equal to that of auction H .
Our next set of results involves price divergence, which we dene as follows.
Denition 3 For a given matched pair of auctions, j and  j, we say that auction j is a
divergent auction if:
(a) Pj  SH + e; and
(b) Pj   P j > e.
Corollary 2 Price divergence. For a given matched pair of auctions in the equilibrium
characterized by  and , a divergent auction is equally likely to be auction H as
auction L.
The rationale behind Corollary 2 is similar to that of Corollary 1. The presence
of the higher starting price in auction H makes a higher ending price more likely in the
absence of any behavioral mechanisms: whereas auction L requires two bidders to bid at
least SH to achieve a price of SH , auction H requires only one. Therefore, by requiring
the divergent auction to have an ending price strictly greater than SH , insures that the
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ending price in the divergent auction is determined by the second-highest valuation of
all buyers in that auction. In that case, the divergent auction is the auction in which
the second-highest buyer valuation is higher. Under the standard rational model, the
divergent auction is equally likely to be auction L as it is to be auction H .
2.2 Utility of Winning the Low Starting Price Auction
To incorporate irrational bidding/non-standard preferences into the simultaneous auc-
tion game, we assume that buyers receive additional utility  > 0 upon obtaining the
item in the auction with the lower standing price. The inclusion of the premium, ,
captures heuristically the added incentive present in each of the behavioral theories for
buyers to obtain the item in auction L, while abstracting away from the specic mech-
anisms under which the premium is formed. For instance, under irrational herding, the
premium arises when a new entrant observes one auction with a greater number of dis-
tinct bidders. Since auction L is more likely to receive bids from a greater number of
distinct bidders, controlling for standing price, the premium represents the average dif-
ference in standing prices that would make a new entrant indifferent between bidding in
the two auctions. Under quasi-endowment, the premium arises when a buyer becomes
the high bidder and increases in the amount of time she holds this position. Since a high
bidder in auction L will have been high bidder for longer on average than a high bidder
in auction H , the premium is the average difference in standing prices such that upon
being outbid, a buyer would be indifferent between which of the two auctions to place
her next bid. The same rationale can be applied to opponent effects and escalation of
commitment.
In analyzing the model, the premium, , simply shifts each buyer's payoffs in a
manner that is equivalent to raising the standing price in auction H by  under standard
preferences. The equilibrium of the game resembles the efcient equilibrium of P&S,
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subject to buyers perceiving the standing price in auction H to be  greater than its
actual amount.
Denition 4 For a given matched pair of auctions, L andH , a -shifted set of standing
prices is the actual standing price for auction L, and the actual standing price plus 
for auction H .
Denition 5 The bidding strategy for all buyers is , dened as:
(a) If the buyer is the current high bidder in any auction, or if the buyer's valuation is
less than or equal to the lowest standing price, the buyer passes.
(b) Otherwise, if one auction has a lower -shifted standing price, the buyer bids in
this auction. If both auctions have the same -shifted standing price and there is
one auction in which either the standing price has changed since the last change
of the high bidder or that has yet to receive a bid, the buyer bids in this auction.
Otherwise, the buyer bids in one of the two auctions with equal probability. The
bid amount is the smallest value on the grid above the standing price.
Proposition 2 It is a perfect-Bayesian equilibrium for all buyers to use strategy  in
the game in which buyers earn a premium of  in obtaining an item in auction L.
Having established an equilibrium of the game in which buyers exhibit irrational
behavior of non-standard preferences, we derive empirical predictions to contrast with
those of the standard rational model.
Corollary 3 Expected prices. For a given matched pair of auctions in the equilibrium
characterized by :
1. Conditional upon Pj  SH + e for each j 2 fL;Hg, then PL = PH + ;
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2. Conditional upon auction H receiving zero bids, then E[PL] may be greater than
or less than SH .
Corollary 4 Price divergence. Assuming  > e, then for a given matched pair of
auctions in the equilibrium characterized by , a divergent price auction is more likely
to be auction L than it is to be auction H .
Corollaries 3 and 4 are the behavioral analogues to Corollaries 1 and 2. Whereas
Corollary 1 predicts that the ending prices in the two auctions will be equal in expecta-
tion, Corollary 3 predicts that auction L will have a higher ending price than auctionH ,
not just in expectation, but in a point-wise manner since all buyers are now assumed to
be aware. Further, since auction L has a higher ending price than auction H , auction L
will be a divergent auction.
3 Data
While much of the literature surveyed in the introduction relies on observational data, we
seek to test for irrational bidding or non-standard preferences using data from of a eld
experiment. Experimental data provide two advantages over observational data. First,
by analyzing only auctions for which we have set the starting price, we can ensure that
starting price is not set in response to expected demand, which we might expect sellers to
do, and which may occur in ways that are unobserved in the data. Second, the matched-
pairs feature of the experimental data allow us to compare outcomes across matched
pairs, thus controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in a way that is only imperfectly
replicable in observational data.
In what follows, we explain how the eld experiment was performed and summarize
the data. This explanation is followed by a description of the collection of observational
data.
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3.1 Experimental Procedures and Data
The data consist of the starting prices, ending prices, and bid histories of 420 auctions of
new movie-DVDs run on eBay from July 13 to August 22, 2007. The experiment was
designed as follows: Twenty-one DVD titles were chosen from Billboard magazine's
best-seller list for June 2007. We excluded all television series and special edition sets
from the original list of 25, leaving us with only feature-length lms. Each title was
auctioned in pairs, simultaneously, one with a starting price of 99c/ and the other with
some higher price, chosen uniquely for that pair. All 21 pairs, 42 items in total, were
then auctioned simultaneously as a cohort. The entire experiment consisted of 10 such
non-overlapping cohorts for a total of 210 pairs of auctions and 420 total auctions.
The functioning of each auction and the appearance of each auction page was stan-
dardized to the greatest extent possible. Each auction in a cohort was started on the same
date and time of day and set to end exactly 72 hours after the start. Each item was listed
with a xed shipping charge of $3.00. The layout of the auction webpage was kept
uniform across auctions. The product description was identical within each title and
differed across titles only by the name of the lm and by DVD format (widescreen or
full screen).15 To avoid any perception of product heterogeneity, the product description
clearly mentioned that the DVD for sale was new and in its original shrink wrap.16
The starting price chosen for the high-starting-price treatment, Sic, was chosen dis-
tinctly for each title i in cohort c. Since average prices were expected to differ across
titles in a cohort, and also over time for a given title, the Sic were chosen distinctly so
as to provide our test with sufcient power. We arrived at each Sic by applying a small
increment to the average selling price for that title reported by eBay the day the auction
15Figure 2.2 in the Appendix provides an example of the layout of the auction page and the product
description.
16As it is customary on eBay for buyers of multiple items to receive bulk discounts on shipping, the
item description explicitly stated that bulk discounts would not be given.
77
was listed.17 In the rst ve cohorts, the increment was 10%, in the latter ve, 25%. The
change in markup had little effect on the probability of sale or the average price.18
Table 2.1 provides a summary of the average outcomes across the two starting-
price treatments. Of the 210 auctions performed under the low-starting-price treatment
(LSPAs), all of them sold and for an average ending price of $6.88. Of those auctions
performed under the high-starting price treatment (HSPAs), starting prices ranged
from $3.75 to $11.25 with a mean of $6.85. Within HSPAs, 81.9% of the items sold.
Conditional upon a sale taking place, the average ending price across HSPAs was $7.76.
That this amount exceeds $6.88, the average across LSPAs, is consistent with the predic-
tions of auction theory based on standard preferences due to the truncation of auctions
that would have ended in a lower price in the absence of a high starting price.19 As
expected, the LSPAs received more bids and were bid upon by more bidders than were
HSPAs. LSPAs averaged 7.5 bids and 4.7 bidders on average as opposed to 1.6 and 1.4
respectively for HSPAs. Commensurate with having been bid upon by more bidders,
LSPA listings were viewed by more prospective bidders, 30.4 on average, than were
HSPA listings, an average of 16.7.20
Table 2.1 further shows that the median rating of winners in HSPAs and LSPAs
respectively. An eBay participant's rating is acquired through completed transactions
17When listing an item for sale, eBay displays the average selling price for that title over the previous
week. In determining the high starting price, we added an increment to this amount. Our use of this
approach is motivated by recognizing that certain titles tend to sell at higher prices than others. By basing
the high starting price on this value, we ensure that the starting price is high enough such that the price
fails to be reached with sufciently high probability to provide meaningful comparisons across the two
auctions within the pair. Given that our analysis relies only on comparisons of matched pairs, any possible
endogeneity problem due to our choice of starting price would be alleviated.
18In cohorts 1-5, 87 of 105 high starting price auctions resulted in sale; in cohorts 6-10, 85 of 105 high
starting price auctions resulted in a sale. While average prices declined in cohorts 6-10, due to the fact
that a portion of market demand had already been satised, the average difference between end prices of
paired low and high starting price auctions remained a constant 37 cents across the two groups of cohorts.
19That the unconditional average ending price across HSPAs, $6.36, was below that of LSPAs, does
not allow us to infer anything about buyer behavior beyond the fact that the chosen high starting prices
were not the revenue maximizing values.
20Each auction run on eBay has a counter that tracks the number of distinct identities that click on the
auction's listing to access the auction's unique URL.
78
on eBay. Sellers can evaluate buyers with a positive (+1), negative (-1) or neutral score
(0); the buyer's rating is the sum of all of these scores. With a median rating of 85, the
winners of HSPAs in our data were slightly more experienced than winners of LSPAs
who had a median rating of 78. However, given the standard deviation in bidder rating
across unique bidders of 462, the difference is not statistically signicant.
Table 2.1: Summary statistics by starting price treatment
LSPA HSPA
Number of auctions 210 210
Number of auctions resulting in sale 210 172
Average starting price $0.99 $6.85
Average ending price conditional on sale $6.88 $7.76
Average ending price unconditional on sale $6.88 $6.36
Average number of bidders unconditional on sale 4.7 1.4
Average number of bids unconditional on sale 7.5 1.6
Average number of views unconditional on sale 30.4 16.7
Median rating of high bidder 78.0 85.5
3.2 Observational Data
To collect observational data from eBay, we created a Java programming tool that makes
use of API handles available on eBay for most aspects of each auction. We collected
bid-level data on all auctions for DVDs of the bestselling movie titles in August and
September 2008 according to Billboard magazine that sold between September and No-
vember 2008.
For each auction, the data record: item characteristics, including condition (ve cate-
gories from Acceptable to Brand New), format (DVD, Blu-ray, HD-DVD), title, whether
the item was relisted, whether the listing had enhancements such as bold letters, ship-
ping cost and method (e.g., rst-class, media), and whether the DVD is a special edition,
79
widescreen, or unrated version; seller characteristics such as the net number of positive
feedback and percent of feedback that are positive, their location, whether their seller ID
has changed, and whether they have an eBay store or are a power seller; and bid charac-
teristics, including amount and time of each bid, whether the bid is an automatic proxy
bid or actual bid, and an identier that allows us to determine whether they are a rst-
time or repeat bidder in the auction.21;22 From the bid data, we construct each standing
price reached throughout the course of the auction, and an indicator variable indicating
whether an additional bid is placed. A change in the standing price is prompted by a the
placing of actual bids, so there is no loss in restricting our attention to only actual bids.
In total, our working dataset consists of 9,095 bids (excluding proxy bids) from 1,733
auctions and 1,037 unique sellers covering sixteen movie titles.
The observational data is used to corroborate our results from testing the effect of
starting price on the probability of receiving bids. The results of the next two sections
rely on the experimental data only.
4 Starting Price versus Ending Price
We now test the rst part of the uniform price prediction of the standard model, given
in Corollary 1, which is that the low and high starting price auctions have the same
ending price on average, conditional on receiving at least two bids. The alternative is
the behavioral prediction, given in Corollary 3, which is that low starting price auctions
have a higher ending price on average than high starting price auctions, conditional on
21The amount of the actual bid itself is available for all non-winning bids.
22The proxy bidding system employed by eBay works as follows: when a bid is placed by someone
other than the current high bidder, the current high bidder's bid is automatically increased up to his actual
bid amount if the new bid exceeds his bid, or up to the new bid plus the minimum increment if the new
bid is less than his actual bid. A bid placed by the high bidder has no effect on the standing price, but
increases the maximum amount that the proxy bidding system will bid for him. In what follows we
distinguish between proxy bids, which is the bid automatically placed up to the buyer's maximum, and
actual bids, which is the amount entered into the system by the bidder, which serves as the maximum
proxy bid.
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both auctions receiving at least two bids.
Table 2.2 presents the average ending prices for LSPAs and HSPAs across all 51
auctions pairs (out of 210) in which both auctions ended with a price of at least SH + e.
The average ending price for HSPAs is 40 cents larger than that for LSPAs. A t-test of
the null hypothesis that the average ending prices are the same fails to reject the null,
and has a p-value of 0.14.23 When the true difference is 10 percent of the average ending
prices of the 51 HSPAs (86 cents), the power of the test to reject the null hypothesis at a
5 percent signicance level is 88 percent.24
Table 2.2: Test of average ending prices of completed auctions
Average
ending
price
Standard
error
N t-statistic p-value
LSPA 8.16 0.24 51
HSPA 8.56 0.34 51
Difference -0.40 0.27 51 -1.48 0.14
After removing
outliers:
Difference -0.14 0.20 49 -0.69 0.49
We next test the second part of the uniform price predictions of the standard rational
model, given in Corollary 1, which is that the ending price of low starting price auctions
is below the starting price of high starting price auctions on average conditional on
the high starting price auction not resulting in sale. The alternative is the behavioral
prediction, given in Corollary 3, which is that the average ending price of LSPAs may
be above or below the starting price of the HSPA, conditional on the HSPA not resulting
23All p-values throughout the paper are calculated using a two-tailed test.
24The price differences in the two outliers, -$8.00 and -$5.32 respectively, represent the only two values
such that there was not a corresponding price difference as large in the opposite direction.
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in sale. The test is weaker than the test above since the two sets of predictions are only
distinguishable if the average ending price of the LSPAs is above the average starting
price of the HSPAs.
Table 2.3 reports the average ending prices of the 38 LSPAs where the corresponding
HSPA failed to sell. The average ending price of the LSPAs is $1.15 less than the average
starting price of the paired HSPA. A t-test rejects the null hypothesis that the amounts
are equal with a p-value less than .01. The results of these two tests are consistent with
the standard rational model, and the result of the rst test is strongly inconsistent with
the behavioral predictions.
Table 2.3: Test of average prices when HSPA received no bids
Average
price (end-
ing/starting)
Standard
error
N t-statistic p-value
LSPA 5.77 0.34 38
HSPA 6.92 0.32 38
Difference -1.15 0.27 38 -4.27 <0.0001
The predictions in Section II do not address paired auctions in which the LSPA and
HSPA both sell but the HSPA receives only one bid. If these auctions were sufciently
prevalent, one may wonder whether this more complete set of auctions (104 pairs of
auctions in total) would show evidence of the behavioral mechanisms. Table 2.4 shows
that the average ending price of this broader set of LSPAs is 6 cents higher than the
average ending price of the corresponding HSPAs. With a p-value of 0.74, a t-test that
this amount is statistically different than zero fails by a wide margin to reject the null
hypothesis. In comparison to the test presented in Table 2.2, this test biases the result
in favor of LSPAs as it includes pairs in which the ending price in the HSPA exactly
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equals SH . Thus, the failure of this test to nd higher ending prices amongst LSPAs is
condemning to the existence of the purported behavioral mechanisms.
Table 2.4: Expanded test of average ending prices of completed auctions
Average
ending
price
Standard
error
N t-statistic p-value
LSPA 7.93 0.17 104
HSPA 7.88 0.11 104
Difference 0.06 0.18 104 0.33 0.74
After removing
outlier:
Difference 0.14 0.16 103 0.85 0.40
5 Individual Cases of Overbidding
The results of the previous section showed that on average, ending prices are consistent
with standard rational model and inconsistent with behavioral mechanisms. However,
we still observe in the data many individual instances of overbidding; that is, instances
where the winning bidder in one auction paid more than the winning bidder in the paired
auction. In this section, we document the patterns of overbidding that occur in the
experimental data, and then examine the individual cases for evidence of the behavioral
mechanisms.
To document the patterns of overbidding in individual matched pairs, we employ the
concept of price divergence that was introduced in Section II. Consideration of diver-
gent auctions restricts attention to only those pairs in which the auction with the higher
ending price receives at least two bids equal to or greater than SH + 0:5. This indicates
that the second-highest valuation buyer present in this auction has a valuation of at least
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SH +0:5. When it can be inferred that the second-highest valuation of buyers across the
two auctions differ by more than 50 cents, then we say that the auction with the higher
ending price is a divergent auction. Since we are not concerned with the magnitude of
the observed price differences, a feature of this analysis is that we can incorporate a
much larger sample than in the analysis of the previous section.
Table 2.5 groups individual cases of price divergence by whether the divergent auc-
tion is a HSPA (column HSPA) or a LSPA (column LSPA). We see that among
divergent auctions, HSPAs slightly outnumber LSPAs 50 to 46.25 These groups are fur-
ther subdivided as to whether the ending price in the paired auction, P j ended with
a price of at least SH + e or not. We observe similar patterns whether or not we in-
clude pairs in which the lower ending-price auction's ending price is below SH + e. In
what follows, we further examine individual cases of overbidding for evidence of the
behavioral mechanisms.
Table 2.5: Divergent price auctions by starting price treatment and by ending price in
paired auction
LSPA HSPA TOTAL
P j  SH + e 14 19 33
P j < SH + e 32 31 63
TOTAL 46 50 96
5.1 Irrational Herding
To test the extent to which irrational herding can explain the incidence of divergent
auctions, we focus on auctions won by rst-time bidders. Low starting prices correspond
to the presence of more bidders at any given standing price; hence, under irrational
25Of the 210 sample pairs, those not included in this table are: 18 pairs in which either both auctions
resulted in a sale and their ending prices were within 50 cents of one another and 96 pairs in which no
comparison of ending prices could be made.
84
herding, buyers that arrive later observe more bidders in the LSPA, and consequently
enter the LSPA with a higher probability. The causal mechanism is illustrated below:
Lower starting price >More bidders enter at lower prices, attracting more
bidders at higher prices > Higher ending price
Our test of irrational herding proceeds as follows:
1. Demonstrate the link between a lower starting price and the entry of bidders, sub-
stantiating the rst causal arrow above; then
2. Show that divergent auctions won by rst time bidders are not more likely to have
been LSPAs, negating the second causal arrow above.
Consistent with the rst causal arrow, winning bidders in LSPAs were in fact more
likely to have placed their initial bid in the auction with a greater number of existing
bidders than were winning bidders in HSPAs. The percentage of winning bidders in
LSPAs who placed their rst bid in the LSPA when that auction had, at the time, more
competing bidders than the paired HSPA, was 87.6%. In comparison, there were no
winning bidders in HSPAs who placed their rst bid in the HSPA when that auction had,
at the time, more competing bidders than the LSPA.26
To demonstrate an effect on divergent auctions caused by irrational herding, it must
then be the case that  consistent with the second causal arrow above  winners of LSPAs
are also more likely to be divergent bidders. This is the prediction of Corollary 4. We
nd this not to be the case as only 36 out of the 78 divergent price auctions won by
rst-time bidders were LSPAs. We test for statistical signicance using a binomial test,
the results of which are presented in Table 2.6. Recall from Corollary 2 that under the
standard rational model, we expect divergent auctions to be equally LSPAs as HSPAs.
26This difference in proportions is statistically signicant at a level of signicance less than one in ten
thousand.
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Therefore, we calculate the p-value based on a two tailed test, where under the null
hypothesis, the Bernoulli probability of a divergent auction won by a rst-time bidder
being a LSPA is 0.5. The column labeled # Trials indicates the total number of di-
vergent auctions for auctions won by rst-time bidders and repeat bidders respectively,
whereas the column labeled # Successes indicates the number of those that are LSPAs.
Given a p-value of 0.57, we fail to nd evidence that divergent auctions are more likely
to be LSPAs.
Table 2.6: Results of binomial tests
# Successes # Trials p-value
First-time bidders 36 78 0.57
Repeat bidders 9 17 0.63
5.2 Quasi-endowment and Opponent Effects
We next examine repeat bidders to test the extent to which quasi-endowment and oppo-
nent effects can explain overbidding. Since low starting prices lead to bidders entering
the auction earlier, the bidders will spend more time on average as the high bidder. To
the extent that a bidder becomes more attached to the item as she spends more time as
the high-bidder, the quasi-endowment effect predicts that the bidder should be willing
to pay more for the item. Escalation of commitment (Ku, Galinsky, and Murninghan
2006) works similarly. Since low starting prices lead bidders to participate in the auc-
tion for a longer period of time, the sunk cost of participating is on average higher for
lower starting prices. To the extent that sunk costs generate a desire to justify these costs
by winning the item, escalation of commitment will be more evident in LSPAs. Like-
wise, since lower starting prices lead to more bidders at a given standing price (most
importantly to multiple bidders participating as opposed to one bidder), opponent ef-
fects causing repeat bidders to overbid are more likely to appear in LSPAs. The causal
mechanism is illustrated below:
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Lower starting price > Earlier bidding at lower prices, greater attachment
at higher prices > Higher ending price
Our test of quasi-endownment and opponent effects proceeds as follows:
1. Demonstrate the link between a lower starting price and the entry of bidders, sub-
stantiating the rst causal arrow above; then
2. Show that divergent auctions won by rst time bidders are not more likely to have
been LSPAs, negating the second causal arrow above.
The applicability of the results we present in this section to escalation of commit-
ment and to opponent effects is subject to the implication that lower starting prices are
in fact correlated with increased opponent effects and feelings of attachment and com-
mitment. These assertions are difcult to support empirically. However, we can demon-
strate that low starting prices do indeed correspond to winning bidders having spent
more time as the high bidder (a necessary condition for attachment), and low starting
prices correspond to winning bidders having spent more time in the auction overall,
measured as the amount of time remaining in the auction upon entering (a necessary
condition for commitment and opponent effects).
Supporting our approach to testing for the quasi-endowment effect, we nd that
winners of LSPAs spent longer as high bidder than winners of HSPAs. As the theory
of the quasi-endowment effect suggests that divergent bidding becomes more likely the
more attached the potential buyer is to the object, we use the amount of time the buyer
spent as high bidder as a proxy for attachment. We look for winning bidders whose
nal bid was a repeat bid and separate them as to whether they had previously been
high bidder for over E hours. The parameter, E, is varied, as it is not evident to us the
length of time required for a person to become attached to an item. Figure 2.1 shows the
number of auctions won by repeat bidders across values of E further distinguished by
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whether the auction was a LSPA or HSPA. Consistent with the rst causal arrow above,
for each value of E considered, winning bidders in LSPAs, whose winning bid was a
repeat bid, were more likely than those in HSPAs to have previously been the high bidder
for at least E hours at some point during the auction.27 Thus, if the quasi-endowment
effect can be said to explain the incidence of divergent auctions, it must also be the case
that divergent auctions won by repeat bidders are more likely to be LSPAs. This is the
prediction given by Corollary 4.
Figure 2.1: Alternate measures of quasi-endowment by starting price treatment
We nd that contrary to the predictions of the behavioral mechanisms, divergent
auctions won by repeat bidders are not more likely to be LSPAs. Table 2.6 presents the
results of our analysis, showing that nine of the 17 divergent auctions won by repeat
bidders were LSPAs. The p-value of 0.63, which was calculated in a similar fashion to
our analysis of rst-time bidders, does not provide sufcient evidence to reject the null
hypothesis and instead provides evidence consistent with the standard rational model.
27These differences for E equal to 1 and 2 are statistically signicant at  < 0:05. At higher values
of E, the discrepancy between winners of LSPAs and of HSPAs decreases somewhat; coupled with the
smaller sample size, this renders the differences not signicant even at the  = 0:10 level.
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Our two analyses of divergent auctions show that auctions won by a rst-time bidder
or a repeat bidder are not more likely to be LSPAs. As such, we do not nd evidence
of any theory that predicts divergent auctions by a mechanism predicated upon a lower
starting price, including irrational herding, opponent effects, quasi-endowment effect or
escalation of commitment.
6 Starting Price versus the Probability of Additional Bids
We now examine whether, conditional on the current standing price, auctions with lower
starting prices are more likely to receive additional bids. Irrational herding predicts that
since auctions started at lower prices attract more bidders at lower standing prices, they
should also attract more bidders at higher ones, thus making the receipt of an additional
bid more likely. Similarly, opponent effects and quasi-endowment effects predict that
the increased bidding activity that occurs at lower prices in LSPAs can intensify motives
such as spite, joy of winning, and competitive arousal, and increase the buyers sense of
ownership over the item, which make the buyer more likely to overbid in response to
being outbid.
6.1 Baseline Model
In performing our test of additional bids, the unit of observation is the individual bid. We
wish to estimate the effect of starting price on the probability that the auction receives
an additional bid conditional on the current standing price of the auction.28 Consider an
auction j that has reached k = 1; : : : ; K distinct standing prices within the sample.29
28S&A conduct a very similar test, which is discussed in the following section.
29Since an auction would have received one bid before entering the sample, the K distinct standing
prices correspond toK +1 distinct bids. Auctions that have yet to receive a bid have been excluded from
the sample as the starting price in such an auction is not comparable to a standing price in an auction
that has received bids. For instance, starting prices in auctions that have not been bid upon may reect a
non-serious or unrealistic strategy by the seller.
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For each auction j = 1; : : : ; N; Xj are auction-specic characteristics that remain con-
stant across observations within a given auction, which include movie title, seller rating,
end date, duration of the auction, and starting price. Zjk are observation-specic charac-
teristics that vary by bid, which include standing price, time left in the auction, and the
number of distinct bidders that have placed bids to that point. The dependent variable
yjk = 1 if the auction receives an additional bid, and yjk = 0 otherwise. The structural
equation is,
yjk = IfXj + Zjk + Ujk > 0g; (1)
where Ujk a mean-zero random error.
6.2 Unobserved Demand
Unobserved demand for the item at the time of an auction is an important but com-
plicating determinant of whether an auction receives an additional bid. There will be
unobserved demand for the particular movie title that varies by the particular date and
time of day. For example, demand for a Batman movie may be highest after the title
is released and during the evenings when more buyers are online. However, demand
for any particular auction at that time may depend on the number of contemporaneous
auctions for the same title. We exploit the matched-pairs aspect of our experimental de-
sign by including a matched-pair xed effect to control for any time-varying unobserved
demand for that particular movie title.
Formally, let, g denote the realization of latent demand for observations in group
g (the matched pairs). We can express the outcome of observation k in auction j and
group g as:
ygjk = IfXj + Zjk + g + Ugjk > 0g: (2)
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The above formulation implicitly assumes that all potential buyers are aware of all
contemporaneous auctions in that all auctions within a given group will be equally af-
fected by unobserved demand. However, in the presence of unaware buyers, there may
still be important variation in unobserved demand across the two auctions. To under-
stand how this unobserved demand may operate, rst consider a HSPA with starting
price of S that has received one bid. The standing price will also be equal to S (recall
that eBay employs a second-price auction), and only one bidder with a valuation of at
least S must be present for this observation to appear in the data. Next suppose the LSPA
has been bid up to the standing price S. For this auction, at least two bidders with valu-
ations of at least S must be present for the observation to appear in the data. Note that
either auction will receive an additional bid if a buyer is present who is not currently the
high bidder but has a valuation above S. However, the presence of the second bidder in
the LSPA whose valuation is at least S indicates a higher expected unobserved demand
in the LSPA versus the HSPA, for which only one bidder has demonstrated a valuation
of at least S. This higher expected unobserved demand in the LSPA indicates a higher
probability of an additional bid in the LSPA conditional on the standing price S, partic-
ularly from an unaware buyer. Without properly accounting for unobserved demand of
this form, the estimates will attribute a higher probability of an additional bid to the low
starting price of the LSPA, when in fact the higher probability of an additional bid is
due to higher unobserved demand. Further, we expect this type of unobserved demand
to have a greater effect on our observational data than the experimental data since the
observational data consist of more than two concurrent auctions, thus making it more
difcult (and hence more costly) for a buyer to be aware of the standing prices in all
concurrent auctions.
To address this second type of demand, we remove observations for which k = 1
from our estimation of equation (2). All observations with a standing price of S and for
which k > 1 are such that we can infer from their inclusion in the data that there are at
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least two potential buyers for the item with valuations of at least S.
Table 2.7: Effect of starting price on probability of additional bid  experimental data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Starting price 0.887 0.959 0.966 1.091
(0.029) (0.038) (0.042) (0.072)
Log of minutes remaining 1.375 1.421 1.455 1.867
(0.048) (0.082) (0.059) (0.194)
Log of seller rating 0.852 0.815
(0.081) (0.090)
Conditional on matched pair? No Yes No Yes
k = 1 observations excluded? No No Yes Yes
Observations 1892 1896 1494 1496
6.3 Experimental Results
The results of our estimation using experimental data are presented in Table 2.7, and
are estimated using logit and conditional models with estimates reported as odds ratios.
The model in column 1 is based on equation (1) and indicates that the marginal effect
of starting price on the dependent variable is negative (a coefcient less than one in
the logit specication) and is statistically signicant at the one percent level. Column
3 presents the estimated model with the k = 1 observations removed. The effect of
starting price on the dependent variable is signicantly reduced relative to column 1
and is not-statistically distinguishable from zero (reported as a coefcient value indis-
tinguishable from one). Column 2 estimates equation (2) whereby a group is dened
as the LSPA and HSPA within a given matched pair. Again, the effect of starting price
is signicantly reduced relative to column 1 and is not-statistically signicant. Column
4 combines the regressions reported in columns 2 and 3 respectively by grouping by
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matched pairs and excluding the k = 1 observations. The effect of starting price is
again statistically indistinguishable from zero.
The estimates indicate that after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, starting
price has little or no effect on the probability that an auction receives an additional bid.
The contrast in results between the estimate of the starting price effect in column 1 and
in columns 2-4 highlights the importance of controlling for unobserved heterogeneity,
which evidently appears to predict starting price and also the probability of additional
bids.30
6.4 Observational Results
One may wonder whether the comparison of two identical items auctioned by the same
seller but with different starting prices is too obvious even for a buyer who would behave
irrationally in a more ambiguous setting. In that light, we now corroborate the results of
the previous section using the observational data.
We now examine data consisting of bidding outcomes at all standing prices reached
within all auctions on eBay with at least one bid that met our inclusion criteria (title,
date, auction format, etc.). We wish to employ the group xed effects approach as
specied by equation (2). Without the matched pairs feature of the eld experiment, we
can only imperfectly control for latent demand, which we do by including group xed
effects where the group is dened to be DVD title, item quality (new versus used), and
auction end date. The logic for this grouping is the same as that used in the matched
pairs analysis: that the pool of buyers present for one auction within a group is similar
or the same as the pool of buyers for the other auctions in that group. Nevertheless,
unobserved demand may also be reected in the k = 1 versus k > 1 distinction.
The results of our estimation are presented in Table 2.8. Columns 1 and 3 present
30Similar results are obtained under a probit specication (which is the specication employed by
S&A). This is discussed further in the following section.
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the results of our estimation of equation (1) with the k = 1 observations included and
excluded respectively. That the odds ratios on starting price are less than 1 and statis-
tically signicant at the 1% level, indicates that starting price is inversely related to the
dependent variable. Column 2 presents the odds ratios from a conditional logit regres-
sion, which includes group effects but includes the k = 1 observations. Again, the odds
ratio on starting price is less than 1 and statistically signicant at the 1% level. Column
4 presents the result of the conditional logit using only the k > 1 observations. The
odds ratio on starting price is not-statistically different from zero, indicating no effect of
starting price on the probability of receiving a bid.
Table 2.8: Effect of starting price on probability of additional bid  observational data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Starting price 0.817 0.858 0.904 1.002
(0.025) (0.033) (0.029) (0.049)
Log of minutes remaining 1.459 1.595 1.493 1.612
(0.025) (0.039) (0.027) (0.048)
Shipping charge 0.895 0.903 0.946 0.967
(0.100) (0.109) (0.058) (0.075)
New dummy 1.239 1.186
(0.135) (0.147)
Log of seller rating 1.010 1.033 1.001 1.044
(0.021) (0.031) (0.023) (0.042)
Seller positive percent rating 1.052 1.050 1.042 1.085
(0.023) (0.032) (0.026) (0.022)
Conditional on matched pair? No Yes No Yes
k = 1 observations excluded? No No Yes Yes
Observations 5706 5640 4420 4370
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We explained in the introduction that the behavioral mechanisms predict a negative
relationship between starting price and the incidence of further bidding while the stan-
dard model predicts no relationship. The results of this section are again consistent with
a standard rational model and not the behavioral mechanisms.
7 Discussion
There are several results in two closely related studies, L&M and S&A, which are in-
consistent with the current ndings and warrant discussion. S&A conduct versions of
the uniform price test and additional bid test that are presented in the current paper, yet
nd evidence that starting price is inversely related to ending prices and the probability
of additional bids (whereas we nd no relationship). We are able to replicate the nd-
ings in S&A for both the experimental and observational data by estimating regression
models with similar specications. Column 1 of Table 2.7 and column 1 of Table 2.8
contain these specications, and both show an important role for starting price. How-
ever, when we more completely control for heterogeneity in unobserved demand across
bids and auctions, the effect disappears. Column 4 of Table 2.7 and column 4 of Table
2.8 contain these results for the experimental and observational data.
This unobserved demand can be thought of as arising from a sample selection pro-
cedure whereby an observation only appears in the data if the auction received bids 
and hence had high realizations of unobserved demand  at all previous standing prices.
That is, unobserved demand is responsible for both the auction appearing in the data at
the given standing price and also for the auction receiving a bid at that standing price.
The surprising result that the probability of additional bids increases with standing price
after controlling for item and seller characteristics in the results in column 1 of Table 2.7
and column 1 of Table 2.8 (in essence, that demand increases with price), and that the
starting price-ending price relationship disappears after more completely controlling for
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unobserved demand, is consistent with this selection mechanism.
While the outcomes of the current study are broadly consistent with those in L&M,
we differ in interpreting the cause of the observed overbidding. L&M assert an irrational
limited attention mechanism whereby buyers overlook plainly obvious but lower-priced
alternatives to the auctions in which they are bidding. The key assumption is that all
bidders know all available options upon entering the bidding, which makes it irrational
to continue to bid in an auction once the standing price exceeds the xed-price option, or,
given the bidder faces switching costs of leaving the auction for the xed-price option,
makes it irrational for the bidder to enter the auction in the rst place given that the
auctions ending at a higher price on average than the xed-price option. However, if
bidders are not aware of all options, it may be rational to enter the auction and not to
switch to a competing xed-price option after entering.
To support the assumption that all bidders know all available options upon entering
the bidding, L&M reconstruct for each bid in their data the set of all auctions and xed
prices available at the time of the bid, assuming bidders see only Cashow 101 listings
and sort the listings by remaining listing time. They then provide evidence that when
the xed-price option is farther away from the auction that is actually chosen, in terms
of number of auctions listed between the chosen auction and the xed-price option, the
xed-price option is more likely to be overlooked; and the further down on the screen
the xed-price option is listed, the more likely it is to be overlooked. We believe instead
that eBay participants cannot be expected to learn all available options at reasonable
cost.
We conducted an eBay search of the Cashow 101 board game, which is the item of
focus in the L&M study, using the search terms Cashow versus Cashow 101, and
sorted the results by time remaining, ascending price, and descending price. The rst
ten search results for each search type are listed in Figure 2.3.31 The rst notable char-
31See Appendix B. The left-most column indicates the ordering of the search results, the next column
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acteristic of the search results is the large number of listings and differences in wording
and product types the bidder faces: there are 66 listings for Cashow 101 and 245
listings for Cashow, with audio versions, cassettes, CDs, Cashow 101 versus 202,
manuals, e-games, etc. Second it is apparent that which listings are seen by the bidder
are sensitive to how the results are sorted.32 Sorting by lowest price primarily returns
auctions while sorting by highest price primarily returns xed-price options (because
the current price in an active auction is typically lower than the xed-price alternative),
and sorting by remaining-listing-time gives a mix of the two.
Wenyan and Bolivar (2008) of eBay! Research Labs report that 30 percent of eBay
searches are sorted by a price ordering and not the remaining-listing-time default search
ordering.33 Thus, without knowing a bidder's search terms and ordering, it appears
infeasible to reconstruct with any precision the ordering of listings the bidder would
have observed. Given the multitude and variety of listings, we believe that information
acquisition costs are likely to affect bidder behavior, and that it is very plausible that the
17 percent of bidders that L&M show are responsible for the observed overbidding may
have simply searched using different search terms, used different search orderings, and
thus failed to account for all available items.34
over provides the item's search heading, and the next column over indicates whether the listing was for an
auction, `A', xed price option, `B', or a xed price option with the option to bid, `A,B'. Listings in this
last category are listed according to the xed price, until a bid is received, after which the item is listed as
an auction.
32The results of Figure 2.3 are re-sorted by lowest price rst in Figure 2.4, then by highest price in
Figure 2.5. See Appendix B.
33This statistic is for 2007 when remaining-listing-time was the default search ordering, as it was for
the period studied by L&M. Starting in 2008, the default search ordering was changed to a new best
match format.
34The ndings of L&M that bidders are less likely to consider eBay items that are listed further away in
the search results page from the auction that is actually chosen, and that this pattern is most pronounced
at the time the bidder rst enters an auction, is also consistent with information acquisition costs.
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8 Conclusion
This paper takes a closer look at a range of non-standard preferences and irrational be-
haviors that have been proposed in recent years and nds little evidence that they are
important in explaining auction outcomes in the eld. Our conclusions are based on
two sets of analyses: First we test the predictions of a theoretical model of rational buy-
ers with standard preferences and heterogeneous search costs using experimental data.
Second, we reassess a signicant result reported in S&A by controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity using both experimental and observational data.
In testing the predictions of our theoretical model, we begin by comparing average
ending prices across the HSPA and LSPA treatments in the eld experiment. The model
of P&S assumes that buyers bid as many times as they please in either auction within the
pair, which leads to the conclusion that when both auctions result in a sale, their ending
prices will be equal. We consider a modication to P&S in which some subset of buyers
is constrained to only bid in one auction, leading to the conclusion that conditional upon
both the HSPA and the LSPA ending at prices strictly above the starting price in the
HSPA, ending prices should be equal in expectation. This prediction stands in contrast
to those of models of irrational bidding that predict the LSPA to end at a higher price.
The results of our test fail to reject the null hypothesis that average ending prices are
equal.
Next, we look at overbidding and test whether our theoretical model explains specic
incidences of overbidding. In contrast to P&S, the model we present allows for variation
in ending prices across auctions in a matched pair due to the presence of unaware buyers
but predicts instances of overbidding as being equally likely to occur in a HSPA as a
LSPA. This prediction stands in contrast to the behavioral models which predict that
overbidding is more likely to occur in LSPAs. We nd no evidence that overbidding is
triggered by any of the behavioral mechanisms though they can be explained by unaware
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bidding.
In the second set of analyses, we replicate the empirical strategy of S&A but more
carefully control for unobserved demand, and nd little evidence to support the pre-
diction that lower starting prices lead to more bidding, conditional on standing price.
Using the matched-pairs feature of the eld experiment, we control for unobserved de-
mand using a xed effect for each pair. The effect of starting price on the probability of
receiving a bid disappears under this specication, and separately under an alternative
specication in which the k = 1 observations are removed. With the observational data,
we group auctions by DVD title/item quality/end date, which admittedly is a weaker
control for unobserved demand since buyers may only enter an auction at the very end
and may not be aware of other auctions ended earlier or ending later in the day. It is un-
der this specication that controlling for k = 1 versus k > 1 becomes more important.
The effect of starting price on the probability of receiving a bid disappears when this
specication is coupled with the removal of the k = 1 observations.35
In sum, the analyses we have performed all indicate that various behavioral mecha-
nisms that have received a great deal of attention recently do not appear to be important
in the eBay environment. Further, it appears that a more standard model in which buyers
are rational but face search costs predict the outcomes of our experimental and observa-
tional data to a much greater extent. This paper, therefore, serves as a cautionary note
that results that may appear unusual may have mundane explanations.
35To more completely control for unobserved demand in the observational data, we suggest estimating
the probability of the receipt of an additional bid using a sample selection framework in which the kth
observation from a given auction only appears in the data, conditional upon the rst k   1 observations
receiving bids. This approach requires one to estimate a multivariate probit model, a computational bur-
densome exercise. This is a possible extension to the current paper, which we are currently pursuing and
which will allow us to more explicitly control for unobserved demand and also run various counterfactual
experiments using the resulting structural model.
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APPENDIX
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof procedes in multiple parts, rst establishing that there is no incentive for an
aware buyer to deviate when all other aware buyers play according to  and all unaware
buyer play according to ; next establishing that there is no incentive for an unaware
buyer to deviate when all aware buyers play according to  and all other unaware buyers
play according to . We spend considerably more time on the rst. Lemmas 1 and 2
characterize the outcome following from some arbitrary state of the game in which all
buyers play according to their proposed equilibrium strategies in what follows. Lemmas
3 - 5 establish that their is no incentive for an aware buyer to deviate from  and Lemma
6 establishes that their is no incentive for an unaware buyer to deviate from .
Let the state of the game be the array of buyers' valuations, sellers' standing prices
together with the identities of buyers who have submitted them, the high bids together
with the identities of the high bidders, the history of the standing and high bids, and the
order in which the buyers move. There is a one-to-one relationship between the nodes
in the game and its states. Precisely, the state of the game is a full description of the
corresponding node in the game. Dene a public state of the game as the union of all
components of the state of the game that are publicly known. Specically,the public
state of the game includes the standing prices, the identities of the high bidders, the
history of all these, and the order of moves. We will assign indices to buyers based on
the order of their entry, with buyer 1 arriving rst and having the rst opportunity to
submit new bid(s) after being outbid, and so on.
At each information set where a buyer is called to move, the buyer knows the public
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state of the game, her own high bids and her bidding history. Information sets are
partially ordered: one information set precedes the other if the latter can be reached
via some sequence of moves from the former. A path of the game is a collection of
all information sets such that for any pair of information sets in it one can be reached
via some sequence of moves from the other. Since the prole of the standing bids in
our bidding game is ascending, along any path, one information set precedes the other
if and only if the standing bid at each seller at the former information set is (weakly)
lower than at the latter.
The equilibrium requires that we specify beliefs for both aware and unaware buyers
both on and off the equilibrium path.
Denition 6 The following characterize the beliefs of all buyers both on and off the
equilibrium path:
1. Aware buyers know that with some probability , each opposing bidder may be
an unaware buyer who nds it too costly to discover the location of the paired
auction.
2. Buyers do not know the aware-unaware status of other buyers and can only infer
it based on each buyer's bidding.
3. Given equilibrium strategies  and , all buyers upon observing a buyer who
has bid multiple times, but always in the auction with the lowest stading price,
believe the buyer to be aware with probability one. The posterior beliefs about
the buyer's high bid are updated as follows: if the standing price has not changed
since the last change in high bidder, buyers infer that the high bid is d greater than
the standing price; if the standing price has changed once since the last change
in high bidder, buyers infer that the high bid is equal to the standing price; if
the standing price has changed more than once since the last change in high
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bidder, then buyers' prior beliefs were incorrect as the bidding of the high bidder
is inconsistent with .
4. Given  and , all buyers upon observing a buyer who has bid only once and the
standing price has increased by at least 2d since the buyer placed his bid, believe
the buyer to be unaware with probability one. The posterior beliefs about the
buyer's high bid are characterized by the posterior distribution of F; conditioning
on the event that the bid is as large as the cutoff value inferred.
5. Given  and , all buyers upon observing a buyer bid only once, all buyers
update their beliefs over whether the bidder is aware, given the likelihood that
the observed bidding would be placed by an aware buyer and unaware buyer in
accordance with  and , respectively. The posterior beliefs about the high bid-
ders is a probability weighted distribution constructed by weighting the respective
distributions conditional upon the buyer being aware and unaware by the proba-
bility that the buyer is aware and unaware.
6. If the observed bidding is inconsistent with  and , the posterior beliefs about
the buyer's high bid are characterized by an arbitrary posterior distribution G,
assigning positive probability over all values in 
, conditioning on the event that
the bid is as large as the cutoff value inferred.
Clearly, these beliefs are rational on an equilibrium path where all buyers follow
 = f; g.
The following establishes the notation used in characterizing the various states of the
game. Let   denote some arbitrary state of the game and G ( ) denote the continuation
game starting from an information set corresponding to  . Consider then any point p on
the grid, and let aj (p;  ) = 1 if auction j has a standing price in state   of p or less, 0
otherwise. An auction for which aj (p;  ) = 0 is one in which a bid of p or less would
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not be possible in state   as either the starting price is above p or the standing price was
bid up above p prior to state   being reached.
Turning to the demand side of the market, let bi (p; j;  ) = 1, for buyer i, a par-
ticipant in auction j, that has a standing price of p in state  , if buyer i is not a high
bidder in the paired auction and buyer i's valuation is no less than p + d. A buyer for
whom bi (p; j;  ) = 1 is willing to bid in any state of the continuation game from state
  where she does not hold a high bid in either auction and the standing price in auction
j does not exceed p and is less than the standing price in the paired auction. Further, let
bdi (p; j;  ) = 1, if buyer i holds a high bid in auction j of at least p which was placed
prior to state   and buyer i's valuation is no greater than p, and equal to 0 otherwise.
A buyer for whom bdi (p; j;  ) = 1 has already deviated from the equilibrium strategies
and holds a high bid such that were she to be outbid, she would not bid further. Thus,
even if she were to follow her prescribed equilibrium strategy going forward i.e. placing
no further bids, she may still obtain an item at a price exceeding her valuation.
To denote the ending prices following state  , dene Pj ( ) such that,
Pj ( ) = max

pjPi bi (Pj ( )  d; j;  ) + bdi (Pj ( )  d; j;  ) > 1; j 2 fL;Hg	
if such a p exists, vmax otherwise (recall that vmax is the highest point on the grid). If
aj (Pj ( ) ;  ) = 1, then Pj ( ) is the lowest standing price at which there is no incentive
for buyers to bid further.
Given the above discussion, it will be useful to distinguish those outcomes, follow-
ing stage  , in which ending prices across the two auctions coincide. In this way, let
bui (p; j;  ) = 1 for an unaware buyer i, who is active in auction j and whose valua-
tion is no less than p + d, 0 otherwise. It should be noted that for an unaware buyer,
bui (p; j;  ) = bi (p; j;  ). Note further that bui differs from bdi in that for bdi to equal 1
requires that the buyer deviated from the equilibrium strategy, whereas bui equal to 1 is
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consistent with the buyer playing in accordance with .
Lemma 1 Upon an aware buyer i being called to bid in state  , when bidding in ac-
cordance with , the following describes the lowest standing price as of the time she
passes:
1. If buyer i bids only in one auction j, then her last bid leaves auction j with a
standing price no greater than the standing price in the paired auction.
2. If buyer i bids in both auctions, then if she stops bidding because the lowest stand-
ing price is no longer lower than her valuation, then after her last bid, the standing
prices will be equal.
3. Otherwise, buyer i bids in both auctions and stops bidding upon becoming the
high bidder in some auction j, in which case, the standing price in auction j,
denoted pj; will be either equal to or d less than the standing price in the paired
auction. The standing prices will be equal after i's last bid if upon reaching a state
in which the standing prices in both auctions are pj , she bids in auction j. Then
this will be her last bid. If however, she bids in the paired auction, j0, whereby
it has been assumed that the bid does not make her the high bidder, the standing
price in j0 will increase to pj + d: Buyer i0s next and last bid will make her the
high bidder in auction j with a standing price of pj .
Proof. Suppose rst that when buyer i is called to bid, there is a unique lowest standing
price in auction j, say. In accordance with , buyer i will bid in auction j in an amount
d above the standing price. If the bid results in either buyer i becoming the high bidder
in j or causes the standing price to increase to where the next highest allowable bid in
either auction is above buyer i's valuation, he will not bid again during this turn. Since
the standing price in auction j will have increased by at most d, the fact that auction
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j had previously had a lower standing price implies that the current standing price in
auction j can be no greater than the standing price in the paired auction.
Suppose then that the bid does not make i the high bidder in j, nor does it raise
the standing price in j to i's valuation, then i will continue to bid in j until the sooner
of the following: (i) buyer i becomes the high bidder in j; (ii) the standing price in j
equals i's valuation; or (iii) the standing price in j equals that of the paired auction. If
i or ii occur rst, then the standing price in auction j must be weakly lower than that of
the paired auction, otherwise, iii would have occured rst. If iii does occur rst, then
in determining which auction to place her next bid, buyer i takes into account that the
standing price in auction j has changed since the last change in high bidder. Therefore,
if the standing price in the paired auction j0 has not changed since the last change in
high bidder, then buyer i bids in auction j. Otherwise, i must make inferences on the
likelihood that the high price in each auction is equal to the standing price and bid
accordingly. Regardless of which auction buyer i chooses, she will continue bidding,
choosing amongst the two auctions in this manner until either becoming a high bidder
in one auction or until the lowest standing price equals her valuation.
Suppose it is the latter. In that case, the standing prices in both auctions must equal
buyer i's valuation. If not, then buyer i must have bid in an auction an amount above
her valuation, which is in violation of . Suppose instead that it is the former. Since
buyer i bids in both auctions, then at some point prior to becoming high bidder, the
standing prices in the two auctions must have been equal. Consider then the last such
standing price at which the two auctions have the same standing price prior to buyer i
becoming high bidder. There are then two cases to consider. First, suppose that buyer i
becomes high bidder with his rst bid placed in auction j, say. Since buyer i has become
the high bidder, the standing price will not have changed, so the standing prices in the
two auctions will remain equal. Next, suppose that buyer i's bid in auction j does not
make him the high bidder in that auction. Such a bid will necessarily raise the standing
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price in auction j, by d. Buyer i's next bid will then be in auction j0. If buyer i's bid
in j0 makes him the high bidder, then the standing price in that auction will not have
increased, thus leaving the standing price in j0 to be d less than in auction j. Lastly, if
buyer i's bid in auction j0 does not make him the high bidder in that auction, then his
bid will have raised the standing price in auction j0 to be equal to that of auction j. This
contradicts the assertion that we were considering the last such standing price at which
the two auctions have the same standing price prior to buyer i becoming a high bidder.
In what follows, let P 0 ( ) = minj fPj ( )g
Lemma 2 Consider any state  . If all aware and unaware buyers use  and ; re-
spectively, in G ( ), then the following must hold:
1. The ending price in any auction j that ends in a sale is Pj ( ).
2. Any auction j for which aj (Pj ( ) ;  ) = 1 results in a sale.
3. PL ( ) = PH ( ) = P 0 ( ) if either both auctions are won by aware buyers for
whom bi (P 0 ( ) ; j;  ) = 1 or if not, then if the second highest valuation in both
auctions is that of an aware buyer for whom bi (P 0 ( )  d; j;  ) = 1; in which
case, the common ending price will be the aware buyer's valuation.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that the ending price in auction j is some
p0 < Pj ( ). In that case,
P
i bi (p
0; j;  ) > 1; so there exists a buyer i who is not a high
bidder in either auction at a standing price strictly below his valuation. Therefore, upon
being called upon to bid, buyer i would not pass, thus contracting the fact that buyer i
had bid in accordance with the prescribed equilibrium strategies.
Suppose then that the ending price in auction j is some p00 > Pj ( ). For the standing
price in auction j to have reached p00 implies the existence of a second bidder who had
bid at least p00: By the construction of Pj ( ), such a bid must have come from a buyer
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that was either a high bidder in the paired auction or whose valuation was strictly below
p00, thus contradicting the assertion that all buyers bid in accordance with the prescribed
equilibrium strategies.
To prove the second part, assume by way of contradiction that aj (Pj ( ) ;  ) = 1
and auction j does not receive any bids. By denition of Pj ( ), there is a buyer i whose
valuation is at least Pj ( ), is not a high bidder in the paired auction, and who has not
bid in auction j. When called to bid, buyer i would bid at least Pj ( ) (if he is an aware
buyer, he will Pj ( )+d in accordance with ; if he is unaware, he will bid his valuation
in accordance with , which is at least Pj ( )+ d), thus contradicting the assertion that
all buyers had bid in accordance with the equillibrium strategies.
The third part of the lemma follows from Lemma 1. Since upon an aware buyer
becoming the high bidder in an auction, the standing price in that auction can be no
greater than the standing price in the paired auction, it follows that if both auctions have
high bidders that are aware buyers, there standing prices must be equal.
Next, suppose this is not the case, but that the second highest valuation bidder in
both auctions is an aware buyer. Upon an aware buyer i placing her last bid when not
the high bidder, the standing prices in the two auctions must be equal. Therefore, it
remains only to show that the result holds even when the aware buyer whose valuation
determines the prices in both auctions is not the nal bidder. It follows that the high bid
in one of the auctions must have been placed after buyer i had become a high bidder, in
auction j, say; if not then there will have been two bids placed since buyer i's last bid
in auction j, which would contradict the assertion that buyer i's nal bid determined the
ending price in that auction. It follows that for buyer i not to have bid in response to
being outbid in auction j, then the standing price upon being outbid must have equaled
her valuation, v. Further, by Lemma 1, by the fact that buyer i had been a high bidder,
the standing price in the paired auction, j0, must have been at least as high as in auction
j. Specically, since buyer i's bid determines the price in auction j0, the standing price
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in auction j0 as of buyer i becoming the high bidder in auction j must have been v.
The rst two parts of Lemma 2 provide what are akin to supply and demand argu-
ments regarding the resulting ending prices in the two auctions respectively. The third
part of the lemma indicates the conditions under which the ending prices in the two
auctions will equate. Intuitively, this third result shows that as long at least one aware
buyer is involved in determining the price in each auction (as either the high bidder or
second-highest bidder), then their prices will equate. Thus, only if there exist at least
two unaware buyers in an auction whose valuations exceed the highest bid placed by
an aware buyer, will that auctions price diverge that of the paired auction. We focus
on the highest bid, as opposed to the highest valuation, or an aware buyer as the highest
valuation aware buyer need not bid up to her valuation in order to win the paired auction.
To formalize the previous argument, let Y uj denote the second-highest valuation of
all unaware buyers in auction j and let Yj denote the second highest value among the
following: the valuations of all aware buyers; the valuations of all unaware buyers in
auction j; and auction j's starting price. Then, in an equilibrium of the game in wich
buyers play in accordance with  and  respectively, then if there exists a j such that
Y uj  Y j , then the ending price in auction j exceeds that of  j.
The following three lemmas demonstrate that an aware buyer cannot protably devi-
ate from  when all other aware buyers play in accordance with  and all unaware buy-
ers play in accordance with . In what follows letM (P 0 ( ))  fjjPj ( ) = P 0 ( )g
and let gi (p;  ) denote the number of high bids help by buyer i in auctions with a stand-
ing price of at least p in G ( ).
Lemma 3 Suppose that inG ( ), all buyers other than i follow, buyer i has valuation
vi and follows some strategy 0 6=  such that the lowest ending price is some P 0 <
P 0 ( ) : Then for vi  P 0 ( ), in state  , buyer i does not obtain any units at a price
strictly below P 0 ( ).
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Proof. If vi  P 0 ( ), then by bidding in accordance with , i obtains an item. By
denition of P 0 ( ), we have that for any auction j with an ending price such that
P 0 < P 0 ( ), P
i

bi (P
0; j;  ) + bdi (P
0; j;  )

> 1: (3)
Therefore, there exists a buyer k 6= i such that bk (P 0; j;  )+bdk (P 0; j;  ) = 1who holds
a high bid in j at a standing price of P 0. Suppose not. If bk (P 0; j;  ) = 1, then since P 0
is the lowest standing price, k bids in j in accordance with . If this bid fails to make
k the high bidder in j, then it raises the standing price above P 0, thus contradicting the
assumption that P 0 is the lowest ending price. If instead, bdk (P 0; j;  ) = 1 and k is not
the high bidder in j, then there must exist a second buyer with a bid in j of at least P 0,
thus contradicting the assumption that P 0 is the ending price in j.
Given the existence of such a k in every such j, it follows that for any P 0  P 0 ( ) 
d, i cannot trade at any such j for a price less than P 0 ( ). Lastly, since any other auction
has a standing price of at least P 0 ( ), i cannot trade in those auctions for any price less
than P 0 ( ).
Lemma 4 Suppose that in G ( ), all buyer other than i follow , buyer i follows some
strategy 0 6=  such that the lowest ending price is P 0 > P 0 ( ). Then the number of
units obtained by i and her total payment is at least as large as when he follows .
Proof. When bidding in accordance with , buyer i obtains at least I (;  ) units
where,
I (;  ) =
P
j2M(P 0( ))
P
k 6=i

aj
 
P 0 ( ) ;  
  bk  P 0 ( ) ; j;    bdk  P 0 ( ) ; j;  
+
Pvmax
p=P o( )+d gi (p;  ) :
Upon deviating to 0 such that the lowest ending price is P 0 > P 0 ( ), i obtains at most
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I (0;  ) units, where,
I (0;  ) =
P
j2M(P 0)
P
k 6=i

aj (P
0;  )  bk (P 0; j;  )  bdk (P 0; j;  )

+
Pvmax
p=P 0+d gi (p;  ) :
It follows that i purchases at least as many units playing 0 as with  if:
I (0;  )  I (;  ) : (4)
If P 0 = P 0 ( ), inequality (4) holds trivially. Otherwise, let P 0 = P 0 ( ) + d, for
some  2 N: Inequality (4) is implied by the following:
 Pj2M(p+d) aj (p+ d;  ) Pj2M(p) aj (p;  ) is the number of auctions selling for
exactly p+ d:
 bk (p+ d; j;  ) + bdk (p+ d; j;  )   bk (p; j;  ) + bdk (p; j;  ) does not exceed
the number of high bids that buyer j holds in   in auctions whose standing prices
are p+ d.
 gi (p+ d;  ) is the number of high bids that buyer i holds in   in auctions whose
standing prices in   are exactly p+ d.
Lemma 5 Suppose that in G ( ), all buyer other than i follow , buyer i follows some
strategy 0 6=  such that the lowest ending price is P 0 ( ). Then i's payoff is no higher
than the payoff she obtains by following .
Proof. If buyer i had not deviated from  prior to state  , then when all other buyers
play according to , Lemmas 3 and 4 are sufcient to establish that there is no incentive
to deviate in state  . Thus, the only buyers worth considering are those that have already
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deviated prior to state  , either by becoming high bidder in two auctions or by becoming
high bidder at a standing price above one's valuation.
Regardless of whether the deviation makes the bidder the high bidder in two auc-
tions, deviation D2, or at a standing price above her valuation, deviation D1, bidding
in accordance with , has buyer i pass until i is no longer the high bidder in an auc-
tion in which she would earn negative surplus would she to have won. If the buyer had
committed deviation D1, then  has her pass for the duration of the auctions. If she
had committed deviation D2,  would call for her to bid if she were no longer a high
bidder in either auction where the lowest standing price is below her valuation. Thus,
following 0 in stage   has buyer i bid in either auction while still high bidder in an
auction in which she earns negative surplus. This would necessarily consist of a bid in
excess of one of her high bids were the buyer to have committed deviation D2. If buyer
i had committed deviation D1, the deviation could also include a bid in the auction in
which she is not the high bidder.
The only potential strategic purpose of a deviation bid in state   would be to inu-
ence the beliefs of other aware buyers to make them more likely to bid in the auction in
which her surplus is lowest if she were to remain high bidder, thus supplanting buyer i
as the high bidder. Given the detion of , such beliefs affect opposing aware buyers'
bidding only upon reaching a state at which the two auctions have the same standing
price. In such case, if the bidding of the high bidder in auction j, which is buyer i, was
consistent with  to that point and if the standing price had increased once since buyer
i became the high bidder, then an opposing aware buyer i0 would infer that the high bid
in auction j was equal to its standing price. Thus, if the same were true in auction j0,
buyer i0 would randomize between the two auction. If the same inference could not be
made for the high bid in auction j0, then buyer i0 will bid in auction j with probability
one and let buyer i off the hook. Note that buyer i's beliefs regarding buyer i's high bid
matter only if the high bid in auction j0 were equal to buyer i's high bid. If the high bid
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in auction j0 were above buyer i's high bid, then even if buyer i0 bid in j0 rst, then upon
failing to become the high bidder in j0, she would then bid in auction j.
The point to realize is that even if buyer i0, upon reaching state   in which she infers
that the high bid of buyer i is equal to the standing price, any deviation from  in  
by buyer i would require buyer i0 to revise his beliefs. Such a revision would have her
believe that buyer i's high bid were equal to or greater than the standing price, with an
expectation determined by rule 5 in Denition 6. If, on the other hand, buyer i0 already
believed the high bid of buyer i to be determined by rule 5 of Denition 6, then any
further deviation by buyer i will do nothing to change belief. Thus, we can infer that
there is no deviation 0 that can positively affect the outcome of buyer i. Further, since
any such deviation subjects i to the possibility of exacerbating her loss, by increasing
the price she would pay or by causing her to become high bidder in a second auction,
there is no incentive for i to deviate from  in state  .
Having established that there is no incentive for an aware buyer to deviate from 
when all other buyers play according to , we turn our attention to unaware buyers.
Lemma 6 When all buyers bid according to , bidding according to  is a best re-
sponse for an unaware buyer.
Proof. Consider an unaware buyer i, with valuation v;who participates in auction j such
if i follows  in stage  , the ending price in auction j is either Pj ( ) or Pj ( ) + d:
First suppose that buyer i enters only after state  . Notice that if Pj ( ) > v, then any
deviation that has buyer i win the auction and pay a price no less than Pj ( ) provides
him with negative surplus. If Pj ( ) + d  v, then a deviation that has buyer i lower
his maximum bid from v can either have no effect on i's surplus, or could cause him to
lose the auction when a high bid of v would have had him earn positive surplus. Next,
consider a deviation 0 that has buyer i submit a high bid of v, but has him bid up to v in
more than one bid. Such a deviation affect buyer i's surplus only if (i) v  Pj ( ) + d;
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and (ii) bidding in accordance with 0 is perceived by aware buyers to be consistent with
. In this case, should the high bidder in the paired auction j0 be an aware buyer and
Yj0 = Pj ( ), then upon reaching a state in which both auctions have a standing price
of Pj ( ), the highest valuation aware buyer may, with positive probability bid rst in
auction j, rasing the price to Pj ( ) + d (in accordance with the third point 3 in Lemma
1). Of course, such a bid may have been placed with positive probability even if i had
bid in accordance with : It remains to show that there does not exists a strategy 0 that
calls i to bid up to v while minimizing the probability that i's price is Pj ( ) + d:
There are two cases to consider. In the rst, suppose that v is at least 2d more than
the standing price in j at stage  . Suppose further that a bid of v makes i the high bidder
in j. If not, what follows is irrelevant. If i bids v in  , then if the standing price increases
by at least 2d, buyers will infer that i's bidding is inconsistent with . If i's bid of v
does not immediately raise the standing price by 2d, then as the standing price in j is bid
up to Pj ( ) in subsequent rounds of bidding, once the standing price increases by 2d
without a chance in high bidder, buyers will make the same inference as if the standing
price had been raised by 2d immediately following i's bid. Thus, any 0 such that i's
bidding according to 0 causes aware buyers to infer that i's bidding is inconsistent with
, leaves them with the same beliefs regarding i's high bid once Pj ( ) is reached as
if i bids according to . In the second case, v is only d greater than the standing price
in j at stage  : In this case,  is the only strategy available to i that has him bid v in
auction j.
Next, consider buyer i's strategy in stage   where he had already entered prior to
stage  . If i had already bid v, then by arguments given previously, any additional
bidding only serves to increase the probability that i wins j at a price above v. If i had
previously bid above v, then any additional bids would have to be placed in auction j
above his previous high bid. Such bidding can only serve to increase the probability that
i wins in j at a price above v. If i had followed any other strategy such that his high
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bid was below v, then if his previous maximum bid were to hold up, then bidding v in
stage   would have no effect on the outcome. However, even if his previous maximum
bid were a high bid, there is a probability that it won't hold up at a price strictly below
v. In this case, i losses out on a protable transaction. It remains to show that if i's
previous maximum were below v, then no alternative strategy 0 that has i bid up to v in
 , has i pay Pj ( ) with a higher probability, as opposed to Pj ( ) + d. The arguments
are identical to those given for the case in which i had not entered prior to stage  .
A.2 Proof of Corollary 1
In characterizing the difference in ending prices, we distinguish between those auctions
in which the price is determined by solely by unaware buyers (i.e. the two highest
bidders are unaware buyers) from those that are not. Dene  such that:
 =

jjPj > Y uj
	
;
where Y uj denotes the second-highest valuation amongst all unaware buyer buyers in
auction j if there are at least two unaware buyers in auction j, zero otherwise. Let 
denote the complement of . If, under the hypothesis, we restrict attention to states at
the conclusion of the bidding such that both auctions have standing prices of at least
SH + e, there are four states to consider:
 fL;H 2 g, in which case, PL = PH ;
 L 2 ; H 2 	, in which case, PL < PH ;
 L 2 ; H 2 	, in which case, PH < PL;
 L;H 2 	, in which case, the comparison between PL and PH is ambiguous.
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Let  denote the probability of the event

L 2 ; H 2 	. The notation for the
probability of the remaining events as enumerated above follow this construction. In
calculating the probability of each state, we condition on there being a totla ofm poten-
tial buyers in the market. Each of the m buyers, with probability  is uninformed, and
with probability 1  , is informed. Conditional upon being informed, with probability
, the buyer enters auction L, and with probability 1   , enters auction H . Let We
N fkL; kH ;m;; g denote the probability of there being kL unaware buyers in auction
L and kH unaware buyers in auction H , given m; , and . We will often express N in
shorthand without the nal three arguments removed. We have that:
N fkL; kHg =

m
kL + kH

kL + kH
kL

kL+kH (1  )m kL kH kL (1  )kH :
In calculating the expected prices across the various states, we make use of order
statistics. Using standard notation for order statistics, let X(k:n) denote kth highest
value of n independent values. For our purposes, k and n denote the number of buyers
participating in a given auction, with the ordering being taken over their valuations.
Noting that the price difference is zero when L;H 2 , we then have that:
D (SH) = E [PL   PH jPL; PH  SH + e]
=
1X
kH=0
m kHX
kL=2
E

X(2:kL)  X(2:m kL)jL 2 ; H 2 ; kL; kH

N fkL; kHg
+
1X
kL=0
m kLX
kH=2
E

X(2:m kH)  X(2:kH)jL 2 ; H 2 ; kL; kH

N fkL; kHg
+
m 2X
kH=2
m kHX
kL=2
E

X(2:m kH)  X(2:kH)jL;H 2 ; kL; kH

N fkL; kHg : (5)
Note that when N fkL; kHg = N fkH ; kLg ; the following are true:
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1. The second term in the three-component summation of D (SH) is the negative of
the rst; and
2. The third term is zero.
We have that N fkL; kHg = N fkH ; kLg if  = 1=2:
A.3 Proof of Corollary 2
By denition, an auction can be characterized as a divergent price auction if it can be
inferred from the ending prices of the two auctions that the second-highest valuation of
all buyers in the divergent auction exceeds that of the paired auction by at least d. Let
the event j 2  if auction j is a divergent auction. It follows that:
P fj = Ljj 2 g = P fj 2 jj = LgP fj = Lg
P fj 2 jj = LgP fj = Lg+ P fj 2 jj = HgP fj = Hg :
Since P fj = Lg = P fj = Hg = 1=2, given the matched-pairs design, it follows that,
P fj = Ljj 2 g = P fj = Ljj 2 g = 1=2
if P fj 2 jj = Lg = P fj 2 jj = Hg :We have that for any mL and mH such that
mL +mH = m,
P fj 2 jj = Lg = P X(2:mL)  X(2:mH) + djX(2:mL)  SH + e	 : (6)
Under the assumption that  = 1=2, we have that P fkL;kHg = P fkH ; kLg. There-
fore the conditional distribution of the second order statistic in auction L, conditional
on being at least SH + e is identical to that of auction H , which implies our result.
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
The model presented in Section 2.2 is identical to that of P&S, except for the inclusion
of   0. We can think of P&S' model as a special case of our model in which   0. In
that case, let 0 denote the proposed equilibrium strategy under P&S as a special case of
. It is evident that the comparison of buyers' payoffs across strategies is isomorphic
to the inclusion of  once  shifted starting prices are accounted for. Therefore, if 0
constitutes a perfect-Bayesian equilibrium when  = 0, so too does  when  > 0.
A.5 Proof of Corollary 3
When  = 0, the equilibrium corresponding to 0 is such that if PL  SH , then PL =
PH . This is because once the starting price in auction L reaches SH , the next bid will,
with positive probability, be in auction H . If the next bid is placed in auction H , the
buyer that placed the bid will pass as the bid would make her the high bidder in auction
H . If not, then the buyer will become the high bidder in auction L, since she would only
bid in auction L if the standing price had increased once since the last change in high
bidder. In that case, the next buyer to bid will bid in auction H: In either case, the rst
bid in auction H will occur when the two auction have equal standing prices. From this
point on, the two auctions' standing prices will continue to be equal until the bidding
concludes, though their high bids may differ by at most d.
Now consider the equilibrium corresponding to  when  > 0. Following , the
rst bid will be placed in auction H when the standing price in auction L is SH + .
Following the rst bid in auction H , the two auctions' standing prices will continue to
differ by exactly , though their high bids may differ by at most  + d. It follows that if
PH  SH + e, then PL = PH + .
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A.6 Proof of Corollary 4
Given the results of Corollary 3 if PL > SH + e, then PL   PH > e and auction L is
a divergent auction. If PL = SH + e, then neither auction is a divergent auction. If,
PH  SH + e, then PL   PH =  > e, so that again, auction L is a divergent auction.
B Additional Figures
Brand New!! Factory sealed.
This widescreen version of {insert name} is brand new in the original shrink wrap.
Payment by Pay Pal and money orders.
Ships anywhere in the U.S. and territories via first-class mail for a flat fee of $3.00.
No combined shipping on multiple items. Sorry.
Will ship within 48 hours after receipt of payment.
Happy Bidding.
Figure 2.2: eBay listing, item description
Search term is "Cashflow 101," sorted by "Time: ending soonest," 66 results Search term is "Cashflow," sorted by "Time: ending soonest," 245 results
1 New CASHFLOW 101 BOARDGAME RICH DAD + READY STOCK B Rich Dad's Cashflow Quadrant by Robert T. Kiyosaki, … A
2 Cashflow 101 investment game Rich Poor Dad Kiyosaki NEW B 5 x MEI Cashflow Bill Acceptor SC6607R Frame 252007032 A
3 CASHFLOW THE E-GAME (101 & 202) A New CASHFLOW 101 BOARDGAME RICH DAD + READY STOCK B
4 CASHFLOW THE E-GAME (101 & 202) A Cashflow 101 investment game Rich Poor Dad Kiyosaki NEW B
5 RICH DAD CASHFLOW 101 BOARDGAME w/BOOK & AUDIO GUIDE A Rich Dad's Cashflow Quadrant: Robert T. Kiyosaki, Shar A,B
6 NEW SEAL CASHFLOW 101 BOARD GAME RICH POOR DAD KIYOSAKI B Ron Legend's Quick Start Book Camp+ Cashflow Manuals$$ A,B
7 NEW RICH POOR DAD CASHFLOW 101 BOARDGAME KIYOSAKI A CASHFLOW THE E-GAME (101 & 202) A
8 NEW CASHFLOW 202 + 101 BOARDGAME RICH POOR DAD KIYOSAKI A CASHFLOW THE E-GAME (101 & 202) A
9 New Seal Cashflow 101 Board Game Express 3 Day Ship + B Rich Dad's Cashflow Quadrant by Robert T. Kiyosaki, … A
10 NEW RICH POOR DAD CASHFLOW 101 BOARDGAME KIYOSAKI A RICH DAD CASHFLOW 101 BOARDGAME w/BOOK & AUDIO GUIDE A
Figure 2.3: Cashow search results, sorted by end time
Search term is "Cashflow 101," sorted by "Price + Shipping: Lowest First," 66 results Search term is "Cashflow," sorted by "Price + Shipping: Lowest first," 245 results
1 NEW RICH POOR DAD CASHFLOW 101 BOARDGAME KIYOSAKI A NEW RICH POOR DAD CASHFLOW 101 BOARDGAME KIYOSAKI A
2 RICH POOR DAD CASHFLOW 202 BOARDGAME KIYOSAKI FOR 101 A RICH POOR DAD CASHFLOW 202 BOARDGAME KIYOSAKI FOR 101 A
3 Cashflow 101 Robert Kiyosaki 3 cassettes A Cashflow Quadrant (Rich Dad's Advisers) A
4 Rich Dad's Cashflow 101 A Squash, Cashflow, 25 seeds, Vegetable Seed B
5 NEW RICH POOR DAD CASHFLOW 101 BOARDGAME KIYOSAKI A The Cashflow Quadrant by Robert T. Kiyosaki, Sharon L. A
6 Cashflow 101 A Rich Dad's Cashflow Quadrant by Robert T. Kiyosaki, … A
7 Cashflow 101 +EXTRAS bonus Robert Kiyosaki Rich Dad NR A Rich Dad's Cashflow Quadrant Audiobook, Kiyosaki A
8 CASHFLOW 101 Rich Dad Board Game Real Estate Investor A R&B, CASHFLOW Love Education 12" Single Vinyl Record. A
9 CASHFLOW E-GAME 101 & 202 A Rich Dad's Cashflow Quadrant by Robert T. Kiyosaki A
10 Cashflow 101 Board Game Complete Good Condition A Cashflow Quadrant: Rich Dad's Guide to Financial F B
Figure 2.4: Cashow search results, sorted by lowest price
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Search term is "Cashflow 101," sorted by "Price + Shipping: Highest First," 66 results Search term is "Cashflow," sorted by "Price + Shipping: Highest first," 245 results
1 NEW CASHFLOW 202 + 101 BOARDGAME RICH POOR DAD KIYOSAKI B CASHFLOW CASHFLOW original germany 1986 CD cameo B
2 Cashflow 101 Board Game Financial Rich Poor Dad Finance B CA$HFLOW CASHFLOW Same s/t 1986 WEST GERMANY CD Cameo B
3 CASHFLOW 101 Board Game Rich Dad Poor Dad KIYOSAKI B MEI NCR CASHFLOW CURRENCY BILL ACCEPTOR 252017140 NEW! B
4 GENUINE CASHFLOW 101 Robert Kiyosaki Rich Poor Dad B CA$HFLOW CASHFLOW (1986) @@ Original Germany CD Cameo B
5 RICH DAD POOR DAD CASHFLOW 101 GAME BOARD - NEW B NEW CASHFLOW 202 + 101 BOARDGAME RICH POOR DAD KIYOSAKI B
6 Cashflow 101 investment game Rich Poor Dad Kiyosaki NEW B MARS MEI Cashflow Series 7000 MDB COIN ACCEPTOR B
7 New Rich Dad Robert Kiyosaki CashFlow 101 Board Game B MEI NCR CASHFLOW MULTI-PROTOCOL CF9529e COIN ACCEPTOR B
8 Cashflow 101 USED ONCE Complete Rich Dad + CD's Sealed B Mars MEI Cashflow 7512i Coin Changer Refurbisher B
9 Rich Dad's Cashflow 101 AND Cashflow 202 Board Games! A,B Cashflow 101 Board Game Financial Rich Poor Dad Finance B
10 BRAND NEW SEAL CASHFLOW 101 BOARD GAME WITH 3 AudioCDs B CASHFLOW 101 Board Game Rich Dad Poor Dad KIYOSAKI B
Figure 2.5: Cashow search results, sorted by highest price
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CHAPTER 3
INFORMATIONAL SHILL BIDDING
1 Introduction
The seminal work of Akerlof (1970) showed how informational asymmetry can erode
the proper functioning of markets. Perhaps nowhere is informational asymmetry more
apparent than in the sale of goods online where quality and authenticity are difcult to
verify and the virtual identities of agents carry little weight. It should be no surprise that
while the volume of transactions taking place online continue to grow, so do reports of
abuse. Complaints of internet fraud continue to be the most prevalent source of fraud
investigated by the Federal Trade Commission.1
A particularly injurious form of internet fraud involves a dishonest seller intention-
ally misrepresenting the condition or authenticity of an item so as to deceive potential
buyers. Such deception is typically carried out through the illegal practice of shill bid-
ding, whereby a seller in an online auction, often with the help of an accomplice, bids on
his own item. In one high prole case from 2000, three men were indicted for inating
bids in attempt to sell a poor rendering of a supposed Richard Diebenkorn painting on
eBay.2 In the description of the item which accompanied the listing, the seller claimed
ignorance of the painting's origins, saying he had found it at a garage sale and simply
wondered whether it had any resale value. The description appeared very forthright,
acknowledging the presence of minor scratches and tears, which were illustrated in a
number of close-ups of the corners. One of the close-ups clearly revealed the name
Richard Diebenkorn scrawled along the bottom-left corner. At no point did the seller
1Internet Auctions: A Guide for Buyers and Sellers. http://www.ftc.gov
2The story was chronicled by Judith Dobrzynski in a multi-part series in the New York Times, May 9
- 11, 2000.
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mention the name of the late abstract expressionist Richard Diebenkorn.
Speculation that this garage-sale giveaway was in fact a lost work of the great mod-
ern master began to grow in online message boards. The steady rise in the auction's
standing price, a result of the over 50 shill bids placed by the three codefendants in the
case, served to further substantiate such speculation. The painting ultimately sold to a
Dutch collector for $135,805 before the scam was uncovered and the transaction voided,
all without the seller ever claiming the painting to be a genuine Diebenkorn! Evidently,
the escalation of the price through shill bidding was enough to convince this and other
serious buyers that the item was genuine.
Though eBay continues to take steps to curb the practice, it is clear that such fraud
persists, perpetuated with the aid of shill bidding. In March of 2008, the FBI uncovered
an international ring of art forgers selling art on eBay as well as other venues.3 In these
cases, shill bidding was shown to be an integral component of carrying out the deception
in online settings. In spite of consumer groups' warnings of the possibility of such
fraud, buyers continue to bid on undocumented works of art, antiques, and collectibles,
all common value items, with the hope of acquiring a treasured item undervalued by
its current owner. This use of the platform as something of an online garage sale has
proven critical to eBay's success since its inception. From the standpoint of eBay and
other similar platforms, it is important to understand the economic factors that give rise
to shill bidding in order to determine how best to preserve the integrity of the auction
platform.
This paper models an auction environment within a game-theoretic context in order
to shed light on the economic factors which allow shill bidding to persist. The model
considers the sale of a single common value item online where market participants are
asymmetrically informed as to the authenticity of the item. The authenticity of the item
3Seven charged in 'eBay art scam', BBC News, March 20, 2008: Accessed from
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7306366.stm September 15, 2008.
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is modeled as a binary variable, Q 2 QL; QH	, which can be thought of as high
quality versus low quality or genuine versus fake. To capture the possibility of the
item being undervalued by its owner, suppose that the seller can either be informed, in
which case he knows Q with certainty, or uninformed, in which case he assigns some
probability to the event that the item is genuine. The demand side of the market consists
of a single uninformed buyer, who shares the initial beliefs of an uninformed seller and
whose valuation depends upon the common value element,Q, and an idiosyncratic taste
parameter, x, which is private information.4 In the event that the item is genuine, then
with some probability, the market may also include an informed buyer, who knows Q
with certainty and whose valuation depends only onQ. To facilitate the analogy between
our stylized model and the real-world environment in which these auctions take place,
in what follows, the two types of bidders are referred to as collectors, if uninformed,
and dealers, if informed.
This setup is meant to capture the various informational asymmetries of the online
auction environment in which a collector hopes to obtain a genuine article from a seller
who does not know its true value. In the Diebenkorn case, the Dutch buyer seemingly
responded to the bids of others and raised his bid accordingly. Such bidding can only be
justied if he believes that other bidders know something about the authenticity of the
item that he does not. The presence of dealers in our model serves this purpose.
The sales mechanism is modeled as a dynamic second-price auction in which bid-
ding takes place over two discrete stages until a set end time.5 The multi-stage feature
4Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom, and Weber (1983) show that the indiosyncratic component is im-
portant to the setup. Without it, the uninformed buyer cannot earn positive surplus and as such has no
incentive to participate unless his valuation exceeds that of the informed buyer.
5Dynamic second-price auction is the name commonly given to the ascending-price auction employed
by eBay. In a dynamic second-price auction, buyers are free to bid as many times as they choose during a
predetermined window set by the seller. At any point during the auction, buyers can observe the identity
of the high bidder and the standing price, which is equal to: (i) the starting price if one or fewer bids
have been received; or (ii) the second-highest bid plus a small increment if two or more bids have been
received. Buyers also observe the number of bids and the number of distinct bidders at any point during
the auction. The standing price is updated in real time until the time runs out. The winner is the high
bidder when the time runs out and pays a price equal to the standing price at the auction's end.
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allows for bids placed in stage 1 to provide information to collectors which they can
incorporate into their bidding strategy in stage 2.6 In particular, a collector who believes
that a stage-1 bid was placed by a dealer must then also believe the item to be gen-
uine, and thus be willing to pay more than what he would have were the authenticity
unknown. Therefore, a shill bid placed by a fraudulent seller (an informed seller of a
fake) for the purpose of deceiving collectors into thinking that the bid was placed by a
dealer, is referred to as an informational shill bid. I establish an equilibrium of the game
characterized by the following set of behaviors:
 If present in the market, a dealer bids in stage 1 with positive probability;
 If present in the market, a fraudulent seller disguises himself as a dealer by bidding
in stage 1;
 Upon observing a bid by another participant in stage 1, a collector increases his
assessment of the item;
 A subset of collectors (distinguished by their idiosyncratic taste parameter) in-
crease their bid in stage 2 if and only if they observe a bid in stage 1.
In the aforementioned informational shill bidding equilibrium (ISBE), a collector
may, with positive probability, obtain a fake at a price above what he would have been
willing to pay had he not observed a bid in stage 1. This is likely the position in which
the Dutch buyer in the Diebenkorn case found himself. Thus, the model establishes that
such an outcome can occur in equilibrium even when potential buyers understand the
potential for such fraud. For this to occur, however, it must be the case that fraudulent
sellers make up a sufciently small proportion of all sellers. Otherwise, the observation
of a bid by an opposing bidder may actually negatively inuence a buyer's assessment
as to the genuineness of the item.
6Any more than two stages of bidding would be superuous under this setup.
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An additional restriction in bringing about an ISBE is that the starting price chosen
by an uninformed seller, which is then mimicked by fraudulent sellers posing as unin-
formed sellers, must be sufciently large that a set of collectors abstain from bidding
in stage 1, thereby only bidding in stage 2 upon observing a bid in stage 1. Given this
result, it is necessary to understand all possible subgames following from all feasible
starting prices in order to characterize the equilibrium starting price. First, I nd that
there exists such a subgame equilibrium in which a collector's assessment of the item
upon observing a bid in stage 1, is not high enough to justify increasing his bid in stage
2. In this case, all collectors bid only in stage 1 an amount that takes into account the
ex-ante expected value of the item. Fraudulent sellers may still shill under these cir-
cumstances, but only for the purpose of extracting greater surplus, given the bidding of
collectors, and not for the purpose of inuencing the bidding of collectors. Thus, this
alternative equilibrium is referred to as a non-informational shill bidding equilibrium
(Non-ISBE). Next, a subgame equilibrium is established in which an uninformed
seller sets a starting price in excess of a dealer's valuation of a genuine item. This no
shill bidding equilibrium (NSBE) equilibrium precludes bidding by dealers and by
extension, shill bidding by fraudulent sellers.
A numerical comparison highlights the parameterizations that rationalize the three
types of equilibria, respectively. The parameterizations giving rise to the ISBE and Non-
ISBE are shown to be nearly complementary to one another, except for a slight overlap
in which either type of equilibrium is possible. As the proportion of fraudulent sellers
increases, the set of all other parameters rationalizing the ISBE shrinks while that of the
Non-ISBE grows. The parameterizations giving rise to a NSBE is a subset of that giving
rise to an ISBE. Where the parameterizations giving rise to the ISBE and the Non-ISBE
overlap, the Non-ISBE gives rise to greater surplus than the ISBE within the range of
parameters considered. Thus, while some collector types benet from the information
gleaned from stage 1 bids within the ISBE, the overall effect of informational shill bid-
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ding is negative as it causes other collector types to simply not participate, which is
partially explained by a higher starting price within the ISBE. Further, the fact that the
Non-ISBE outperforms the ISBE in total surplus gives rise to a very counter-intuitive
result that an increase in the proportion of fraudulent sellers, though negatively affecting
total surplus in either equilibrium type, can actually result in an increase in total surplus
in the event it causes players to switch from playing strategies consistent with the ISBE
to that of the Non-ISBE.
Of the existing literature on shill bidding, the study most closely resembling this
one is Chakraborty and Kosmopoulou (2004), which considers the sale of a pure com-
mon value item to buyers with symmetric, but imperfect, information. In Chakraborty
and Kosmopoulou (2004), buyers update their beliefs over the authenticity of the item
in response to the number of competing bidders, which in the equilibrium they con-
sider, is positively correlated with the likelihood that the item is genuine. Similar to
the result shown herein, shill bids are only informative when the proportion of would-
be shillers is sufciently small. I, nevertheless, argue that the current study offers two
advantages over Chakraborty and Kosmopoulou (2004). First, Chakraborty and Kos-
mopoulou (2004) model the sales mechanism as a button-push auction of Milgrom and
Weber (1982), in which the price ascends automatically until all but the last bidder have
released their button and dropped out. This modeling assumption abstracts away from
the decision of whether or not to bid in the early stages of the auction if bidding pro-
vides valuable information to one's opponents. In the button-push auction, a buyer is
required to keep his button depressed if he is to be allowed to participate in later stages.
The assumption also abstracts away from the amount a buyer would choose to bid as the
standing price is increased automatically until only one bidder remains. This assump-
tion restricts the strategy set of buyers in a way that prevents additional information from
being conveyed. By giving buyers a choice as to whether or not to bid in each stage,
the auction mechanism considered herein more closely resembles the dynamic second-
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price auction employed by eBay. Second, Chakraborty and Kosmopoulou (2004) model
all buyers as having identical valuations and identical beliefs. As such, a buyer's ex-
pected surplus is zero whether or not shill bidding is informative, thus precluding any
meaningful comparison of consumer surplus.
Much of the remaining literature on shill bidding restricts attention to the sale of
private value goods.7 In these models, shill bidding serves to extract additional sur-
plus from buyers in ascending-price auctions by exploiting the difference between the
standing price and the high bidder's valuation, a practice dubbed competitive shilling
by Kauffman and Wood (2005). Kauffman and Wood (2005) distinguish between com-
petitive shilling and reserve price shilling, whereby a seller uses a single shill bid to
serve the purpose of a reserve price while shielding themselves from eBay's listing fees
which discourage the use of reserve prices. While not mutually exclusive, competitive
shilling and reserve price shilling are means for a seller to increase his or her surplus
illegally; but when used in conjunction with the sale of a private value good, such be-
havior need not be inefcient. Izmalkov (2004) shows that shill bidding can be used to
implement the optimal auction mechanism of Meyerson (1981) when buyers' valuations
are independently drawn from different distributions. In a pure private values setting,
a seller restricted to using a single starting price and no shill bid may set the starting
price too high from an efciency standpoint. But when shill bidding can be used in
conjunction with a starting price, the chosen starting price may be set lower in order to
bring about an outcome that more closely resembles that of rst-degree price discrimi-
nation. In contrast, informational shill bidding can only lead to inefcient outcomes and
is thus a greater threat to the proper functioning of markets than are competitive shilling
and reserve price shilling. The study of informational shill bidding is important in un-
derstanding the economic mechanisms at play in the fraudulent sale of the Diebenkorn
7See Sinha and Greenleaf (2000), Wang, Hidvegi, and Whinston (2001), Izmalkov (2004), and Wang,
Hidvegi, and Whinston (2004) for examples of models of shill bidding in which buyers know their valua-
tions with certainty.
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painting considered earlier as models of competitive and reserve price shilling cannot
capture such behavior.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the basic model and formal-
izes the concept of an informational shill bidding equilibrium; Section 3 demonstrates
conditions under which an informational shill bidding equilibrium exists; Section 4 es-
tablishes two alternative equilibria among the set of all possible equilibria of the game
and characterizes the necessary conditions of all equilibria; Section 5 illustrates the para-
meterizations giving rise to the various classes of equilibria within a numerical example;
and Section 6 concludes.
2 Common Value Auction Model with Asymmetric In-
formation
The following describes the basic model used throughout the remainder of the paper and
denes the concept of an ISBE.
Consider a single seller attempting to auction a single item to a set of potential
buyers. The seller may be either informed or uninformed as to the authenticity of
the item, which is represented by some quality parameter Q: An informed seller knows
Q with certainty while an uninformed seller has only imperfect information over Q. Let
 denote the proportion of sellers who are informed.
The identities of potential buyers are unknown prior to the start of the auction. As
such, information is revealed only by the bidding. Each buyer has a private valuation
over the item which depends, at least partially, on the realization of Q. A buyer may be
either uninformed, a collector, or informed, a dealer. A dealer is assumed to know
Q with certainty while a collector has only imperfect information over Q.
Consistent with the interpretation that the item be either genuine or a fake, the quality
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parameter takes on one of two values, QH and QL. Assume that uninformed sellers and
collectors hold common initial beliefs over the value of Q, denoted by 0. Beliefs are
updated over the course of the game, using Bayes' rule. Beliefs of collectors depend
upon the information set which the player nds himself at, denoted I . Let the beliefs of
a player with imperfect information and at information set I , be given by the function 
such that:
 fIg = P Q = QH jI	 :
Given the interpretation of the informed buyers as dealers, who care only about the
resale value of the item, assume that dealers' valuations depend only on Q. In this way,
let a dealer's valuation be equal to Q and normalize the values of Q such that QL = 0
and QH = 1:
Collectors' valuations are assumed to vary based upon personal taste. In this way,
let x 2 X denote some taste parameter, such that the valuation for buyer i with taste
parameter xi; in information set I; is denoted:
v (xi; fIg) = (1 + xi) fIgQH :
It is assumed that the xi are independent and identically distributed over [0; 1].
The valuation of an uninformed seller depends only on his information. Let ! ( fIg)
denote the valuation of an uninformed seller who believes the item to be of quality QH
with probability , where ! 2 [0; 1] is common knowledge. Informed sellers of fake
items, which are referred to as fraudulent sellers, have no value for the item. This as-
sumption is consistent with the notion that if the fraudulent seller were to attempt to sell
the item in a traditional market, it would be evident that the item was not genuine and
as such would not sell for any price above QL, which has been normalized to zero.
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To simplify the analysis, the number of bidders in the auction are limited to at most
two: one collector and possibly one dealer. Regardless of the realization ofQ, there will
be a single collector in the market. If Q = QH , then with probability , there will be a
dealer in the market; if Q = QL, dealers will not enter the market so the collector will
be the only potential buyer. Neither the collector nor the seller know whether a dealer is
present except by inferring from his bidding behavior. If present, the dealer knows that
a single collector is present but does not know the collector's taste parameter, x, since it
is private information.
This setup is meant to capture a situation in which buyers (both collectors and deal-
ers) scour the listings in hopes of nding an item that is undervalued by its seller i.e. an
uninformed seller. During the course of any auction, collectors can gain information as
to the authenticity of the item upon observing the bidding of others i.e. dealers, as such
bidders are thought to have superior information. Learning from the bidding of others
in this way can lead to a collector raising his assessment of the item's value. But when
it is known that collectors use information in this way, an incentive exists for fraudulent
sellers to bid as a dealer would in order to deceive the collector.
The sales mechanism is a two-stage dynamic second-price auction. The timing of
the game is as follows:
1. The seller lists the item for sale and posts a public starting price, S.
2. Stage 1 of the bidding: All buyers, including a shilling seller, may place a single
bid that must exceed the starting price; all bids are recorded; the identity of the
high bidder is revealed as are the number of bids, and the standing price, which
is equal to the second highest bid if two or more bids have been placed, or the
starting price if one or fewer bids have been placed.
3. Collectors and uninformed sellers update their beliefs based upon the information
revealed following stage 1 of the bidding.
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4. Stage 2 of the bidding: All buyers, including those who did not bid in stage 1,
may place a single bid. Each bid may fail to be transmitted with probability  2
(0; 1). The identity of the winning bidder and the nal price are revealed and the
transaction is completed.
Table 3.1: Summary of notation
Q the quality of the item, taking on values in

QL; QH
	
= f0; 1g
 the proportion of informed sellers in the market
 fIg a collector's beliefs as to the probability thatQ = QH at information
set I; 0 denotes his initial beliefs
x a collector's taste parameter, which is uniformly distributed over
[0; 1]
v (x;  fIg) a collector's valuation of the item, given taste parameter x and be-
liefs  fIg; equal to (1 + x) fIg
! ( fIg) an uninformed seller's valuation of the item, given beliefs  fIg
 the probability of there being a dealer in the market, conditional on
Q = QH
 the probability that a bid placed in stage 2 of the auction fails to
transmit
The two-stage bidding setup allows for early bids placed in stage 1 to convey infor-
mation which can then be incorporated into the stage 2 bids of collectors. The prob-
ability of transmission error in stage 2 reects the reality that to be sure that there is
no time left in the auction for opposing bidders to bid in response to one's bid comes
with the risk that one's own bid is not placed in time. Without this assumption, there
would be no incentive for a dealer to bid in stage 1 as he would simply wait for stage
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2 where his information would remain private until after the auction had ended.8 Table
3.1 summarizes the notation that has been introduced in this section.
In considering the behavior of informed sellers of genuine items, it is assumed that
these seller types can distinguish themselves from other seller types. Whether this takes
the form of publishing the results of an appraisal or by signaling the item's quality
through some other mechanism is not important as long as the information is conveyed
to uninformed buyers as of the start of stage 1. The rationale for this assumption is
justied in Section 3.
The concept of an informational shill bidding equilibrium (ISBE) can now be de-
ned as follows:
Denition 1 An informational shill bidding equilibrium is an equilibrium of the two-
stage dynamic second-price auction game characterized by the following:
1. Informed sellers of authentic articles distinguish themselves from all other seller
types;
2. Fraudulent sellers choose a starting price so as to be indistinguishable from un-
informed sellers to collectors;
3. Dealers, if present in the market, bid in stage 1 with positive probability;
4. Fraudulent sellers mimic the actions of dealers in stage 1;
5. Collectors update their beliefs in response to stage 1 bidding such that a higher
standing price following stage 1 leads to a greater likelihood that a higher bid
will be placed in stage 2.
8Roth and Ockenfels (2002) introduce this assumption as a way of modeling the end of auction rule
in eBay.
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3 Characterization of an ISBE
This section, begins by characterizing an ISBE. Such an equilibrium requires that deal-
ers bid in stage 1 and that fraudulent sellers mimic that bid. In establishing an ISBE, the
formal equilibrium concept used is perfect Bayesian equilibrium, which species the
actions of each player at each possible information set as well as a set of beliefs over the
types of all other players.
The analysis begins by considering the beliefs of a collector upon reaching informa-
tion set I1, the start of the auction. Upon entering an auction in which the item's true
quality is not revealed, he infers that he is not in an auction for a genuine item being
sold by an informed seller, an occurrence with probability 0. The possible realiza-
tions, conditional upon having reached I1; are the following:
 Seller is uninformed and Q = QH : probability of (1  )0= (1  0) ;
 Seller is uninformed and Q = QL: probability of (1  ) (1  0) = (1  0) ;
and
 Seller is informed and Q = QL: probability of  (1  0) = (1  0) :
Therefore, upon reaching the start of the auction, the buyer believes that the proba-
bility that the item is genuine is,
 fI1g = (1  )0
1  0
; (1)
which is less than his initial belief of 0 for any  > 0:
Suppose that dealers are thought to bid some amount  in stage 1. Following stage
1, a collector's beliefs will be updated in a manner depending upon whether or not he
observes a bid in stage 1 that is indistinguishable from a bid of . Such an outcome
occurs under the following circumstances:
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 The collector does not bid in stage 1 and observes that a bid has been placed by
another player. In this circumstance, the standing price would be S; regardless
of the magnitude of the bid. Since the high bid is always unobservable to other
players, the high bid could be any amount greater than S:
 The collector bids some amount less than  in stage 1 and nds that he is not the
high bidder following stage 1. The standing price would be equal to the collector's
bid. As in the previous case, the high bid would be unobservable, so it could be
any amount greater than the collector's bid.
 The collector bids some amount greater than or equal to  in stage 1 and nds he
is the high bidder following stage 1 and the standing price is . As the buyer in
question is the high bidder, the bid of the opposing bidder is observable.
In each of the aforementioned cases, the bidding of the opposing bidder is consistent
with the equilibrium strategy that would be played by a dealer or mimicked by a fraud-
ulent seller engaged in shill bidding. Let I0 denote this information set. The collector,
upon nding himself in information set I0; updates his beliefs as follows:


I0
	
=
 fI1g
 fI1g+  (1   fI1g) : (2)
The derivation of equation (2) involves a direct application of Bayes' theorem:  repre-
sents the probability of I0 being reached, conditional onQ = QH and conditional on I1;
 represents the probability of I0 being reached, conditional onQ = QL and conditional
on I1.
A second information set that can be reached in equilibrium is one in which no bids
are placed by opposing players. In equilibrium, this occurs when either the item is a
fake but the seller is uninformed, or if the item is genuine, the seller is uninformed
and no dealers are present. Let I 0 denote this information set. Upon nding himself in
136
information set I 0, the collector updates his beliefs as follows:
 fI 0g = (1  ) fI1g
(1  ) fI1g+ (1  ) (1   fI1g) ; (3)
where the construction is symmetric to that of equation (2). For the beliefs specied by
equations (2) and (3) to be consistent with an ISBE, it must be the case that observing a
bid consistent with the bidding of a dealer raises a collector's assessment of the item. It
is straightforward to show that  fI 0g <  fI1g <  fI0g if and only if  < :
The following lemma applies a standard result in auction theory to the current set-
ting, which guides the analysis of equilibrium bidding strategies.
Lemma 1 All buyer types bid their valuations in stage 2 if they haven't already bid an
amount greater than or equal to their stage-2 valuation in stage 1. Specically,
1. A collector, upon nding himself in some information set I following stage 1, bids
v (x; I) in stage 2 if v (x; I) is both greater than the standing price and his bid in
stage 1.
2. A dealer bids QH in stage 2 if QH is greater than both the standing price and his
stage 1 bid of .
The intuition for this result follows from the fact that bids in stage 2 have no strategic
ability to alter the bidding of opposing bidders. As such, each potential buyer bids in a
manner consistent with a pure private value setting.
The next result establishes that certain collector types, distinguished by their taste
parameter, will bid in stage 2 in response to the information set reached following
stage 1. In keeping with the intuition of the ISBE, it should be the case that those
collectors that do respond to information revelation only respond to positive informa-
tion. This is specied in the following condition. Before establishing the result, dene
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the following collector types: x
 
QH ; I0

= min

xj v (x; I0) = QH	 and x (S; I 0) =
min fxj v (x; I 0) = Sg.
Condition 1 In any ISBE, it is required that x
 
QH ; I0

< x (S; I 0) :
Condition 1 requires that the lowest type that would nd it protable to bid should I 0
be reached within an ISBE, x (S; I 0) ; exceed the lowest type that would nd it protable
to bid should I0 be reached, x
 
QH ; I0

.9 The logic for this follows from the denition
of an ISBE which requires that a bid placed in stage 1 makes additional bids in stage 2
more likely. In an ISBE, upon observing a bid in stage 1, a collector believes that the
item is more likely to be genuine than if he had not. At the same time, the observed
bid raises the high bid from S to  and ultimately to QH should the dealer or fradulent
seller's stage 2 bid be transmitted. Therefore, Condition 1 requires that the observation
of the bid in stage 1 has a large enough effect on collectors' beliefs such that the collector
types whose valuations fall between x
 
QH ; I0

and x (S; I 0) nd it protable to bid in
stage 2 following observing a bid in stage 1, but would not if they did not observe a bid.
The bidding of collectors under Condition 1 is characterized in what follows.
Lemma 2 Given  2 [S;QH ]; there exists a cutoff x such that the collector's best
response, b0 , is characterized as follows:
 If x  x , then bid v (x; fI0g) in stage 1;
 If x < x , then, do not bid in stage 1; bid v (x; fI0g) in stage 2 if and only if I0
is reached and if x  x (; I0);
 Otherwise, do not bid in either stage.
9This assumes, for ease of discussion, that the dealer or fraudulent seller's bid of QH in stage 2
is transmitted. The proof of the following lemma takes into account that stage 2 bids face the risk of
transmission failure.
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The value x serves to distinguish collector types whose expected valuation of the
item is sufciently high as to make bidding in stage 1 protable from those that only
bid upon observing positive information in stage 1. When Condition 1 holds, x falls
between x (; I0) and x (S; I 0) : Thus, the indifferent type; x; earns negative surplus
should I 0 be reached. For buyers whose taste parameter falls between x
 
QH ; I0

and x;
it is only protable to bid upon observing a bid in stage 1, which makes the possibility
that the item is genuine more likely. It is these bidders for which shill bidding is intended
to deceive.
Taking as given the behavior of collectors, the following result describes the bidding
of dealers in equilibrium.
Lemma 3 When collectors bid according to b0 , a dealer's best reponse is characterized
as follows: there exists an  > 0 such that for any   , a dealer bids QH in stage
1 with probability 1.
The proof of Lemma 3 proceeds in two parts: rst, showing that conditional on
bidding in stage 1, the optimal bid is QH ; and second, that for  sufciently large, it
is a best response to bid in stage 1 as opposed to stage 2. The rst part follows from
the fact that when collectors bid according to b0 , the magnitude of  has no effect on
the collector's bid. If x  x , the collector does not bid in stage 2 and so his bidding
is unaffected by the value of  (even if his assessment of the item is). If x < x ,
the collector believes himself to be in information set I0 regardless of the magnitude
of the dealer's bid since he does not bid in stage 1 and cannot observe the magnitude
of the high bid. Given no informational advantage to disguising his valuation in stage
1, bidding anything less than his valuation only serves to expose him to the risk of
transmission failure upon attempting to increment his bid in stage 2. Given this result,
let x  xQH and b0  b0QH .
In deciding whether to bid QH in stage 1 or in stage 2, the dealer trades off a higher
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probability of obtaining the item from bidding in stage 2, conditional on having his bid
transmitted, against a higher probability of having his bid be transmitted in stage 1.
As the probability of transmission failure gets larger, the latter consideration swamps
the former. The value  is the largest such value of  that make a dealer indifferent
between the two. The proof of the lemma further demonstrates that   :5:
Formally, a dealer bids in stage 1 with probability one if the following holds:
x
 
QH ; I0

+ 

x   x  QH ; I0  (1  )x: (4)
Inequality (4) expresses a dealer's trade-off in deciding whether to bid QH in stage 1
or stage 2. The dealer's surplus upon winning, 1   S, cancels out of both sides as S
is necessarily the price he pays upon his obtaining the item. Thus the trade-off is over
the probability of winning under the two possible actions. Bidding in stage 1, the dealer
obtains the item if either the collector's preference parameter is not high enough to bid
in stage 2 should I0 be reached, or if the collector's valuation is high enough to only bid
if I0 is reached, but his bid fails to transmit. Upon bidding in stage 2, the dealer obtains
the item if his own bid transmits and if the collector's preference parameter is not high
enough to justify bidding in stage 1.
If inequality (4) does not hold, this does not imply the existence of an equilibrium
in which dealers bid only in stage 2. To see this, assume that  < :5 and consider
an equilibrium in which the inequality (4) is reversed. In such an equilibrium, dealers
would nd it unprotable to bid in stage 1. Therefore, upon observing a bid in stage 1, a
collector would infer that the bid had been placed by a fraudulent seller; this implies that
x
 
QH ; I0

= 1, thus violating Condition 1. It follows that an ISBE must have dealers
bidding in stage 1 with positive probability. However, when the inequality in equation
(4) is reversed, it is unprotable for a dealer to bid in stage 1 when collectors believe
that he will do so. Thus, an equilibrium in this case must be one in which collectors
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believe dealers will bid in stage 1 with probability  < 1 a decrease in  increases a
dealer's surplus from bidding in stage 1 and that under those beliefs a dealer is just
indifferent between bidding in stage 1 and bidding in stage 2. Indifference requires that
equation (4) holds with equality, where collectors' beliefs in equations (2) and (3) must
be revised accordingly to reect the fact that  < 1.
A collector's beliefs, when dealers bid in stage 1 with probability  (while fraudulent
sellers still bid in stage 1 with probability one), can be expressed as:10


I0; 
	
=
 fI1g
 fI1g+  (1   fI1g) (5)
and
 fI 0; g = (1  ) fI1g
(1  ) fI1g+ (1  ) (1   fI1g) : (6)
It is then straightforward to extend the derivation of b0, the collector's bidding strategy,
to the case where  < 1 by expressing the collector's beliefs accordingly. Formally, let
P fI0; g and P fI 0; 0g denote the probability that I0 and I 0, respectively, are reached,
given . Further, let  denote the probability of a dealer transmitting a bid in stage
2, conditional upon I 0 being reached.11 Lastly, let x
 
QH ; I0; 

and x (S; I 0; ) be as
before, only now reecting the fact that  may be less than unity. It follows that the
cutoff collector type, x () ; takes the form:
x () =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 if x (S; I 0; ) = 0
1 if x
 
QH ; I0; 

= 1
c+ S otherwise
(7)
10It will be shown in what follows that as long as Condition 1 holds, fraudulent sellers will shill with
probability one.
11This probability is zero if  = 1. Clearly is a function of ;  and  fI1g, the probability of there
being a dealer in the market.
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where
c =
P fI0; g+ P fI 0; g
[1   (1  )] fI1g   1
and
 =
P fI 0; g (1 )
[1   (1  )] fI1g :
Having established the bidding of potential buyers, consider the strategy of a fraud-
ulent seller. It is assumed that a fraudulent seller cannot take any action that would have
him be identied as a fraudulent seller. This restriction is justied on the grounds that
were he to be identied as a fraudulent seller, the auction would be voided and termi-
nated immediately.12 This restriction affects a fraudulent seller's choice of starting price
as well as his shill bidding decision. Since it has been assumed that informed sellers of
genuine items have already distinguished themselves as such  either by directly verify-
ing the authenticity of the item or through some other mechanism  the fraudulent seller
is left with no other choice of starting price other than S, the uninformed seller's starting
price.
In deciding whether or not to shill bid, he chooses between a bid ofQH , a strategy of
not bidding at all and a strategy of bidding in only stage 2 if  < 1 (since a bid in stage
2 would have him potentially revealed as a shiller if dealers only bid in stage 1). A shill
bid of QH in stage 1 puts the collector in information set I0. Thus, the fraudulent seller
gains a sale at a price of QH with probability 1  when the collector's taste parameter
is between x
 
QH ; I0; 

and x () ; whereas he otherwise would have received no bid.
When the collector's taste parameter is greater than or equal to x, the collector bids in
stage 1 regardless of the fraudulent seller's shilling decision, however placing a shill bid
of QH raises the price paid by the collector from S to QH . Lastly, when the collector's
taste parameter is below x
 
QH ; I0; 

, the auction would not have resulted in a sale
12This assumption is equivalent to assuming that the cost of being identied as a fraudulent seller is
greater than 2QH , the maximal gain from carrying out the fraud.
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regardless of the fraudulent seller's shilling decision. As the fraudulent seller cannot be
made worse off, there is no incentive for a fraudulent seller to deviate from the proposed
shilling strategy.
It remains to characterize the uninformed seller's choice of starting price, S0. If
Condition 1 is satised at S0 and , then the subgame following the seller's announce-
ment of S0 is consistent with an ISBE. Notice that if S0 were to equal QH , Condition 1
would necessarily be satised. Thus, Condition 1 requires that S0 is not too much lower
than QH . This is accomplished when the seller's valuation is sufciently high.
The following proposition characterizes an ISBE in the subgame in which the unin-
formed seller's starting price, S0 satises the aforementioned condition. It must be noted
that this does not imply that such a starting price is globally optimal over all possible
starting prices that the uninformed seller can choose. In order to solve for the global
optimum, it remains to characterize the subgame equilibria that are consistent with each
possible choice of S. This task is taken up in the following section.
In what follows, let !0 denote uninformed seller's expected valuation, conditional
on the item going unsold in an auction in which other players play according to the
strategies specied in the equilibrium. It can be shown that S0 is increasing in !0, which
implies the last result.
Proposition 1 ISBE. If the seller's optimal starting price gives rise to the following,
then the following constitute an equilibrium:
 Dealers bid QH in stage 1 with probability 1 if the following holds:
x
 
QH ; I0; 1

+ 

x (1)  x  QH ; I0; 1  (1  )x (1) ;
otherwise, they randomize, bidding QH in stage 1 with probability  and bidding
143
QH in stage 2 with probability 1  , where  satises:
x
 
QH ; I0; 

+ 

x ()  x  QH ; I0;  = (1  )x () :
 Collectors update their beliefs following stage 1 according to equations (5) and
(6) and bid according to b0:
 Fraudulent sellers bid QH in stage 1 with probability 1; and
 Both uninformed sellers and fraudulent sellers set a starting price of S0 solving:
max
S2[0;1]
0
 
[1  x ()] + (1  ) x ()  x  QH ; I0;  (8)
+0S
 


x ()  x  QH ; I0; + x  QH ; I0; 
+(1  0) [S (1  x ()) + !0x ()] ;
subject to x () satisfying (7) :
 S0 and  are such that,
x
 
QH ; I0; 

< x
 
S0; I 0; 

: (9)
Further, there exists a !0 such that if !0  !0, then the solution to problem (8)
satises inequality (9).
Proposition 1 demonstrates that there exist parameterizations of the model such that
Condition 1 holds when all players play according to the proposed strategies. For Con-
dition 1 to hold, S0 must be high enough such that the marginal collector who bids in
stage 2 would rather bid in stage 2 upon observing a bid in stage 1 and realizing that
he will pay QH upon winning the auction than not observing a bid in stage 1 and pay-
ing S0 upon winning. Equation (8) makes explicit the relationship between S0 and !0:
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the higher is !0, the higher will be S0. Thus, for Condition 1 to hold requires !0 to be
sufciently large. If the uninformed seller's choice of starting price under the parame-
terization is globally optimal, then said strategies make up an ISBE.
It should be noted that there exists a solution to equation (8) in which the constraint
that S0  1 binds for !0 sufciently large. In such an equilibrium, all dealers are
indifferent between not bidding at all and bidding in accordance with the equilibrium
strategy. However, ss long as  is such that inequality (4) holds, then bids by dealers
are informative to collectors even if they have no effect on the end price. In such case,
x ()  1 and there exist collector types such that x < x () that would bid in stage 2
only upon observing a bid in stage 1.13
4 Characterization of All Equilibria
The previous section restricted attention to establishing those parameterizations of the
model that give rise to an ISBE. This section serves to characterize all equilibria of the
game. In the previous section, Condition 1 demonstrated that an ISBE requires that
collectors be positively inuenced by stage 1 bidding, so much so that they prefer to
pay QH upon observing a stage 1 bid over paying S; an amount less than QH , upon
not observing one. Therefore, by relaxing Condition 1, I establish alternate equilibria in
which collectors are not inclined to increase their bids upon observing stage 1 bidding.
Additionally, Proposition 1 required that S be no greater thanQH in an ISBE. Therefore,
I relax that constraint in this section and establish a third type of equilibrium in which
shill bidding is precluded due to the uninformed seller setting a starting price above
what a dealer would be willing to bid. The section concludes by demonstrating that the
three classes of equilibria are comprehensive of all equilibria, thereby allowing for a
characterization of the uninformed seller's optimal starting price.
13The case in which S  1 and  = 0 is considered in the following section.
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4.1 Additional Subgame Equilibria
I begin by characterizing an equilibrium of the game in which inequality (9) does not
hold. The intuition for such an equilibrium is established by considering possible de-
viations from the ISBE strategies. When inequality (9) is reversed, assuming all other
players continue playing according to their ISBE strategies, a collector may nd a prof-
itable deviation as follows: collector type x
 
QH ; I0; 

, who did not bid unless a bid in
stage 1 was observed, can now protably deviate by bidding in stage 2 when no bid is
observed in stage 1 and not bid when one is. Working backward to such a buyer's stage
1 bid, it is evident that he can place a bid of QH in stage 1 that has him pay QH if a bid
of QH is placed by an opposing bidder (either a dealer or a fraudulent seller), or S if no
bids are placed by opposing bidders. By construction of x
 
QH ; I0; 

, either outcome
leaves him no worse off than under the ISBE strategy when inequality (9) is reversed.
Before establishing the aforementioned bidding strategy as a best response under an
alternate equilibrium, it is necessary to introduce some notation. Suppose that in the
equilibrium under consideration, dealers bid in stage 1 with probability  and fraudulent
sellers shill in stage 1 with probability . Conditional upon bidding in stage 1, a dealer
will bid QH due to arguments used in the proof of Lemma 1. Under the restriction
that a fraudulent seller cannot take any action that would have him be identied as
a fraudulent seller, the fraudulent seller must only bid QH : As before, let I0 and I 0
denote a collector's information sets upon observing and not observing a bid in stage 1,
respectively. A collector's beliefs in information sets I0 and I 0 are expressed as follows:


I0; ; 
	
=
 fI1g
 fI1g+  (1   fI1g) ; (10)
and
 fI 0; ; g = (1  ) fI1g
(1  ) fI1g+ (1  ) (1   fI1g) : (11)
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As a last bit of notation, let x
 
QH ; I0; ; 

and x (S; I 0; ; ) be dened as before, only
now making explicit the reliance of collectors' beliefs on  as well as . The collector's
best response can now be described as follows.
Lemma 4 In any equilibrium such that x (S; I 0; ; ) < x
 
QH ; I0; ; 

, a collector's
best response, b, calls for him to bid only in stage 1 as follows:
 If x  x  QH ; I0; ; , bid v (x; I0; ; ) ;
 If x 2 x (S; I 0; ; ) ; x  QH ; I0; ; , bid S;
 Otherwise, do not bid.
The collector's best response, b, as characterized by Lemma 4, separates collectors
between those that prefer to win the auction when the price is as high as QH from
those who only prefer to win the auction when the price is below QH . In contrast to
b0, a collector's strategy under the ISBE, bids are placed in stage 1 only. In this way,
collectors do not respond to the bidding of dealers. Consequently, there is no incentive
for a dealer to not bid in stage 1, which implies  will be equal to unity in equilibrium.
To characterize the fraudulent seller's bidding strategy, let RI
 
QH ; b; 1; 

and
RI (0; b; 1; ) denote the fraudulent seller's revenue from shilling and not shilling re-
spectively when collectors bid according to b, dealers are believed to bid with probabil-
ity one, and when fraudulent seller's are believed to shill with probability . A necessary
condition for an equilibrium in which  = 1 is,
RI
 
QH ; b; 1; 1
  RI (0; b; 1; 1) : (12)
If inequality (12) does not hold, then  = 1 is not in equilibrium. However,  = 0
is unlikely to be part of an equilibrium either, since if it were known that all fraudulent
sellers refrain from shilling, then upon observing a bid in stage 1, collectors would
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assign a probability of one that the item were genuine. This argument is evident from
setting  to zero in equation (10) : In that case, placing a shill bid of QH in stage 1
is likely a protable deviation for the fraudulent seller. Thus, it would seem that the
fraudulent seller's strategy should be purely mixed when (12) does not hold.
The following proposition characterizes a non-informational shill bidding equilib-
rium (Non-ISBE) in which the uninformed seller's starting price, S, as well as collec-
tors' beliefs as dictated by  and ; causes inequality (9) to be reversed, thereby making
stage 1 bids uninformative.
Proposition 2 Non-ISBE. If the seller's optimal starting price gives rise to the follow-
ing, then the following constitute an equilibrium:
 Dealers bid QH in stage 1 with probability one.
 Collectors bid according to strategy b.
 Fraudulent sellers bid QH in stage 1 with probability , equal to: unity if
RI
 
QH ; b; 1; 1
  RI (0; b; 1; 1) ;
or some value in [0; 1) satisfying
RI
 
QH ; b; 1; 

= RI (0; b; 1; )
otherwise.
 Uninformed sellers and fraudulent sellers set a starting price of S solving:
max
S2[0;1]
0
 
1  x  QH ; I0; 1; + Sx  QH ; I0; 1;  (13)
+(1  0) (S [1  x (S; I 0; 1; )] + !0x (S; I 0; 1; )) ;
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and
 S and  are such that:
x
 
QH ; I0; 1; 
  x (S; I 0; 1; ) : (14)
Further, there exists a ! such that if !0  !, then the solution to problem (13)
satises inequality (14).
Proposition 2 establishes a Non-ISBE such that if shill bidding occurs, it is uninfor-
mative to collectors. Since stage 1 bidding is uninformative to them, a consequence of
inequality (14), collectors bid only in stage 1. Collectors' stage 1 bids are such that they
take into account that the seller may be a fraudulent seller, based on their beliefs from
having reached information set I1. Since collectors do not bid in response to stage 1
bidding, dealers necessarily bid in stage 1. Fraudulent sellers however, cannot use shill
bidding to deceive collectors into increasing their bids in stage 2. Therefore, they shill
only as a competitive shill when they would have otherwise preferred a starting price
of QH to a starting price of S. The uninformed seller sets a starting price of S, which
is mimicked by a fraudulent seller, that maximizes the seller's expected surplus, given
the strategies of others within the equilibrium characterization.
Having characterized a Non-ISBE, I consider possible equilibria in which S  1.
The characterization of an ISBE constrained the uninformed seller's starting price to be
no greater than 1. This is because if S > 1, dealers would nd it unprotable to bid, thus
precluding fraudulent sellers from placing shill bids. However, as was discussed in the
previous section, there may ISBE in which S0 = 1 and  > 0, so that dealers still bid
in stage 1 with positive probability even if their bids confer no benet to them. In this
case, informational shill bidding is benecial to a fraudulent seller as long as inequality
(9) holds. My purpose in this section is to characterize equilibria in which  = 0.
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Without the potential to learn from stage 1 bidding, the best response of collectors
must have them bid only in stage 1, similar to b. Unlike b, however, which takes
into account the collector's valuation ex-post, when all dealers are screened out due
to the high starting price, the collector's beliefs post-stage 1 are identical to their be-
liefs pre-stage 1,  fI1g. In this way, dene an indifferent collector type, x (S; I1) =
min fxj v (x; I1) = Sg : The following proposition characterizes a no shill bidding equi-
librium (NSBE) such that S  1.
Proposition 3 NSBE. If the seller's optimal starting price is no less than 1, then the
following constitute an equilibrium:
 Collector's bid according to b0, characterized by the following: if x  x (S 0; I1) ;
bid v (x; I1) in stage 1; otherwise, do not bid.
 Neither dealers nor fraudulent sellers bid in either stage.
 Both uninformed sellers and fraudulent sellers set a starting price of S 0 solving:
max
S1
S [1  x (S; I1)] + ! (0) x (S; I1) : (15)
Further, the constraint that S  1 does not bind on the solution to problem (15)
if the following holds:
! (0) > 2 (1   fI1g) :
As a nal case, consider potential equilibria in which dealers bids only in stage 2.
Proposition 1 established that in the ISBE, dealers may bid in stage 2 with positive
probability. However, it was argued that if dealers only bid in stage 2 and never in
stage 1, then inequality (9) would not hold. Therefore, it seems natural to ask whether
there exists an equilibrium in which a dealer bids only in stage 2 regardless of whether
inequality (9) holds. Proposition 4 answers negatively.
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Proposition 4 There does not exist an equilibrium of the game in which dealers bid
only in stage 2.
The reason why there cannot be an equilibrium in which dealers bid in stage 2 is that
there does not exist a set of beliefs such that neither a dealer nor fraudulent seller nds it
protable to deviate by bidding in stage 1. To see this, rst recognize that were dealers
and fraudulent sellers to bid only in stage 2, collectors would bid according to a strategy
similar b.14 Since a bid in stage 2 subjects a dealer to the risk of transmission failure, to
rationalize stage 2 bidding, the beliefs of collectors upon observing a bid in stage 1 must
be such that they reduce the dealer's expected prot. But for that to happen, collectors
would have to increase their assessment of the item following observing a stage 1 bid to
the point that certain collector types that had bid S in stage 1, would increase their bid
upon observing a bid in stage 1 to at least QH in stage 2. In that case, a fraudulent seller
could protably deviate by bidding in stage 1.
4.2 Optimal Starting Price
In characterizing the uninformed seller's optimal starting price, it is necessary to rst
characterize the subgame equilibrium following each possible choice of starting price.
The following result indicates that the three classes of subgame equilibria are compre-
hensive of all equilibria in the game.
Proposition 5 Consider an uninformed sellers choice of S. If S  1, then for any
strategy played by dealers and fraudulent sellers, the resulting subgame equilibrium is
one of two types: either x
 
QH ; I0;  < x (S; I 0; ) or x  QH ; I0;   x (S; I 0; ) : If the
former, then b0,  = 1 and  as characterized in Proposition 1 constitute a subgame
14The bidding strategy would be modied to account for the probability that stage 2 bids by dealers or
by fraudulent sellers may not be transmitted.
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equilibrium following from S. If the latter, then b;  = 1 and  as characterized by
Proposition 2 constitute a subgame equilibrium following from S. If S > 1, then b0,
 =  = 0 constitute the only subgame equilibrium following from S.
Proposition 5 demonstrates that the three classes of equilibria are comprehensive.
The key insight behind the result is that for a given S, the resulting subgame equilibrium
is predicated on the beliefs of collectors, of which  and  are key inputs. First, it is
demonstrated that for any set of beliefs collectors may have, a dealer's best response
necessarily involves him bidding QH in stage 1 with probability . Upon inputing 
and  into their beliefs, collectors bid according to b0 or b depending on the direction
of the inequality between x
 
QH ; I0;  and x (S; I 0; ). Since collectors' beliefs are
assumed to be common knowledge, dealers and fraudulent sellers understand whether
b0 or b is a best response. Whether b0 or b is the best response, dealers and fraudulent
sellers choose whether or not to bid in stage 1. The restriction on collectors' beliefs is
that they must be correct in predicting the bidding behavior of dealers and fraudulent
sellers. Given that collectors' beliefs may be self-fulllling, it follows that for a given
S, both the ISBE and Non-ISBE subgames may be supported. Further, when S = 1,
 > 0 can support an ISBE subgame equilibrium and  = 0 supports a NSBE subgame
equilibrium.
Understanding the beliefs, and consequently the subgame equilibrium associated
with each choice of S, the uninformed seller's optimal starting price maximizes his
surplus over all values of S. Proposition 2 showed that for small values of !0, which
itself is a function of the uninformed seller's idiosyncratic preference and his beliefs, the
solution problem (13) gives rise to a starting price that is consistent with the Non-ISBE
subgame. Proposition 1 showed that for large values of !0, the solution to problem (8)
gives rise to a starting price that is consistent with the ISBE subgame. As the uninformed
seller's valuation becomes larger still, the optimal starting price may be either a value
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of S = 1, which is consistent with the ISBE subgame or a value of S > 1, consistent
with the NSBE subgame. The comparison between the surplus earned from these two
choices is determined by whether  > 0 when S = 1: If  = 0 at S = 1, then
the ISBE and NSBE subgames are equivalent since neither involve stage 1 bids from
dealers or fraudulent sellers. But when  > 0 at S = 1, the uninformed seller's surplus
is increased by the fact that bids by dealers can give rise to collectors bidding in stage
2, whereas they would have otherwise not bid at all. Further, as long as inequality (9)
holds, the overall effect on the uninformed seller's surplus is unambiguously positive.
Therefore, if  > 0 at S = 1, then there exists some " > 0 such that if the uninformed
seller's solution in a NSBE subgame is S 0 = 1 + ", the uninformed seller's surplus is
higher by setting a starting price of S = 1.
In general, the number of parameters to consider make drawing general conclusions
regarding the optimal starting price and the resulitng equilibrium difcult. The fol-
lowing section considers a parametric example to demonstrate the effect of the seller's
valuation, the beliefs of uninformed sellers and buyers and the proportion of informed
sellers in the market affect the equilibrium.
5 Numerical Example
The previous two sections established three possible classes of equilibria, which were
shown to be exhaustive of all equilibria of the game. The purpose of this section is
to better understand the conditions under which each equilibrium occurs, and see how
changes in certain parameter values affect surplus within a numerical example.
The results of this section rely on a number of parameterizations, which are dis-
cussed in what follows. First, let  = :6: The proof of Lemma 3 showed that inequality
(4) holds for any   :5. The choice of  = :6 ensures that this condition holds for any
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S  1.15 Next, let  = :1 and let  vary between zero and :1. It seems reasonable to
assume that both  and  are small so that the presence of a dealer or a fraudulent seller
is considered a rare event. The assumption that  is less than  is a necessary condition
for inequality (9) to hold.16 Further, I make the following functional form assumption
that ! ( fIg)  !   fIg : Under this functional form, it follows that:
!0 = !  (1  )0
1  20
and
! (0) = !  0:
Throughout this section, ! and 0 are varied between zero and one.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the values of 0 and ! giving rise to each class of subgame
equilibrium, keeping  constant. The area above curve A represents the f0; !g combi-
nations for which inequality (9) holds. The area below curve B represents the f0; !g
combinations for which inequality (14) holds. Thus f0; !g combinations between
curves A and B can give rise to an ISBE or a Non-ISBE depending upon the beliefs held
by collectors over  and . These beliefs then govern whether the starting price cho-
sen by uninformed sellers and mimicked by fraudulent sellers is a solution to problem
(8) (giving rise to an ISBE) or a solution to problem (13) (giving rise to a Non-ISBE).
Interestingly, along all points between curves A and B, collectors' surplus (integrating
across all collector types) as well as total surplus is higher in the Non-ISBE than the
ISBE while the uninformed seller's surplus is higher in the ISBE.
15It is assumed that  = 1 even when S = 1:
16The second-order condition, by which the interior solution to problem (8) is optimal requires  to be
sufciently small.
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Figure 3.1: Equilibrium characterization in f0; !g space.
The area above curve C reects combinations of f0; !g for which S0 = 1. The area
above curve D, not inclusive of the curve itself, reects f0; !g combinations such that
S 0 > 1. Thus for all points above and inclusive of curve C, the beliefs of collectors are
in a sense dictated by S. If S = 1; collectors may believe that  > 0, thus giving rise to
a ISBE in which S0 = 1. Not surprisingly, for all points between curves C and D, and
for any  > 0, the uninformed seller's surplus is higher in an ISBE in which S0 = 1 than
in a NSBE in which S 0 = 1. Moving further to the northeast beyond curve D, eventually
the uninformed seller's surplus is higher upon choosing S > 1 and having buyers bid in
accordance with the NSBE than in choosing S = 1 and having them bid in accordance
with the ISBE. The reason for this is that at lower levels of 0, observing a bid in stage 1
is very informative to collectors. However, at higher values of 0, collectors' valuations
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are high enough that observing a bid in stage 1 has little effect. The uninformed seller
prefers to exploit the high valuations of collectors by setting a starting price in excess of
1 rather than setting a starting price no greater than 1 and have to rely on the presense
of dealers to convince collector's to raise their bids.
The equilibrium starting price path for a given path is described in reference to Fig-
ure 3.1 as follows: For points near the axis, the equilibrium starting price solves problem
(13). Moving to the northeast while staying below curve A, S is increasing in 0 and
! so the equilibrium starting price is increasing. For all points between curves A and
B, S0 > S. Therefore, the optimal starting price will have a jump point once the value
in 0 and also in ! is reached such that the equilibrium switches from a Non-ISBE to
an ISBE. Moving further in the northeast direction to points between curves B and D,
the optimal starting price is increasing as S0 is increasing in both 0 and !. The opti-
mal starting price will again reach a jump point beyond curve D when the equilibrium
switches from an ISBE in which S0 = 1 to a NSBE in which S 0 > 1. This last point
requires that  > 0 in the ISBE in which S0 = 1; otherwise, the jump point disappears.
The effect of a change in  on the equilibrium characterization can also be seen in
reference to Figure 3.1. As  increases, both curves A and B rotate upward from their
common pivot point along the ! = 1 line. Likewise, curves C and D rotate upward
from their common pivot point along the ! = 1 line. In doing so, this the set of f0; !g
combinations giving rise to an ISBE and NSBE shrink and the set of combinations
giving rise to a Non-ISBE increases. The opposite is true as  decreases; however, the
fact that the axis of rotation (along the horizontal dotted line at ! = 1) does not move
indicates that there is a threshold value of 0 such that an ISBE is precluded for any 0
below the threshold.17 Likewise, there is a threshhold value of 0, as shown by the pivot
point of D along the ! = 1 line, below which a starting price strictly exceeding 1 is
precluded. On the other hand, for  =  the entire range of f0; !g values gives rise to
17This is true given the functional form assumption on ! (), but needn't be true in general.
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a Non-ISBE as do values of  > , while the ISBE is precluded for all   .
Further, as  increases, so do the set of f0; !g points in which  < 1. For a
given , inequality (12) fails to hold only at points nearest the axes. As  increases
and curve B rotates upward, the f0; !g combinations for which inequality (12) fails to
hold expand outward. However, for the parameterizations considered, inequality (12)
still holds for all f0; !g combinations above curve A for all values of .
Consider now the total surplus within the ISBE and Non-ISBE, respectively. Total
surplus in both types of equilibria behaves similarly across changes in 0, !, and  in
that it is:
 increasing in 0;
 decreasing in ! at low values of !, then increasing at higher values; and
 decreasing in .
The increase in surplus due to an increase in 0 results from the simple fact that the
object for sale is more likely to be genuine. The ambiguity of surplus with respect to
! is due to the effect of ! on the choice of starting prices S0 and S, respectively. An
increase in ! leaves an uninformative seller with higher surplus should the auction fail
to result in a sale. At the same time, it causes the equilibrium starting price to increase,
which reduces the probability of a sale to a buyer with a potentially higher valuation.
Thus, it is not obvious whether an increase in ! should lead to an increase or decrease
in total surplus. With respect to , an increase in its value means that the seller is more
likely to be fraudulent and hence the item is more likely to be a fake.
It is interesting to note that of all the f0; !; g combinations giving rise to both the
ISBE and the Non-ISBE, the Non-ISBE results in greater surplus than the ISBE. This
gives rise to a counter-intuitive result that while surplus in either equilibrium decreases
with an increase in , an increase in  can still increase surplus. To see this, recall that
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as  increases, curves A and B rotate upward. Thus, the set of f0; !g combinations
giving rise to an ISBE shrinks while the set giving rise to a Non-ISBE gets larger. Thus
for values of f0; !g along curve A, an increase in  results in players switching from
an ISBE to a Non-ISBE. It can be shown that for a sufciently small increase in , the
resulting Non-ISBE yields greater surplus than the ISBE that would have been played
at the smaller value of .
6 Conclusion
This paper was motivated by the desire to understand from a game-theoretic standpoint,
the economic conditions and behavior giving rise to the type of fraud illustrated by the
Diebenkorn example. A central achievement of this paper has been to show that such
fraud can be perpetrated upon rational buyers behaving in accordance with equilibrium
strategies. This is the upshot of Proposition 1 in establishing the informational shill
bidding equilibrium (ISBE). In doing so, the characteristics of the marketplace and of the
auction mechanism itself that allow for such an equilibrium to persist were illustrated.
Firstly, the proportion of fraudulent sellers (those entering the market with the purpose
of defrauding buyers) must make up a sufciently small proportion of total sellers. If
the proportion of fraudulent sellers is too high, uninformed buyers will fail to be swayed
by the bidding of others and the fraud cannot be carried out. Further, when bidding
by other players serves as a positive indication of the item's quality, uninformed sellers
(those with honest intentions but imperfect information) must set a starting price high
enough that paying the starting price in an auction that did not involve a competing bid
is less attractive than paying a higher price in an auction that did. When this condition
holds, a certain set of uninformed buyers will enter the bidding upon observing a bid
from a competing buyer. At the same time, the starting price cannot be so high as to
screen out the bids of informed buyers.
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In order to characterize all equilibria of the game, I sought to establish an equilib-
rium when uninformed buyers are not inuenced by the bidding of others. I therefore
established a non-informational shilling bidding equilibrium (Non-ISBE), in which the
proportion of fraudulent sellers is sufciently high that upon observing a bid from an-
other buyer, uninformed buyers are not compelled to increase their previous bid. Know-
ing that they can't very well lower their bid upon observing a bid from an opposing
buyer, uninformed buyers bid only once but take this information into account in deter-
mining the optimal bid amount. I also established a no shill bidding equilibrium (NSBE)
in which the uninformed seller nds it protable to screen out all informed buyers by
announcing a starting price above what such buyers would be willing to pay. The three
classes of equilibria are shown to be comprehensive of all equilibria of the game.
In examining the parameterizations giving rise to the three classes of equillibria, it
is evident that for the range of parameter values considered, the Non-ISBE is essentially
the counter to the ISBE. While the ISBE requires high initial values amongst unin-
formed sellers and uninformed buyers, the Non-ISBE requires low values. The NSBE
requires initial values that are higher still than those giving rise to an ISBE. The restric-
tion on initial valuations giving rise to the ISBE becomes more strict as the proportion
of fraudulent sellers in the market increases. There is however, a small sub-set of the
parameter space giving rise to both the ISBE and Non-ISBE. Holding constant all pa-
rameters within this space, the Non-ISBE always results in higher total surplus than the
ISBE. Thus, an increase in the proportion of fraudulent sellers may actually serve to
increase total surplus if it causes players to switch from the ISBE to the Non-ISBE. This
result asserts an additional level of complication to be considered by a mechanism de-
signer in designing the auction and enacting policies for the detection and prosecution
of fraud. That is to say, it is not enough to consider what changes in certain parameters
may affect the efciency of the mechanism across a given equilibrium characterization
as changes in parameters may give rise to entirely new equilibria. The consideration of
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this mechanism design question is left for future work.
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APPENDIX
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The proof of both parts follows from standard auction-theoretic arguments where a
buyer knows his valuation but not the valuation of others. I formalize the rst part of the
lemma, then extend the result to the second. In doing so, consider a collector who nds
himself at information set I following the stage 1 bidding in which the standing price is
S1. His valuation upon obtaining the item following stage 2 is v (x; I). Note that since
all the information that can be gleaned from other participants would have been revealed
in stage 1, the buyers unconditional expected value and his expected value, conditional
upon obtaining the item are equal. If if his stage 1 bid exceeds v (x; I), then any further
bids in stage 2 can only increase the probability of his winning the auction and receiving
negative surplus. Thus, he is better off not bidding in stage 2. Now suppose his stage 1
bid was less than v (x; I). Further, let Y denote the maximum of S1 and the highest bid
of all opposing bidders in stage 2 and let V denote his expected surplus if his stage 2
bid does not transmit. Clearly, V is positive if the bidder in question is the high bidder
following stage 1, zero otherwise, and is independent of his stage 2 bid. Bidding some
amount B in stage 2, if transmitted, has him obtain the item at Y if Y  B and lose out
if Y > B. He then chooses B to solve:
max
BS1
(1  )
Z B
S1
(v (x; I)  Y ) dY + V:
This equation is solved by B = v (x; I) if v (x; I)  S1.
The second part of the lemma is proven trivially by substituting QH for v (x; I) :
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A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
In light of Lemma 1, there are three classes of collectors' strategies to consider: bid
v (x; I0) in stage 1; bid some amount b; less than v (x; I0) ; in stage 1 and bid v (x; I) in
stage 2 if b < v (x; I), for any information set I reached following stage 1; and do not
bid in stage 1 and bid v (x; I) in stage 2, for any I reached following stage 1.
Working backward, I begin by considering the payoff to bidding v (x; I0)  assumed
greater than   in stage 2, conditional upon I0 being reached in stage 1. If his bid is
transmitted, he obtains the item and pays QH (normalized to unity) if the dealer's bid
transmits,  if it does not; if his bid is not transmitted, he receives nothing. The expected
payoff is expressed as a function of T , a random variable, equal to 1 if his opponent's
stage 2 bid transmits, 0 otherwise. His expected payoff is then:
C (0; x; ; ) = (1  )P I0	 I0	 (1 + x)  P fT = 0g    P fT = 1g
Within the notation C (0; x; ; ) ; the rst term reects that he bids zero in stage 1
and optimally in what follows. The second term is his preference parameter. The third
term reects that his decision is based upon knowing that dealers and fraudulent sellers
bid  in stage 1. His payment upon winning the auction depends on whether or not
the opposing bidder's stage 2 bid is transmitted. He pays QH if it is transmitted,  if it
isn't. If the opposing bidder is a dealer, his bid is transmitted with probability . If the
opposing bidder is a shilling seller, then let  denote the probability that his stage 2 bid
is transmitting upon allowing for the seller to play a (possibly) mixed strategy in stage
2.18
Consider then the payoff to bidding v (x; I0) in stage 1. Since a bid of v (x; I0) will
be at least as great as his valuation following the stage 1 bidding, there is no circum-
18The fraudulent seller does not violate the condition that he be indetectable as a fraudulent seller by
not mimicing the dealer's stage 2 bid since not all stage 2 bids are transmitted.
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stance under which he will bid in stage 2. By bidding v (x; I0)  assumed greater than
  in stage 1, then should I0 be reached, he receives the same payoff as he would have
bidding v (x; I0) in stage 2, only his payoff is not subject to transmission error. Should
I 0 be reached, then he obtains the item and pays S. His expected payoff can be expressed
as:
C
 
v
 
x; I0

;x; ; 

= C (0; x; ; ) = (1  ) + P fI 0g  fI 0g (1 + x)QH   S :
Dene x as the value of x such that
C
 
0;x; ; 

= C
 
v
 
x; I0

;x; ; 

:
If such a point exists, then the fact that
@C (v (x; I0) ; x; ; )
@x
>
@C (0; x; ; )
@x
implies that any collector such that x > x strictly prefers to bid v (x; I0) in stage 1.
Under Condition 1, all collector types prefer to obtain the item in information set I0 than
in I 0. Notice that in order for the indifference condition to hold, it must be the case that
 fI 0g (1 + x)QH   S < 0
for values of x  x; otherwise all collector types prefer to bid v  QH ; I0 in stage 1. It
follows from Condition 1 that:
x 2
 
x
 
QH ; I0

; x (S; I 0)

:
Thus, for any collector such that x < x , it is not protable to bid in stage 2 upon nding
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himself in I 0 following stage 1.
It remains to show that no bidding strategy that has a collector bid in both stages
yields as high a surplus asC (v (x; I0) ; ; ). Consider this in two parts. First, consider
a strategy of bidding some amount b >  in stage 1 and optimally in stage 2. Bidding b
instead of v (x; I0) in stage 1, has no effect on the buyer's payoff should I 0 be reached;
but if I0 is reached, bidding b affects his payoff by causing him to win the auction with
a lower probability. For any collector such that x > x
 
QH ; I0

, this yields a lower
expected payoff. Next, consider the possible strategy of bidding b <  in stage 1. As
compared to a bid of v (x; I0), such a bid has no effect on the collector's payoff should
I 0 be realized. If I0 is realized, such a strategy introduces the possibility that he lose out
on a protable trade if his stage 2 bid is not transmitted. As compared to not bidding at
all in stage 1, bidding b <  gives the collector the same payoff should I0 be reached,
but gives him negative surplus should I 0 be reached, where as not bidding at all would
have given him zero surplus. Thus, no collector will ever bid b < .
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
The proof begins by showing that conditional on bidding some amount  in stage 1, the
only value of  that can be part of an ISBE is QH . When collector's bid according to
b0 , the magnitude of the dealer's bid has no effect on the collector's stage 2 action: if
x < x , then any bid in

S;QH

will result in a standing price of S following stage 1,
so no deviation will be detected; if x  x , then any deviation from  will be detected
by the collector following stage 1, but it will be too late for him to change his bidding
in response. Since collectors do not respond to the dealer's bid, the standard arguments
regarding second price auctions support QH as the only equilibrium candidate.
Given the previous result, let x  xQH and b0  b0QH . To show the conditions under
which a dealer would bid in stage 1, compare the dealer's expected surplus from bidding
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QH in stage 1 when collectors bid according to b0, D
 
QH ; b0

; to his expected surplus
from bidding QH in stage 2, D (0; b0). It follows that,
D
 
QH ; b0

= (1  S) P x < x  QH ; I0	+ P x 2 x  QH ; I0 ; x	 :
This expression follows from the fact that the dealer only obtains the item when the
collector does not bid, in which case he pays S. The collector does not bid if either
x < x
 
QH ; I0

or if x 2 x  QH ; I0 ; x and his stage 2 bid fails to transmit.
In considering waiting for stage 2 to bid, the dealer gains an informational advantage.
By not bidding in stage 1, the dealer puts a collector with x 2 x  QH ; I0 ; x into
information set I 0, causing him not to bid in stage 2 when he otherwise would have. He
also puts himself at a risk of not having his own bid transmitted at all. Formally, his
payoff from implementing this deviation strategy is,
D
 
0; b0

= (1  S)P fx < xg (1  ) :
The dealer has no incentive to deviate if D (Q; b0)  D (0; b0) ; or equivalently:
(2  1)x + (1  ) x  QH ; I0  0: (16)
The existence of an  follows from the intermediate value theorem. For  = 0, expres-
sion (16) reduces to
 x (S; I 0) + x  QH ; I0  0;
which fails to hold under Condition 1. For  = 1=2, the left-hand side of expression
(16) reduces to
1
2
x
 
QH ; I0
  0
which is true by construction.
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 1
The rst part of the proof extends the derivation of b0 to the case in which  = QH and
dealers bid in stage 1 with probability , which may be less than unity. When dealers
and fraudulent sellers bid QH in stage 1 with probabilities  2 [0; 1] and 1 respectively,
then by not bidding in stage 1 and bidding only in stage 2 if I0 is reached, a collector
earns:
C (0; x; ; 1) = (1  )P I0; 	 I0	 (1 + x)  1 :
Bidding his valuation in stage 1, a collector earns:
C
 
v
 
x; I0

;x; ; 1

= C (0; x; ; 1) = (1  )
+P fI 0; g  fI 0g (1 + x)QH    (1 )S :
Indifference between these two actions gives rise to the derivation of x () in equation
(7) :It is straightforward to show that:
@C (v (x; I0) ; x; ; 1)
@x
>
@C (0; x; ; 1)
@x
:
Therefore, any collector such that x > x () strictly prefers to bid v (x; I0) in stage 1
to not bidding in stage 1, then bidding only in stage 2. The rest of the proof of Lemma
2 proceeds as before.
In characterizing the best response of dealers, the proof of the result of Lemma 3 that
upon bidding in stage 1, dealers bid QH is unaffected by allowing collectors' strategy
to incorporate  < 1. The decision of whether to bid in stage 1 is straightforward. For
any  that collectors imput into their beliefs, which are common knowledge, a dealer
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bids in stage 1 if:
x
 
QH ; I0; 

+ 

x ()  x  QH ; I0;   (1  )x () : (17)
Since collectors' beliefs must be correct ex-post, if the inequality in (17) is strict, then
 = 1 is in equilibrium. Lastly, if (17) holds with equality at some , then that value
of  is in equilibrium as an indifferent dealer with bid in stage 1 with any probability
[0; 1]. The equilibrium thus requires them to bid with probability .
It remains to formalize the strategies of the sellers and to establish that Condition 1 is
met at the uninformed seller's optimal starting price. Consider rst the decision faced by
the fraudulent seller. When constrained to choose actions that will not have him revealed
as a fraudulent seller, he must choose a starting price of S since he is unable to mimic
the starting price of an informed seller of a genuine item. When considering his stage 1
action, the choice is between a bid of QH and not bidding at all since any bid other than
QH would have him revealed as a fraudulent seller. In choosing the prescribed strategy,
his payoff is:
RI
 
QH ; b0; ; 1

= (1  x) + (1  ) x   x  QH ; I0 :
By not shill bidding, his payoff is:
RI
 
0; b0; ; 1

= S (1  x) :
It is sufcient that S  1 to establish that there is no incentive to deviate from the
proposed equilibrium strategy of bidding QH in stage 1.
Now consider the uninformed seller's choice of starting price. When collectors bid
according to b0, dealers bid QH in stage 1 with probability  and fraudulent sellers
bid QH in stage 1 with probability one, from the perspective of the uninformed seller,
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information set I0 is reached with probability 0. It is then clear that problem (8)
characterizes the uninformed seller's problem. To prove the last part of the Proposition
requires that the solution to problem (8) be characterized.
Let RU  RU (S;!; b0; ; 1) denote the uninformed seller's surplus from a starting
price of S, given: valuation given by !, collector's bidding according to b0, dealers bid-
ding in stage 1 with probability  and fraudulent sellers bidding in stage 1 with probabil-
ity one. The solution to the uninformed seller's problem depends on whether RU 00 < 0,
or equivalently, whether the following holds:
0 <
1
1 + 
: (18)
Since this condition is independent of S, it follows that either RU 00 < 0 or RU 00  0 in
all S. The following lemma characterizes the set of possible optima, depending upon
whether equation (18) holds. In doing so, it is necessary to rst x some notation. Let
S0 denote the value of S such that c + S0 = 0 and S1 denote the value of S such that
c + S1 = 1: It follows that SL = max fS0; 0g and SU = min fS1; 1g represent the
lower and upper bounds respectively of the range over which RU 0 and RU 00 are dened.
Lemma 5 The solution to the uninformed seller's problem, S0, can be characterized as
follows:
1. If RU 00 < 0; then there exists a pair (!L; !H) such that:
 If !0  !L, then S0 = SL;
 If !0  !H , then S0 = 1;
 Otherwise, there exists a unique S0 such that RU 0 (S0) = 0;
2. If RU 00  0; then S0 = SL only if SL > !0; if SL  !0 S0 = 1.
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The intuition for this result is as follows: The second-derivative of the seller's rev-
enue function concerns the relative likelihood of information set I0 being reached. When
I0 is relatively unlikely to be reached, as in when equation (18) holds, the optimal start-
ing price focuses on the bidding of collectors, trading off, from a marginal increase in
starting price, a higher sale price against a decrease in participation. Depending upon the
specic parameter values, this could result in a solution in either of the corners f0; 1g,
or an interior solution.
When I0 is sufciently likely to be reached, the seller can guarantee herself QH in
information set I0 by either setting the starting price to QH or by inducing all collectors
to bid with a starting that sets x to zero. The difference between the two strategies is
the payoff he would get in information set I 0. Under the former strategy, no sale takes
place in I 0 and he gets !0; in the latter, he gets a sale at a price of SL. Part 2 of the lemma
expresses this trade-off.
The optimal starting price, when interior, satises the following:
S0 =
(1  0) (!0 + S1)  0 [ (1 + S0)  (1  ) x=]
2 [1  (1 + ) 0]
; (19)
where x  x  QH ; I0;  :
It remains to show that x
 
QH ; I0

< x (S0; I 0). If inequality (18) holds, then by the
fact that S0 is continuous and increasing in !0 for all SL, the result is established using
the intermediate value theorem. It is straightforward to show that !H  1. Therefore,
if !0 = 1, then S0 = 1, in which case, x
 
QH ; I0; 

< x
 
QH ; I 0; 

: It follows from
the intermediate value theorem that !0 2 [0; 1] : If inequality (18) does not hold, then
!0 = SL by Lemma 5.
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A.5 Proof of Lemma 4
Begin by considering the collector's strategy. By playing the prescribed strategy, he
earns:
C (b;x; ; ) =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
P fI0; ; g [v (I0;x; ; )  1]
+ [1  P fI0; ; g] [v (I 0;x; ; )  S]
if x  x  QH ; 
[1  P fI0; ; g] [v (I 0;x; ; )  S] if x (S; )  x
< x
 
QH ; 
0 otherwise
It should be evident that no collector type can protably deviate to the strategy employed
by any of the other collector types when the following holds:
x
 
QH ; I0; 1; 
  x (S; I 0; 1; ) : (20)
Therefore, consider strategies that have the collector bid in stage 2 with positive proba-
bility. Consider then a strategy that has the collector bid in stage 1, then bid optimally
in stage 2 given the information revealed in stage 1. If the collector bids in accordance
with b, under no circumstances will he wish to bid again in stage 2. Thus, the collector
would have to bid less than the amount prescribed by b in order for it to be protable
to bid in stage 2.
Consider rst a collector for whom x  x  QH ; I0; 1; . By bidding less than
v (x; I0; 1; ) in stage 1, then upon observing a bid in stage 1, the best he can do is to
bid above QH in stage 2. But since his stage 2 bid will fail to transmit with positive
probability, he would have been better off bidding v (x; I0; 1; ) in stage 1. Upon failing
to observe a bid in stage 1, it does not matter what he had bid in stage 1 so long as it was
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at least S. Thus, he is weakly better off having bid in accordance with b.
Now consider a collector for whom x 2 x (S; I 0; 1; ) ; x  QH ; I0; 1; . By bid-
ding less than S, then upon failing to observe a bid in stage 1, the best he can do is
bid an amount above S. But since his bid will fail to transmit with positive probability,
he would have been better off bidding some amount at least S but less than QH . Upon
observing a bid in stage 1, it does not matter what his stage 1 bid was so long as it was
less than QH .
A.6 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof proceeds by taking the behavior described in the proposition as given, then
showing that none of the players have an incentive to deviate from the proposed strate-
gies.
Having established the bidding of collectors in Lemma 4, consider the dealer's strat-
egy. By playing the prescribed strategy, he earns:
D
 
QH

= (1  S)  x (S; I 0; 1; ) +  x  QH ; I0; 1;   x (S; I 0; 1; ) :
By deviating to not bidding in stage 1 and bidding QH in stage 2, his payoffs are iden-
tical, conditional on having his bid transmitted. However, given the probability that his
stage 2 bid will fail to transmit, he is strictly better off bidding QH in stage 1. Now
suppose he deviates by bidding some amount less than QH in stage 1. Since any bid is
indistinguishable from a bid of QH to a collector who bid S, this deviation will have no
effect on his payoff. Such a bid may have an effect on the beliefs of a buyer who had
bid in excess of QH as the second highest bid becomes observable to all participants.
However, this bidder would have already bid more than the dealer's valuation ofQH and
it has been assumed that bids cannot be retracted. Thus, such a deviation will have no
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effect on his payoff. Lastly, bidding above QH in either period is weakly dominated by
a bid of QH .
Consider now the fraudulent seller's shill bidding decision. By shilling with some
probability 0 when fraudulent sellers are thought to shill with probability , he earns:
RI (0; b; 1; ) = 0

1  x  QH ; I0; 1; + (1  0)S [1  x (S; I 0; 1; )] :
Any deviation that would have the fraudulent seller bid any amount other QH in stage
1 would have him potentially detected as a fraudulent seller. It has been assumed that
the punishment from being detected is sufciently severe as to make such a deviation
unprotable. Thus, it is sufcient to consider deviations that have the fraudulent seller
shill with some probability 0 6= :
Maximizing RI
 
0; x
 
QH ; I0; 1; 

; 1; 

with respect to 0, the fraudulent seller
will choose 0 as follows:
0 =
8>>>><>>>>:
1 if 1  x  QH ; I0; 1;  > S [1  x (S; I 0; 1; )]
0 if 1  x  QH ; I0; 1;  < S [1  x (S; I 0; 1; )]
any  2 [0; 1] if 1  x  QH ; I0; 1;  = S [1  x (S; I 0; 1; )]
:
Thus, if  2 (0; 1), there is no incentive to deviate if
1  x  QH ; I0; 1;  = S [1  x (S; I 0; 1; )] :
If  = 1, there is no incentive to deviate if
1  x  QH ; I0; 1; 1  S [1  x (S; I 0; 1; 1)] :
However, if  = 0, there is an incentive to deviate, except in a special case. Since
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 fI0; 1; 0g = 1, it follows that x  QH ; I0; 1; 0 = 0, which implies
1  x  QH ; I0; 1; 0  S [1  x (S; I 0; 1; 0)]
where the inequality is strict if x (S; I 0; 1; 0) > 0:
Given the strategies played by the aforementioned players, the uninformed seller
sets the price to solve the objective function specied in the proposition. It remains to
show that there exists a solution, S, such that equation (20) holds. In characterizing
the solution to problem (13) let SL = min fSjx (S; I 0; 1; ) = 0g. It follows that SL =
 fI 0; ; g. It is evident that inequality (14) is satises for S = SL. Thus, it remains
to show that SL is reached under certain parameterizations. There are two cases to
consider, depending upon whether  = 1 or  < 1 at S.
First consider the case in which  = 1 at S. If the solution to problem (13) is
interior, then S satises:
0x
 
QH ; + (1  0) ([1  x (S; )]  (S   !0) (dx (S; ) =dS)) = 0: (21)
When  = 1 at S, then dx (S; ) =dS is constant in S and . It is evident from (21),
that S  !0 and that S is increasing in !0. Dene S = maxSjx  QH ;  = x (S; )	.
It is straightforward to show that at !0 = 0, S < S. By the intermediate value theorem,
there must exist some ! such that if !0 = !, then S = S.
Next, consider the case in which  < 1. In this case, the interior optimum is
as before, only now dx (S; ) =dS > 0. Therefore, it can be shown that the interior
uptimum under  < 1 is no greater than the interior optimum under  = 1, all else
equal. This is sufcient to prove the existence of !.
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A.7 Proof of Proposition 3
By extending the arguments from Lemma 1, it is straightforward that for a dealer to
bid at all in weakly dominated by a strategy of not bidding at all. When dealers do
not bid, any bid by a fraudulent seller will have him be detected as such and as such,
cannot be part of an equilibrium. Consider then a collector's decision. Upon observing
a starting price of at least QH , he correctly concludes that neither dealers nor fraudulent
sellers will be in stage 1 (or any stage for that matter). Since he faces no competition
from competing bidders, any strategy that has him bid in stage 2 is weakly dominated
by any strategy that has him bid the stage 2 amount in stage 1 due to the probability
of transmission failure. When neither dealers nor fraudulent sellers bid, the collector's
beliefs conditional upon obtaining the item can be calculated from equation (11) by
setting  =  = 0, which yields beliefs of  fI1g. Standard arguments from Lemma 1
indicate the it is weakly dominant for a collector to bid his valuation (conditional upon
obtaining the item) in stage 1, which is equal to v (x; I1). v (x; I1) is greater than S if
and only if x  x (S; I1) :
Given a collector's best response, the uninformed seller chooses S 0 to solve (15).
The interior optimum satises:
S 0 =  fI1g+ ! (0) =2;
so that S 0 > 1 if and only if
 fI1g+ ! (0) =2 > 1:
174
A.8 Proof of Proposition 4
The proof proceeds to show that there does not exist a set of beliefs upon observing a
bid in stage 1 when dealers are thought to bid only in stage 2 that rationalize such an
equilibrium. In such an equilibrium, fraudulent sellers must bid in stage 2 if at all. By
way of contradiction, suppose that there was an equilibrium in which dealers only bid in
stage 2 but fraudulent sellers bid in stage 1. Upon observing a bid in stage 1, a collector
would infer that the bid was placed by a fraudulent seller and the auction would be
terminated immediately.
When dealers bid in stage 2 and fraudulent sellers bid with probability 2 2 [0; 1],
collectors bid in accordance with b. Since both dealers and fraudulent sellers are subject
to the same risk of transmission failure in stage 2, collectors' beliefs will remain those
specied by (10) and (11).
Let  fI2g denote a collector's beliefs upon observing an out-of-equilibrium bid in
stage 1. If  fI2g >  fI1g, then collectors will increment their assessment of the
item. In that case there exist collector types whose preference parameter falls within
x
 
QH ; I2; 

; x
 
QH ; I0;  that nd it protable to increment their bid of S in stage
1 to a bid of QH . Given a non-zero probability that such a bid will transmit, such
a deviation will raise the fraudulent seller's expected revenue, while eliminating the
probability that his own stage 2 bid will fail to transmit. Alternatively, if  fI2g 
 fI1g, collectors will lower their assessment of the item upon observing a bid in stage 1.
Unable to reduce the bids they have already placed, there will be no change in collectors'
bids. Consequently, a dealer could deviate by placing a bid in stage 1 that will have no
effect on the auction's outcome other than eliminate the possibility that his bid will fail
to transmit. Either way, there is an incentive for either a dealer or a fraudulent seller to
deviate.
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A.9 Proof of Proposition 5
The proof serves to demonstrate that the ISBE, Non-ISBE and NSBE subgames are
comprehensive of all subgames following from the uninformed seller's announcement
of S. Suppose S  1 and let  denote the behavioral strategy played by a dealer. Lemma
3 demonstrated that if  is a pure strategy, then the equilibrum has him bid QH in stage
1 with probability . Now suppose that  denotes a purely mixed strategy in which g ()
denotes the density of stage 1 bids over the support [0; 1], with cdf G (). Bids below S
are not actually placed, thus  provides for the possibility that a dealer bids any amount
and for the possibility that he bids nothing at all.
Consider the beliefs of collectors following stage 1. If no bids by opposing buyers
are observed, then the collector's beliefs are given by (5) and (6) where  = 1 G (S)
and for some arbitrary . If a bid by an opposing buyer is observed, then the observed
bid is consistent with  unless the collector is the high bidder following stage 1 and
the standing price following stage 1 is not equal to a value in the support of g. Since
any bid that a dealer would place in the support of g would lead a collector to infer that
behavioral strategy  was being played, there is no reason for the dealer to not simply
bid QH . This establishes the result of Lemma 3 more generally and establishes that the
only degree of freedom in the dealer's strategy is over .
Given the result of the previous paragraph, a fraudulent seller, upon bidding in stage
1, bids only QH . Thus  and  are sufcient to characterize the strategies played by
dealers and fraudulent sellers, respectively. Given  and  and S; it is obvious that
either, x
 
QH ; I0; ; 

< x (S; I 0; ; ) or x
 
QH ; I0; ; 
  x (S; I 0; ; ) is true. If
the former, then the derivation of b0 has been sufciently general that it is a best response
to any ,  and S if x
 
QH ; I0; ; 

< x (S; I 0; ; ). However, when collectors bid
according to b0, only  = 1 is in equilibrium. Thus, buyers' beliefs in calculating
x
 
QH ; I0;  and x (S; I 0; ) such that x  QH ; I0;  < x (S; I 0; ) must have  = 1.
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Further, for any  2 [0; 1], when buyers bid according to b0, the uninformed seller's
starting price must solve problem (8). Lastly, given b0,  and S, the derivation of  must
be that given by Proposition 1.
If instead, collectors' beliefs are such that x
 
QH ; I0; ; 
  x (S; I 0; ; ). Again,
the derivation of b has been sufciently general so as to not depend on specic values
of  or . As long as x
 
QH ; I0; ; 
  x (S; I 0; ; ) is true for the  and  assumed
by collectors, no collectors will bid in stage 2 in response to the stage 1 bidding. Given
that, collectors bid only in stage 1. When collectors bid only in stage 1, only  = 1
is in equilibrium. Thus, buyers' beliefs in calculating x
 
QH ; I0;  and x (S; I 0; ) such
that x
 
QH ; I0;   x (S; I 0; ) must have  = 1. Further, for any  2 [0; 1], when
buyers bid according to b, the uninformed seller's starting price must solve problem
(13). Lastly, given b;  and S; the derivation of  must be that given by Proposition
2. This result, combined with the result of the previous paragraph, establishes that the
subgame following some S  1 must be consistent with either the ISBE or Non-ISBE.
Consider then a starting price of S > 1. The proof of Proposition 3 is sufcient for
establishing that the subgame following S must be consistent with the NSBE.
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